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...but it is very striking that there isn't just one way of modeling the world, there are often two ways
of modeling the same phenomenon and depending of what kind of mind you have you may find one




The aim and the structure of this work are twofold: a general analysis of the current status of the
evolutionary research  programme will  serve  as  a  general  framework for  an  inquiry in  specific
aspects of a much debated field-study: the evolution of language. This case-study will do as a sort
of testing arena to put at work the explanatory tools of the evolutionary research programme, in
order to show what conceptual framework can better deal with the unsolved issues associated to the
chosen case-study. Hence this work will be characterized by a continuous interplay between specific
issues  pertaining  to  the  level  of  evolutionary  biology  (evolutionary  processes  at  work,
morphological,  behavioral  and  cognitive  adaptations)  and  theoretical  analysis  pertaining  to  the
meta-level  of  philosophy  of  science  (like  conceptual  and  terminological  analysis,  causation
mechanisms in play, research programmes' evolution).
In the Preface we try to delimit the scope of this work, as the chosen case-study is characterized by
a strong interdisciplinarity. In the Introduction we provide an essential historical reconstruction of
the language evolution debate,  starting from Darwin and Wallace's  times,  identifying some key
concepts that will serve to navigate the contemporary debate. We then move forward identifying the
common structure of some language evolution hypotheses that have been proposed across the years
and highlight some limitations. We also discuss the necessity of providing a proper definition of the
language faculty in order to display the evolutionary inquiry accordingly; we take into account the
FLB – FLN distinction and highlight some limitations as well. In particular we show the difficulty
by  the  Standard  Evolutionary  Theory  (SET)  conceptual  framework  in  integrating  the  cultural
dimension in language evolutionary explanations. We then stress the importance and the necessity
of operating such an integration and we argue that  the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis  (EES)
conceptual framework provides an explanatory toolkit that is better equipped to solve such a task.
We then  present  an  abstract  model  (the  assimilate-stretch  principle)  that  is  able  to  provide  in
principle this integration, exploiting some of the key concepts of the EES conceptual framework.
We then show that a co-evolutionary model between language and cumulative culture might be a
promising  path  to  integrate  biological  and  cultural  evolutionary  processes,  trying  to  rely  our
argument on results from co-evolutionary comparative studies (the cultural drive hypothesis).
The three central chapters of this work consist of independent papers that were written at different
stages. Each one of them deepens a specific aspect but all three of them share the common intent to
show how the EES conceptual framework can be properly put at use.
The first  chapter  is  dedicated  to  an  exploration of  the  Self-domestication hypothesis  in  human
evolution through the analysis of a selection of critical examples concerning genus Homo evolution,
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relevant  for  the evolution  of  language,  such as  the evolution of  hominin life-history traits,  the
enlargement of the social group, increased cooperation among individuals, behavioral change and
innovations (the use of fire), heterochronic modifications leading to increased synaptic plasticity. It
is argued that a relaxation of selective pressures caused by niche construction activity might have
played a role both in human and language evolution.
In the second chapter, the selected critical examples presented in chapter one are explicitly analyzed
through the lenses of the EES conceptual framework. The evolution of language is treated as an
open problem in the evolutionary research programme and it  is  shown how four factors (niche
construction,  inclusive inheritance,  phenotypic plasticity,  developmental  bias)  and two concepts
(reciprocal  causation,  constructive  development)  can  be  usefully  exploited  to  gain  a  better
understanding of human and language evolution.
The third chapter explores a specific theoretical issue linked to the EES debate, that is the need to
revisit  the  distinction  between  proximate  and  ultimate  causes  of  evolution.  In  fact,  cultural
transmission, operating at an intermediate level between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic one,
can  be  assumed to  be  both  a  proximate  and an  ultimate  mechanism,  with  associated  different
predictions. We argue that assuming one or the other position leads to two different perspectives of
how biological and cultural evolution interact. We argue in favor of an integrative perspective, that
is  acknowledging  culture  as  an  ultimate  cause,  in  agreement  with  an  EES-inclined  conceptual
framework. We also discuss the consequences of this theoretical shift and show how this can shed
light on the evolutionary rate of language evolution (punctuationism and gradualism) debate.
In the Conclusions we advance some further proposals, two in particular: first, we treat language as
a form of teaching, specifically verbal teaching, and re-examine the hypothesis, presented in the
previous  chapters,  that  language  could  have  evolved  as  a  form  of  high-fidelity  transmission
mechanism; second, we discuss the proposal according to which language can be intended as a
major transition in evolution and in particular we propose to split this transition in two steps: the
first concerns the evolution of cumulative cultural capacities, the second the evolution of language;
these two steps could share a common evolutionary process at their bases and we suggest this could
be identified in an expanded version of the assimilate-stretch principle, which we propose in the
conclusions, discussing also possible future directions.
Finally,  we conclude that gene-culture co-evolutionary models are proving their  fruitfulness not
only to shed light on human evolution, but also on other social species, and that the EES conceptual




Research  in  language  evolution  represents  one  of  the  most  intriguing  and  at  the  same  time
challenging  field  of  study  in  science.  The  nature  of  this  research  is  strongly  and  necessarily
interdisciplinary, as it puts together elements from anthropology, archeology, linguistics, historical
linguistics,  neurobiology,  cognitive  psychology,  evolutionary  biology,  genetics,  artificial
intelligence,  game theory,  philosophy and complex systems research.  Each of these domains is
essential  for  language  evolution  inquiry,  making  it  one  of  the  “hardest  problems  in  science”
(Christiansen and Kirby, 2003).
Obviously, no single researcher can cover such a wide range of expertise, so some choices have to
be made in order to face such a complex matter. This work is primarily a work of philosophy of
biology.  Philosophy of  biology is  a  particular  branch of  philosophy of  science  and it  must  be
conceived as a philosophy of particular science, dealing mainly with 4 kinds of issues (see Pievani,
2015b):
1) the specificity of biology compared to other sciences (Mayr, 2005)
2)  what  kind of inferences characterize scientific  explanation (and evolutionary explanation)  in
biology (Pievani, 2013)
3)  conceptual  and  terminological  analysis  of  fundamental  objects  of  biological  inquiry  (gene,
species, information, evolution, etc.; see for example Stotz and Griffiths, 2011)
4) how scientific research programmes evolve in biological fields (Pievani, 2011; 2015).
It  is  a  common  tendency  in  philosophy  of  science  today  to  specialize  in  particular  scientific
subfields, in order to deal with specific problems of the discipline instead of trying to apply a rather
generalist  analysis  based  on  logical  argumentation.  Ernst  Mayr  (2005)  argued  that  a  healthy
philosophy of biology should develop in the direction of a philosophy of particular science.  The
work proposed here will develop in particular the fourth point of the list just proposed.
Scientific research activity takes place within cultural and historical spans characterized by sets of
ideas,  conceptual  tendencies  and  theoretical  assumptions  underlying  the  scientific  practice.
Evolutionary biology found its grounding conceptual framework during the first half of the XX
century with the Modern Synthesis, namely the unification of Mendelian genetics and population-
level Darwinian evolutionary theory. This incredible work was initiated by the combined effort of
eminent statistician Ronald Fisher, poliedric scientist J. B. S. Haldane and geneticist Sewall Wright,
and brought forward by other evolutionary biologists like Julian Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhanksy,
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George Gaylord Simpson, Ernst Mayr Mayr, 1982), among the other eminent scientists. The result
was a fruitful research programme able to explain adaptation and diversification of living beings.
Some assumptions were put at the core of the Modern Synthesis:
1) the pre-eminence of natural selection as the major driving and creative force in the evolutionary
process
2)  a  gene-centric  perspective,  assigning  to  genes  a  causal  primacy  over  phenotypic  variation,
regarding genetic  inheritance as  the only inheritance system. The criterion chosen to  define an
evolutionary process was change in gene frequencies across generations: selection, mutation, drift
and gene flow were regarded as evolutionary processes.
(3) evolution is always a gradual accumulation of small and randomly arisen genetic variants
(4) macroevolution can be derived from microevolution.
This set of core assumptions guaranteed the long success of evolutionary biology, intended as the
genetic theory of natural selection, for the whole XX century. However, some themes of research
were neglected, or at least they were not given a central role in the architecture of the Synthesis: in
particular development and ecology.
According  to  Mayr's  (1961)  distinction  between  proximate  and  ultimate  causes  in  biology,
development falls within the proximate mechanisms, consequently it plays no active role in the
evolutionary  process,  which  instead  is  characterized  as  a  historical  explanation  of  differential
survival of organisms and their genes. However, researches accumulated in the second half of the
XX century showed the interconnections between evolution and development (Gould, 1977) and
today this  study culminated  in  the  Evo-Devo  research  programme  (see  Moczek  et  al.,  2015).
Moreover,  the  understanding of  the  interactions  between organisms and their  environment  was
further  inquired in  the second half  of  the XX century:  studies on phenotyipic  plasticity (West-
Eberhard,  2003)  and  on  the  ecological  niche  (Odling  Smee  et  al.,  2003)  showed  a  more
interactionist  and  constructive  perspective,  overcoming  the  idea  of  a  unidirectional  causality
flowing from the selective environment to the organisms.
Today a debate is open on the need to update the evolutionary theory along these themes (Laland et
al., 2014; Laland  et al., 2015): on one side there are the defenders of the Standard Evolutionary
Theory (SET), on the other side the supporters of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES).
Laland et al. (2015) provide a comparison of the main core assumptions at the heart of these two
conceptual frameworks (see Table 1).
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Table 1. A comparison between SET and EES core assumptions (see Laland et al., 2015).
SET core assumptions EES core assumptions
Pre-eminence of natural selection Reciprocal causation
Pre-eminence of genetic inheritance Inclusive inheritance
Random genetic variation Non-random phenotypic variation
Gradualism Variable rates of change
Gene-centred perspective Organism-centred perspective
Macroevolution from microevolution Macroevolution not by microevolution alone
The  EES  approach  shows  some  fundamental  theoretical  shifts,  compared  to  the  SET  core
assumptions, that can be summarized in some keywords: niche construction, inclusive inheritance,
phenotypic plasticity, developmental bias, reciprocal causation, constructive development (Laland
et al., 2015).
According to the EES supporters, causation in biology is fundamentally reciprocal: variation in one
element modifies another element to which it is causally linked and this modification eventually
feeds back its consequences to the starting element. Niche construction (Odling Smee et al., 2003)
is a typical example of this feedback model of causation: variation in the organismal activity brings
variation in the ecological niche in which the organism operates and the modified environment
generates  novel  selective  pressures  that  modify  organism's  evolution  across  generations.  The
interaction between organisms and their environment is seen from a constructive viewpoint from
the  EES  perspective.  Genetic  inheritance  is  considered  only  one  of  the  multiple  systems  of
inheritance  that  contribute  to  phenotypic  variation  across  generations:  epigenetic  inheritance,
ecological inheritance, behavioral or cultural inheritance and parental effects are other independent
but interacting systems of inheritance; genes are not the only type of information that is transmitted
across generations from this  inclusive perspective.  Phenotypic plasticity plays a fundamental and
underestimated  role  in  evolution:  organisms  can  exploit  their  plasticity  to  flexibly  adjust  to
environmental variation without any alterations in allele frequencies across generations; if selective
pressures stay consistent  enough, genetic  fixation of the advantageous (and randomly emerged)
variants  will  eventually  follow;  this  perspective  was  labeled  genetic  assimilation  or  genes-as-
followers,  as  in  this  case  evolution  is  not  driven by mere  genetic  variation,  but  rather  genetic
variation is a result of a plastic adjustment to novel environmental conditions. Moreover, not only
organismal  activity  (niche  construction)  can  systematically  bias  selective  pressures,  but  also
developmental constraints can bias the possible solutions that natural selection can explore.
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The EES research programme relies on some core assumptions summarized in Table 1. However,
we think that some of them are more arguable than others (see Pievani, 2015a). For example, posing
the focal level of the evolutionary inquiry only on the organism (organism-centred perspective)
might miss some fundamental hierarchical interactions between levels (top-down and bottom-up
causation; see Okasha, 2011); moreover, we think the assumption that macroevolution is decoupled
from microevolutionary needs more theoretical refinement in the EES inclined researches today
present in literature.
Laland et al. (2015), beyond assessing what the core assumptions of the EES research programme
are, claim the existence of a structure and of a set of predictions. We believe that the EES implant is
still far from being organized in a coherent and consistent structure and more theoretical work is
much  needed  from  this  viewpoint.  Moreover,  according  to  an  evolutionary  epistemology
perspective in which two scientific theories compete for providing the best explanations, strictly
speaking, a research programme represents an expansion of its rival research programme only when
it is able to show that its predictions are able to explain new facts that the rival research programme
is not able to explain, relying on different and novel assumptions compared to the rival research
programme (Motterlini, 2000). The EES research programme still has to prove that it  is able to
produce a consistent set of predictions that set it apart from SET conceptual framework: the next
years  will  be  crucial  for  this  enterprise,  and this  crucial  point  will  establish  the  nature  of  the
epistemological evolution we are witnessing today in evolutionary sciences. The debate is open and
alive.
In this  work,  we will  try to show how this general debate on the epistemological status of the
evolutionary  research  programme  finds  a  testing  arena  in  a  much  debated  field  study,  full  of
unsolved  issues:  the  evolution  of  language.  In  particular,  we  will  stress  that,  according  to  the
analysis proposed here, in order to face these issues, it is indispensable for the evolutionary research
programme to make a major integration, that is incorporating the interactions between classical
biological (or genetic) evolution and cultural evolution. The evolution of language is hence treated
here as a case-study to tackle this issue: how to integrate biological and cultural evolution in an
updated evolutionary research programme. The explanation we will propose here consists of a co-
evolution between transmission mechanisms and culture during the long course of human evolution.
We will show how all the key epistemic elements of a EES are indispensable ingredients for a gene-
culture co-evolutionary explanation. We argue that this in principle represents an expansion of the
scope of the evolutionary research programme.
This  work has  been conceived in  the form of  'paper  collection'.  Each paper  was written as an
independent work; however, the three papers, each of which represents a chapter, explore a specific
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part of a larger whole. In this sense, the Introduction serves as a wide common denominator to
frame the complex topics inquired in this work. A summary of the main key points associated to the
debate on language evolution will be given in the Introduction, to allow who is not familiar with
this topic to share the crucial concepts. Among the many facets of this debate, the Introduction will
serve  also  to  take  a  specific  direction  that  will  be  developed  in  the  three  chapters  and in  the
conclusions. The latter will give some suggestions also on how the issues treated here can be further




1. A long debate: from Darwin to Chomsky
Language has always represented a thorny issue for evolutionists, since Darwin and Wallace times,
diverging in interpreting the role of natural selection in shaping human intelligence and language
capacities. The co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection Alfred Russell Wallace (1823 –
1913) argued that human intellectual faculties (the brain, consciousness and language) could not be
the product of the action of natural selection, provoking Darwin's discourage and disappointment
when the  support  of  his  colleague was  most  needed (Wallace,  1869,  1870).  Famous  Wallace's
argument was based on the observation of the so called primitive populations, possessing a brain as
big as the one possessed by the civilized white man, but with apparently alleged inferior mental
faculties. If brain size would be the product of natural selection acting on adaptive and functional
mental faculties, primitive and civilized brain sizes should significantly differ, due to the alleged
different mental capacities. As natural selection cannot foresee the future and build structures that
are not serving a specific use,  Wallace argued that the human brain,  and the associated mental
faculties, could not have evolved for the effect of natural selection, but rather some other “superior”
force should be responsible for such an accretion. According to Wallace, a qualitative difference
stands between humans and the rest of the animal reign: humans crossed a Rubicon that no other
species ever crossed.
More than a hundred years after this fundamental debate, influent linguist Noam Chomsky (1988)
still  defended  a  rather  similar discontinuist and  qualitative  viewpoint  on  language  evolution
(Parravicini and Pievani, 2016) assessing that natural selection could not explain why humans are
provided with a complex computationally powerful cognitive device which has no equals in other
animal  communication  systems:  Universal  Grammar  (UG).  In  its  early  formulations,  UG  is
conceived as an innate, biologically grounded and genetically determined faculty, which provides
the predisposition to acquire language to all members of Homo sapiens species. According to UG
supporters,  this  shared  computational  cognitive  device  leads  children to  learn  languages  within
some constraints features: the result is that languages across the world show fundamental shared
grammatical features called language universals (Croft, 1990; Hawkins, 1998).
Language universals were first identified by American linguist Joseph Greenberg (1915 – 2001)
comparing approximately thirty languages across the world. A simple example of spoken language
universals are vowels and consonants; also, all languages are provided with nouns and verbs, but it
is  less  clear  whether  all  languages  display  subjects  and  objects.  Linguists  proposed  different
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hypotheses for such alleged shared features of world languages: monogenesis (all language derive
from an ancestral language possessing these features); language contact (communication among
individuals and population brought world languages to “hybridize” and to share common features);
functional explanation (it is functional for languages to have these features, in terms of learnability,
commuincation efficiency, etc.); innateness. The latter hypothesis spread in the linguists community
as the most plausible during the so called Cognitivist  Revolution in the second half  of the XX
century, led by Noam Chomsky. In strong opposition to Skinner's Behaviorism, according to which
the child's mind at birth is a tabula rasa, an empty box (or an unfathomable black box) which gets
filled with learning stimuli  (and consequently language is acquired through trial and errors and
reinforcement), Chomsky argued that a language acquisition device pre-existed the external stimuli
through which languages are acquired after birth. The multiplicity of stimuli a child's mind has to
cope with are too many, too various and not language-specific to let the child acquire language
properties in a remarkable short amount of time (“poverty of the stimulus” argument). According to
Chomsky, the innate component allows to select the relevant stimuli and build languages within
some constraints determined by this innate, biological, cognitive toolkit, that was named Universal
Grammar.  Through the second half  of  the  XX century,  UG passed from being conceived as  a
complex interplay between mental/cognitive modules, to a single computational mechanism defined
Merge  (Minilmalist  Thesis),  embodying  the  core  recursive  properties  of  syntax  (property  of
embedding  linguistic  elements  in  one-another;  property  of  generating  hierarchical  linguistic
structures; property of discrete infinity, that is making infinite use of finite means).
Although  conceived  as  a  biologically  grounded  trait,  UG  sudden  emergence  during  human
evolution  is  not  considered  by  Chomsky  to  be  consistent  with  Darwinian  gradualism  and
evolutionary continuity.
“it seems rather pointless (…) to speculate about the evolution of human language from simpler
systems—perhaps as absurd as it would be to speculate about the “evolution” of atoms from clouds
of elementary particles” (Chomsky 1968: 61). 
Chomsky's account of language emergence was a nonfunctional one. The abstract properties of UG
did not relate to communicative or pragmatic considerations. Indeed, it has been argued that many
aspects of UG may even hinder communication (e.g.,  Chomsky, 2005),  further highlighting the
nonfunctional nature of UG. 
Chomsky stresses in particular that language should be conceptualized not as a social practice, but
rather as the output of an organ or module hard-wired in the human brain: language is in primis a
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tool for thought rather than a means of communication that could be shaped by social selection.
Influenced by the theoretical framework of the Cognitivism that intended to remark the distance
from Behaviorism, Chomskian account assigns primacy to Internal-Language (I-L) as a cognitive,
computational device and conversely assigns an almost negligible role to External-Language (E-L),
that  is  the  geographically  contingent  realization  of  the  universally  shared  biological  core.  This
stance is sometimes labeled (Neo)Cartesianism for recalling a similar form of Dualism (separation)
between mind and the outer world (Ferretti, 2010).
This stance assigns to language an (1) irreducible complexity that is believed to be not the product
of the slow and gradual action of natural selection (saltationism: de novo and abrupt emergence of a
full-developed  complex  organ)  and  (2)  a  qualitative  difference  from  any  other  animal
communication system, a difference in kind and not in degree (evolutionary discontinuity).
These arguments against the usefulness of natural selection in explaining language evolution are
quite similar to the critiques that British zoologist George Mivart moved against Darwin's theory of
Natural Selection and its gradualist explanation for the evolution of complex adapted traits (Mivart,
1871). According to Mivart, the gradual action of natural selection cannot explain why the 5% of a
complex trait such as a wing or an eye should spread within the population, as it would serve no use
at all. In the 60s and the 70s of the XIX century other scholars such as  Max Müller, a famous
German philologist, supported an anti-Darwinian explanation of language evolution, embracing this
discontinuist perspective.
Darwin's  reply to  Mivart's  critiques  are  contained in  the  last  edition  of  the  Origins  of  species
(Darwin, 1872), introducing the principle of what Gould and Vrba (1982) would have labeled later
exaptation: the current function of a trait can be decoupled from its historical origin. A trait might
have  served  a  certain  function  or  might  have  emerged  as  a  structural  by-product  of  some
developmental effect (spandrel, see Gould and Lewontin, 1979) and might have been coopted or
exapted for a new function only in a secondary phase, following some reshaping of the ecological
niche and of the associated selective pressures. Hence, a 5% of a complex organ might have served
a different function before being coopted for the current function (type 1 exaptation). Brids wings,
for  example,  were  probably  exploited  for  thermoregulation  before  being  coopted  for  flight.  A
structural  by-product  of  some developmental  effect,  serving  no specific  functions,  tolerated  by
natural selection, might be coopted for a new function once the ecological conditions require it
(type 2 exaptation). A typical example is the so called “panda's thumb”, a hypertrophic wrist bone
(sesamoid bone) exploited by the animal (belonging to Ursidae family, hence a former carnivorous
that changed its  diet)  to grasp bamboo while eating it  (on the different types of exaptation see
Serrelli and Pievani, 2011).
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Chomsky's  stance  regarding  the  relationship  between  human  language  and  evolution  changed
several  times  across  the  years  and it  is  quite  difficult  to  recognize  a  coherent  and continuous
position (see for example Hauser  et al., 2002). Today, UG in the so called “Minimalist program”
(Chomsky, 1993) is equated to Merge, the capacity that embodies the central recursive property of
syntax (a key component of the language faculty) to compute linguistic information hierarchically.
Merge allows to embed linguistic elements such as phonemes in words (phonology) and words in
meaningful  sentences (syntax);  this  operation has the property of “discrete  infinity”,  as a  finite
number of elements can produce a potentially unlimited number of new combinations. In this sense
UG is intended in a modularist framework (Fodor, 1983) as a cognitive domain-specific device
dedicated to language acquisition and production.
Recently the eminent linguist endorsed what he describes as a evo-devo perspective on language
evolution, arguing in favor of a rather lucky (and however still unobserved to date) genetic mutation
providing  Cognitively  Modern  Humans  (CMHs)  with  a  structural  modification  (and  still
nonfunctional) that allowed the emergence of the full-developed language capacity approximately
100 – 50 kya (Chomsky, 2010; 2012; Berwick and Chomsky, 2016). However,  the probability of
randomly  building  a  fully  functioning,  and  completely  novel,  biological  system  by  chance  is
infinitesimally  small  (Christiansen  and  Chater,  2008).  Today  this  “lucky  mutation”  or  “magic
bullet” hypothesis on language evolution, making a complex trait emerging abruptly, is considered
almost anti-darwinian in literature (Hillert, 2015) and so incompatible both with the known action
of evolutionary processes and with the definition of the language faculty (which will be discussed
later on).
The reason we quickly summarized these key points here was to put in light some fundamental
conceptual elements that can help in providing a general framework for the language evolution
debate. Here we propose a categorization:
1)  the function-selection problem: is language the outcome of the action of continuative selective
pressures on a specific function, such as communication (adaptation), or did it evolve as a non
selected by-product from structures previously involved in other tasks (exaptation)?
2) the evolutionary rate problem: did language appear abruptly in human evolution (saltationism) or
was it the outcome of a long, step by step, uniform cumulative evolutionary process (gradualism)?
3)  the  comparative  problem:  is  the  language  faculty  uniquely  possessed  by  humans
(autapomorphy), representing a qualitative difference from other animal communication systems
(evolutionary discontinuity) or is it, or are some of its subcomponents, traceable in other non-human
animals (synapomorphies), being an example of evolutionary continuity?
4) the protolangiage problem: which, if any, kind of language (protolanguage) was possessed by the
hominin ancestors of modern Homo sapiens?
5)  the ethological problem: in which measure language is biologically determined (innate) and in
which measure is it culturally determined (acquired)?
6)  the multilevel problem: regarding the evolutionary processes that acted on language, have they
acted at the individual level or have they acted at the population level?
We believe that this categorization provides a set of helpful conceptual tools that will help navigate
the main aspects of the debate on language evolution.
2. Internal Language and a Naïve evolutionist view
In 1990, MIT psychologists Stephen Pinker and Paul Bloom tried to reconcile Chomskian definition
of language with evolutionary biology, providing an adaptationist hypothesis for UG, still intended
as the species-specific trait  that distinguishes human language (Pinker and Bloom, 1990). Their
argument goes as follows: according to Darwinian evolutionary theory, the only natural process able
to shape complex, domain-specific, adapted traits is natural selection and human language is exactly
a complex trait  that should be intended as the product of natural selection.  Language has been
selected by the slow action of continuous selective pressures for a specific  function conferring
fitness to its bearers. As the eye (a complex organ) was slowly shaped by natural selection for visual
functions, so was language for communicative functions. Even though Pinker and Bloom could
have challenged Chomskian assumption about E-L irrelevance at its roots, they were cautious in
stating the specific function language was selected for. However, communicative efficiency was
retained  the  most  plausible  candidate,  as  current  language  shows  efficient  design  for
communication.
From this follows that functional communicative systems of lower efficiency were probably present
before modern language, that is protolanguages: pidgin and creols are considered living examples of
the plausibility of the existence of such lower-efficiency communicative systems (Bickerton, 1990).
Although Pinker and Bloom's work has the merit of “naturalizing” the study of language evolution,
the problems associated to a discontinuist (hence an anti-darwinian) view are not totally overcome.
In fact,  what they were trying to naturalize was Chomskian UG, that is a biological,  cognitive
device that has no equal in the animal kingdom, that is believed to be uniquely human, and is
thought to be not derivable from other animal communicative or cognitive traits (Pinker, 1994).
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Considering UG as an adaptation, which means a  de novo  emerged and optimalized trait, suffers
exactly this kind of problems. Continuity is hard to meet if language is equated to UG, intended as a
genetically determined cognitive leap, separating humans from other non-human animals. 
Pinker  and Bloom hypothesis  however  argues  against  a  saltationist  account  and in  favour of  a
gradual evolution of language, in accordance with Darwinian theory. However, the detalis of this
gradualism are  not  exposed properly.  The two authors  instead  simply assume that  every small
variation in grammatical competence must have conferred selective advantage to its bearer, lasting
long enough to be fixed in the ancestral population. They explicitly refer to genetic variation:
“For universal grammar to have evolved by Darwinian natural selection, it is not enough that it be
useful in some general sense. There must have been genetic variation among individuals in their
grammatical competence. There must have been a series of steps leading from no language at all to
language as we now find it, each step small enough to have been produced by a random mutation or
recombination, and each intermediate grammar useful to its possessor” (Pinker and Bloom, 1994, p.
36)
Pinker and Bloom do not deny the eventuality that cultural dynamics may have played a role in the
evolution of the human capacity for language and they explicitly discuss the possibility of gene-
culture  co-evolutionary  dynamics  (Hinton  and  Nowlan,  1987),  discussing  the  plausibility  of
interactions between learning and innate structure resulting in a Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896;
Simpson, 1973). However, they also highlight that:
“the ability to use a natural language belongs more to the study of human biology than human
culture;  it  is  a topic like echolocation in bats or stereopsis in monkeys,  not like writing or the
wheel” (Pinker and Bloom, 1990, p. 708)
By stressing this, a marginal evolutionary role is expressively attributed to culture.
The tentative reconciliation of human language with the evolutionary theory proposed by Pinker
and Bloom is affected by the adoption of a rather simplistic view of evolution, that Tecumseh Fitch
labeled  the  naïve  evolutionist  view  (Fitch,  2012).  This  view  can  be  summarized  in  some
fundamental points:
1) a prime mover logic: the evolution of language wants to be explained by finding those genetic
mutations  that  are  believed to  be the  necessary and sufficient  conditions  for  the  emergence  of
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language. Genes cause the phenotype and genetic variation always precedes phenotypic variation.
2)  unidirectional  causality:  genes  are  believed  to  be  the  prime  mover  for  language  evolution
(unidirectional  causal  arrow from genes  to  the  phenotype)  and  selective  pressures  acting  over
genetic variance is considered the only ultimate cause for language evolution (unidirectional causal
arrow from the selective environment to the genetic variance).
3)  atomistic approach: language is equated with a single trait, a single component, that is UG or
Merge, hence the capacity of recursion that allows to process linguistic information hierarchically.
Finding the biological and genetic bases of this trait will allow to explain language evolution.
A confirmation of the application of this approach to language evolution is represented by the fact
that the discovery of FOXP2 human variant was welcomed in the 1990s as the “language gene”,
and still today this erroneous label is simplistically used in both popular and scientific journals (see
Box 1 and paragraph 5).
Box 1 – FOXP2
FOXP2  is  a  protein  belonging  to  a  family  of  transcription  factors  (Forkhead  bOX  or  FOX)
regulating  the  expression  of  suites  of  genes  during  embryogenesis  and  development  and  in
adulthood in different tissues (see Ramus and Fisher, 2009). In the 1990s an interesting case-study
was reported: members of the KE family (15 individuals across 3 generations) were shown to
display  a  severe  speech  and  language  disorder,  in  particular  Developmental  Verbal  Dyspraxia
(DVD)  (impaired  tongue,  lips  and  jaw movements,  impairment  in  ordering  sounds  in  correct
sequences and in pronouncing words correctly), inherited as a Mendelian trait with an autosomal
dominant mode of transmission. Analyses of the FOXP2 genes revealed heterozygous single-base
change in all 15 affected members, which was not found in any unaffected members and controls.
Moreover,  FOXP2 has  been  found to  regulate  the  expression  of  CNTNAP2 gene  (located  on
chromosome  7q35)  in  neurons;  allelic  variants  of  this  target  were  shown to  be  associated  to
Specific Language Impairment (SLI).
More insights  on the role  of  FOXP2 came from comparative studies.  Mice carrying the same
mutation as that found in KE family members display abnormal synaptic plasticity were FOXP2 is
expressed and significant motor-skill deficits in species-typical behaviours and they do not emit
innate calls in isolation from their mothers (Groszer et al., 2008).
Convincing evidence of a role for FOXP2 in vocalization skills of nonlinguistic species comes
from studies of vocal learning in songbirds, in particular zebra finches where expression of FOXP2
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in  Area X correlates to  vocal  plasticity (White  et  al., 2006) and to inaccurate  and incomplete
copying of the tutor’s song, which was suggested to show parallels to DVD in humans (Haesler et
al., 2007).
Analyses  of  the  evolution  of  FOXP2 in  primates  indicated  that  two  amino-acid  substitutions
occurred on the human lineage after splitting from the chimpanzee, and found evidence of recent
Darwinian  selection (Enard  et  al.,  2002). However,  the  same  FOXP2  variant  was  found  in
Neanderthal genetic analyses (Krause et  al.,  2007),  suggesting a more ancient origin (300-400
kya).
Overall, these comparative data suggest that FOXP2 plays a role related to motor sequencing and
vocal learning. However, FOXP2 cannot be regarded as “the language gene” as it is just one of the
multiple bricks that build up the language mosaic.
3. External Language, social selection and functional hypotheses
In the following years several hypotheses on language evolution were proposed (for a review see
Szamado and Szathmary,  2006),  shifting the  focus  of  attention  from I-L to E-L;  in  a  nutshell,
researchers started considering language in a primarily social dimension, hence object of social
selection. These kind of hypotheses, contrarily to the non-functionalist or structuralist Chomskian
explanation, represent examples of functional hypotheses for the origin and evolution of language.
For example, primatologist Robin Dunbar, who found statistical correlation between brain size and
dimension of the social group in primate evolution (see Dunbar and Shultz, 2007), proposed the
“grooming hypothesis”  for  the  evolution  of  language (Dunbar,  1996).  Primates  maintain  social
bonds by manual grooming, however this is a costly activity as it occupies both hands and precludes
other activities such as foraging or feeding. According to this hypothesis, as group size increased,
vocal  grooming  substituted  manual  grooming,  giving  the  advantage  to  groom  more  than  one
individual  at  once  and  giving  the  opportunity  to  perform  other  tasks  simultaneously.  First
vocalizations were not meaningful, much like contact calls in geladas and other primates. It was
only with  Homo sapiens  that  meaning entered the  evolutionary scene,  with symbolic  language
considered as the last step allowing reference to abstract concepts.
By stressing  continuity with  primate  communication  systems,  Dunbar  is  not  able  to  provide  a
specific  explanation  for  the  alleged  species-specific  features  of  human  language  such  as  the
hierarchical structure of phonology and syntax (also called duality of patterning, that is phonemes
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merging into words and words merging into sentences; see Fitch, 2010).
However,  the  largest  difference  with  Chomskian  UG  hypothesis  is  that  the  attention  is  here
switched to other components of the language faculty, such as meaning and symbols, and not only
syntax.
Many hypotheses  of  this  kind  (functional  hypotheses  relying  on social  selection,  hence  giving
evolutionary relevance to E-L) were proposed across these years (Dessalles, 1998; Donald, 1991;
Deacon,  1997;  see  Szamado  and  Szathmary,  2006  for  a  review)  and  some  criteria  have  been
elaborated to evaluate the strength of such hypotheses.
For  example,  a  good  evolutionary  hypothesis  should  solve  the  problem  of  honesty,  that  is,
explaining  why there should  be  a  shared  interest  among individuals  to  communicate,  hence to
cooperate  sharing  useful  or  adaptive  information,  avoiding  at  the  same  time  cheaters  to  take
advantage. A large amount of literature has been produced around the honesty problem and it is not
the aim of this work to review it all here.
Although language evolution  is  tackled  from its  external  component  in  the  works  reviewed in
Szamado  and  Szathmary  (2006),  these  hypotheses  still  share  a  common  explanatory  structure
characterized by an atomistic approach, that is isolating a single component, and a monofunctional
explanation, that is attributing to this component a precise function (gossip, grooming, hunting,
mating,  etc.,  see  Szamado  and  Szathmary,  2006)  that  is  considered  responsible  for  the  whole
evolution of language.
However,  the critique that can be moved to this  type of explanations is  that these hypothetical
scenarios  are  not  proper  evolutionary  explanations,  as  functional  explanations  alone  are  not
sufficient  to  characterize  a  full  evolutionary  explanation.  In  fact,  following  Tinbergen  4  Qs
(Tinbergen, 1963), the functional explanation is just one of the aspects that should be inquired in
order  to  obtain  a  proper  comprehension  of  the  evolutionary  origin  of  a  trait.  Reducing  an
evolutionary explanation to its functional aspects is a simplified representation of the evolutionary
process and represents what Stephen J. Gould labeled  just so stories. The hypothetical functional
scenario  must  be  met  with  the  historical  side  of  the  evolutionary  explanation;  in  this  sense,
integrating what we know from the archeological and fossil record (in the case of human evolution
and the origin of language), as well as with the alleged structures and the mechanisms involved, is a
crucial aspect that has often been overlooked in many proposed hypotheses for the evolution of
language.
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4. A tentative definition for the language faculty: FLB – FLN
All these studies in language evolution produced the positive effect of widening the components of
the  language  faculty  that  should  be  considered  in  the  evolutionary  analysis  beyond  the  only
recursive property of syntax that, as an effect of the influent chomskian legacy, in the previous years
was equated to the language faculty itself. As a matter of fact, some scholars stick with this ultra-
narrow definition of language still today (Bolhuis et al., 2014, 2015; Berwick and Chomsky, 2016).
Language  is  an  extremely  complex  trait  whose  evolutionary  building  up  involved  genetic,
morphological, neural, cognitive, behavioral and cultural change. The definition of the object of
inquiry and the research method employed for its investigation are elements that go side by side.
Finding a definition able to keep together all these aspects is at the same time a very hard and a
crucial  task.  The goodness  of  a  definition  can  be  evaluated  on the fecundity of  the  associated
research program it is able to generate.
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) tried to put order to the various components of the language
faculty, proposing a categorization based both on linguistic and biological criteria (see also Fitch,
2010). According to their proposal, the language faculty can be subdivided into:
1) its sensory-motor component (signal: speech or sign)
2) its conceptual-intentional component (semantics and pragmatics)
3) its abstract computational component (syntax and its recursive property)
Figure 1
From Kirby  (2007).  A
schematic  view  of  the
role played by the main
components  of  the
language  faculty








From Fitch (2010). The Three
“Ss”  of  the  faculty  of
language:  Signal,  Structure
and  Semantics.  Each  of  this
component  can  be  further
subdivided  into  multiple
separate  but  interacting
mechanisms;  for  an  example
see the role of gaze processing
in Theory of Mind (Fitch et al.
2010)
Signal, Semantics and Syntax are labeled the three “Ss” of the faculty of language (see fig. 1 for a
schematic description of the main components; see fig. 2, from Fitch, 2010). These components,
however,  are  further  categorized  according  to  the  comparative  method  into  two  groups.  The
sensory-motor and the conceptual intentional component belong to the  Faculty of Language in a
Broad sense (FLB). This set contains all those elements of the language faculty that are involved in
language,  but  that  are  not  exclusively  present  in  humans.  An  example  is  represented  by  the
relatively wide distribution in the tree of life of vocal learning, the capacity to imitate, elaborate and
reproduce acoustic sounds learned from conspecifics: beyond humans (the only primates possessing
it),  songbirds,  parrots,  hummingbirds,  cetaceans,  pinnipeds,  bats,  elephants  and  possibly  goats
possess it (Petkov and Jarvis, 2012). The recursive property of syntax instead is proposed to belong
to the Faculty of Language in a Narrow sense (FLN), that is intended as a subset of FLB containing
the  component(s)  that  makes  language a  human species-specific  characteristic,  not  shared  with
other animals. Elements should be assigned to each set with no a priori assumptions, but only after
empirical  evaluation.  This  definition  in  fact  allows  to  exploit  the  explanatory  power  of  the
comparative method as the distinguishing criterion and research roadmap (see for example Fitch et
al., 2010).
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However, the authors explicitly proposed recursion, hence the capacity for discrete infinity, to be
the  alleged uniquely human characteristic  that  distinguishes  language from any other  forms  of
animal communication, exposing their proposal to falsifiability. They also advanced an exaptationist
hypothesis for the evolution of recursion: they don't consider it as a specific adaptation for linguistic
tasks,  as  they  conceive  it  as  a  characteristic  with  tenuous  connections  with  communicative
efficiency,  in  line  with  the  traditional  Chomskian  view.  Instead  they  suggest  that  these
computational properties evolved for reasons other than communication (even if without clearly
specifying them) and that they were exapted only in a second stage for linguistic tasks.
The distinction between FLB and FLN allows to see the language faculty not as a single trait (such
as when language is equated to UG) but rather as a mosaic of traits, with several subcomponents
(multicomponent  approach,  see  Fitch,  2012)  that  can  be  ordered  by  applying  a  comparative
criterion.  A certain  subcomponent  can  be  found  in  different  species,  belonging  to  different
vertebrate taxa; a case by case evaluation will tell us whether it results from convergent evolution or
homology, whether it evolved as a specific adaptation or rather it derives from extant structures
exploited  for  novel  functions  (exaptation).  This  in  principle  should  help  understanding  how
language, intended as a complex cognitive trait, came together as we know it today. 
If we take into account the three main domains of the language faculty (speech, semantics and
syntax, following Fitch, 2010 categorization), we can provide for each one of them some examples
of the productivity of a multicomponent and comparative approach:
1)  Speech:  it  has  been shown that  the descent  of  the larynx may not  necessarily be a specific
adaptation for speech as many animals among mammals possess this analogous trait (Lieberman,
1984; Fitch and Reby, 2001; Weissenburger et al., 2002). This comparative analysis provides data
that  can  help  understanding  the  evolutionary  path  followed  by human  larynx,  which  possibly
descended for reasons other than speech and only later was exploited for speech-related functions.
Vocal learning also proves to be a rather convergent trait among some distantly related vertebrate
taxa (Nottebohm, 1976; Janik and Slater, 1997; Petkov and Jarvis, 2012). Shedding light on the
selective  pressures  which  favored  this  trait  may help  understanding  why humans  are  the  only
bearers among primates. However, it must be said that it is more and more acknowledged that a all-
or-nothing approach to the presence of a trait in a certain species is leaving room in the latter studies
to a bottom-up approach (see de Waal and Ferrari, 2010) according to which it is possible that a
certain trait, such as vocal learning or theory of mind, can be present in different degrees in different
species.
2) Semantics: an example of the productivity of a comparative and multicomponent approach is
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represented  by  the  possibility  of  constructing  cognitive  phylogenies:  a  preliminary  cognitive
phylogeny of vertebrate gaze sensitivity and processing has been proposed for some subcomponents
(gaze detection and gaze following) of a key component (theory of mind – TOM) of the semantic
and  pragmatic  domain  of  the  language  faculty  (Fitch  et  al. 2010).  Understanding  how  such
components are distributed among taxa and how they are intertwined into one single species helps
figuring  out  which  evolutionary  steps  have  been  made  to  reach  a  certain  cognitive  capacity
(attention and basic forms of TOM, in this case), shedding more light on how the language faculty
is complexly arranged.
3) Syntax: much has been debated on whether the recursive properties of syntax (hence Merge) are
unique to humans or shared with other species. Although it  has been argued that the European
starling is able to handle recursion (Gentner et al., 2006), other scientists suggested such a claim is
premature (Beckers  et al.,  2012).  Once again the solution to this  puzzle  lays  in relying on the
comparative analysis, suspending any a priori stance, producing testable hypotheses and letting the
empirical results speak (see fig. 3).
Extensive application of the comparative method and accurate analysis of the components of the
language faculty showed that the three main components of the language faculty (speech, semantics
and syntax)  are  themselves  made up of  subcomponents.  Results  of comparative work in social
cognition for example revealed that species distantly related to humans (like crows) show cognitive
abilities that are lacking in primates (Fitch et al., 2010). This kind of work has the merit to show the
inadequacy of a scala naturae view of evolution according to which cognitive abilities increase in
the approximation to humans.  A modern Darwinian viewpoint instead assesses that each species
cognitive abilities evolve to fit the demands of its ecological niche. 
5. Problems with FLB – FLN
FLB – FLN distinction had the merit to put the language faculty in the tree of life, treating language
not  as a monolith,  but rather as a mosaic of traits,  each of which might in  principle have had
different  evolutionary paths,  might  have  being present  in  different  degrees  in  different  species
(bottom-up  approach,  see  de  Waal  and  Ferrari,  2010),  might  have  emerged  different  times  in
phylogeny (convergent evolution), or might have being present in the common ancestor of a group





The faculty of language in broad
and narrow senses: two ways in
which  the  term “language” can
be  used.  FLB  (faculty  of
language in  the  broad sense)  is
the  all-inclusive  sense,
incorporating  any  mechanism
that  is  involved  in  language
processing.  FLN  (faculty  of
language in the narrow sense) is
the exclusive sense: by definition
it  includes  only  that  subset  of
mechanisms  that  are  both
specific  to  humans,  and specific
to  language  within  human
cognition. Only a small subset of
language-related  mechanisms
are  expected  to  be  in  the  latter
category.
However, a problem with FLB definition is represented by the fact that this group contains all those
components of the language faculty that are not exclusively present in humans, so either they are
inherited  from ancestors  or  they are  present  in  other  animals.  However  the  definition  of  FLB
remains unclear on which of the two alternatives is correct.
Moreover,  the recursive  property of  syntax  for  example were thought  to  be  a  uniquely human
characteristic, but different studies today found that different species of birds can master recursive
properties in signal processing (Gentner  et al., 2006; Suzuki  et al., 2016; Spierings and ten Cate
2016). If these studies are correct, recursion, believed to be the element filling the FLN set, should
be moved to FLB set, leaving FLN an empty set and challenging the usefulness of the dinstinction
between FLB and FLN.
However, given the actual uniqueness of human language as a communication system in the animal
reign, it is legitimate to expect some forms of specificity. A solution to overcome this difficulty was
presented by Okanoya (2007), arguing that FLN should be intended not as a single trait unique to
humans, but rather as a unique-to-humans combination of not unique traits. 
Moreover, it must be said that the original multicomponent approach was affected by a top-down
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inclination. Intending syntax as an all-or-nothing characteristic, as Chomskian UG implies, leads
necessary to treat it as a monolithic trait, long considered to be the species-specific characteristic
that conferred full-developed language to humans.
“Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive research has focused on the pinnacles of mental
evolution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind,
culture, linguistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research programs adopting this top-down
perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines. Insight
into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind (…). A dramatic change in focus now seems to
be under way, however,  with increased appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition
might be shared across a wide range of species. We argue that this bottom-up perspective, which
focuses on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with
both neuroscience and evolutionary biology.” (de Waal and Ferrari, 2010, p. 201)
This bottom-up approach is apparent in studies on vocal learning. The field has long been neatly
divided into vocal learners and non-vocal learners. However, recent studies showed much more
variability  in  vocal  learning  across  species  (Petkov  and  Jarvis,  2012;  Arriaga  et  al.,  2012),
suggesting that it cannot be intended as an all or nothing trait. Rather, both birds and mammals
show some minimum level of vocal learning capacities (such as mice, see Arriaga et al., 2012), but
only a few groups evolved independently full-developed capacities in response to specific regimes
of selective pressures (Jarvis, 2006). For example, predation rates are an important factor: humans,
dolphins and killer whales stand on the top of their food chain and predation-related pressures are
relaxed;  hummingbirds  evolved  good escape  behaviors  allowing  them to  lower  pradation  rates
(Jarvis,  2006);  in  a  domesticated  condition,  hence  in  a  condition  with  low  predation-related
selective pressures,  male individuals  of Bengalese Finches  developed more complex songs and
female preference reinforced this tendency (Okanoya, 2012). We will discuss the plausibiity of the
Self-domestication hypothesis applied to human evolution in the first chapter of this work (Suman
and Pievani, 2015). Nowicki and Searcy (2014) also showed that vocal learning maintenance is
favored within a population when the trait is already present in the population in a certain degree.
We will discuss in chapter three (Suman, submitted) and in the conclusions of some aspects of a
frequency dependent model of selection.
The same top-down approach was once applied to other cognitive traits such as Theory of Mind, the
capacity to understand other individuals belief and intentions. Premack and Woodroof (1978) in
their influential paper asked whether chimpanzees had a theory of mind, answering in the negative.
30
Researchers in the following years outlined that this cognitive trait cannot be intended and inquired
as an all-or-nothing trait, but it is given in different degrees: for example, Call and Tomasello (2008)
conclude that chimpanzees understand others in terms of perception-goal psychology, while humans
in terms of a belief-desire psychology.
As  a  consequence  of  these  considerations,  speech,  semantics,  syntax,  intended  as  monolithic
subcomponents (as it is in the FLB – FLN distinction) of the language faculty might represent a
rather simplistic account.
Nonetheless, this distinction was adopted to formulate hypotheses on possible protolanguages that
our non-human primate ancestors might have possessed (see Fitch, 2010). There are three main
hypotheses on possible protolanguages:
1) lexical: described as individual words unconnected by syntactic rules (Bickerton, 1990);
2)  gestural:  intended  as  a  manual/visual  modality  of  communication  that  preceded  the
auditory/vocal modality (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Corballis 1999);
3) musical: conceived as a communication system in which phonology and syntax were present but
propositional meaning of sounds was lacking (Darwin 1871, Fitch 2006).
Each of them hypothesizes a different evolutionary sequence of the three main components of the
language faculty, and consequently different type of communication systems:
1) lexical: speech, semantics, syntax;
2) gestural: semantics, syntax, speech;
3) musical: speech, syntax, semantics.
Despite resulting intuitive, this categorization might result rather simplistic and still limited by a
top-down approach. Moreover, the original categorization (Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch, 2002) doesn't
include pragmatics (somehow reduced to semantics) while the latter is included in Fitch, 2010 (see
figure), after recent studies that put it in light as a key component of the evolution of language (see
Scott Phillips, 2015).
The  original  definition  of  FLB  (Hauser  et  al.,  2002)  also  didn't  include  general  systems  not
specifically evolved for language such as memory, while the latter is included in Fitch, 2010 (see
fig. 3). This might seem as a sign of weakness of the definition as it becomes too inclusive and
rather unspecific.
Another critical point of FLB – FLN distinction, highlighted in Boeckx (2014), is how to categorize
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novelties. FOXP2 for example belongs to a highly conserved family of transcription factors, but it
has been subject of two significant mutations in the human lineage and in humans it is involved in
specific linguistic  functions,  as documented by the  Devolopmental Verbal Dyspraxia in  the KE
family showedin  Box 1. In which set should FOXP2 be assigned? If its specific involvement in
language tasks in humans is considered, FLN would be the answer (Boeckx, 2014), but according to
Fitch et al. (2005) the highly conserved nature of this transcription factor prevails on its functional
specificity,  assigning it  to  FLB.  If  we stick  with Okanoya's  proposal  of  considering  FLN as  a
combination of traits, still FOXP2 could be arbitrarily assigned to one set or the other, without a
clearcut criterion.
Given this difficulties, given the elusiveness of FLN, being said that only a wide application of the
comparative method could assess the composition of the language faculty (“quantitative” approach),
the  FLB –  FLN  distinction  seems  to  remark  a  qualitative  distinction  between  what  is  shared
(synapomorphies) and what is derived (apomorhpies) which is unnecessary: in evolution there is
nothing special in being special, given that this is just what descent with modification is all about.
Finding species  specific  traits  does  not  make their  possessors  qualitatively different  from their
ancestors and their relatives.
Moreover, Hauser et al., 2002 FLB – FLN distinction conceived the idea that cognitive evolution
occurs via accumulation of novel components (FLN) on a set of pre-existing ones (FLB), that is
adding novel characters on top of others. This probably obscures the idea that new cognitive traits
could  emerge  even  without  the  appearance  of  de  novo  or  unique  adaptations,  but  only  via  a
reorganization of the already existing cognitive traits. Stephen J. Gould already suggested that the
brain has undergone massive exaptive processes (Gould,  1991).  Neural reuse is the mechanism
through which a same neural area could be recruited in different circuits performing different tasks;
this exaptive principle might have played a significant role both in development and in evolution
(Anderson, 2010). Okanoya's proposal of considering FLN as a combination of traits is in principle
an attempt to preserve FLB – FLN distinction against a “cumulative” view of cognitive evolution
and in favor of an exaptationist view based on a re-organization of existing features.
6. Cultural evolution and the innate-acquired problem
Despite  displaying  the  explanatory  power  of  the  comparative  method,  FLB –  FLN distinction
carries around some problems connected to a conception of language influenced by Chomskian
legacy.  An  ultra-narrow definition  of  the  language  faculty,  stressing  language  uniqueness  and
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arguing against the usefulness of the comparative analysis, is still defended today (Berwick et al.,
2013;  Bolhuis  et  al.,  2014,  2015;  Berwick and Chomsky,  2016).  So the  debate  is  far  from its
resolutive endpoint.
Supporters of a strong biological determination of language tend to state that the alleged universal
features of world languages (such as “word order”, that is the sequence of Subject, Object and Verb
in a grammar) are engrained in a biologically inherited language acquisition device that constraints
language acquisition within certain innate parameters.
Recent studies in the field of historical linguistics (a comparative and historical approach to world
languages adopting phylogenetic methods of analysis) seriously challenge the idea that all world
languages share universal features such as word order (Dunn et al., 2011). Some studies show that
cultural evolution is the primary factor that determines linguistic structure, in respect to word order,
showing that different language families (Indo-European, Austronesian, Bantu and Uto-Aztecan)
display different word order organization (Dunn et al., 2011).
Other studies (reviewed in Evans and Levinson, 2009) show that this variability is not limited to
word order,  but  rather  is  extended  to  almost  every other  level  of  description,  such as  sounds,
meaning, lexicon and even syntactic organization, which shows compelling variability. The concept
of UG is hence considered hindering the appreciation of such fundamental structural differences
among languages (Evans and Levinson, 2009).
Such an intuition was already present in Deacon (1997):
“Grammatical universals exist, but I want to suggest that their existence does not imply that they are
prefigured in the brain like frozen evolutionary accidents. In fact, I suspect that universal rules or
implicit axioms of grammar aren’t really stored or located anywhere, and in an important sense,
they are not  determined  at all.  Instead,  I  want to suggest the radical possibility that they have
emerged spontaneously and independently in  each evolving  language,  in  response  to  universal
biases in the selection processes affecting language transmission.” (Deacon 1997:115-116)
A series of studies performed by evolutionary linguists from the University of Edinburgh in the last
20 years seems to rise serious challenges to the nativist account of language, according to which the
syntactic features of languages can be traced in the recursive properties of a language acquisition
device, biologically determined and inherited. Simon Kirby and colleagues proposed a radically
different  explanation  for  compositional  syntax  as  the  outcome  of  dynamics  of  learning  and
information transmission among individuals (Kirby 1998). The Iterated-Learning-Model (ILM) is
the approach developed by Kirby and colleagues. 
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Iterated learning is a process in which an individual acquires a behavior by observing a similar
behavior in another individual who acquired it in the same way. Models of this process show that,
over repeated episodes of transmission, behaviors transmitted by iterated learning tend to become
easier to learn and increasingly structured (Kirby et al., 2008).
ILMs consist  mostly in computer simulations of transmission dynamics among agents provided
with some specified but rather general learning bias (for example defined as Bayesian inference in
Kirby et al., 2007). The linguistic behavior a learner is exposed to as an input is itself the output of
learning by other individuals. Similarly, the language spoken within a population at a generation is
the learning input for the subsequent generation. Language is hence intended as a population-level
phenomenon whose characteristics are shaped along the cultural transmission processes (see fig. 4).
Figure 4.
From Kirby (2002).
Cultural  evolution  is
intended as the process that
produces  change  in
languages in time, but more
generally  that  transmits
behaviors  through  social
learning  across
generations.  This  time-
scale  of  change  is  often
labeled  the  glossogenetic
level  (Fitch,  2008)  and  it
interacts  with  the  learning
mechanisms  at  the
ontogenetic level  and  with
biological  evolutionary
processes  occurring  on  a
phylogenetic timescale:
language  emerges  as  the
complex  intersection  of
these  processes  occurring
at different timescales.
ILM  experiments  assume  Chomskian  distinction  between  I-L (patterns  of  neural  connectivity
constituting the biological substratum for abstract grammars) and E-L (the actual sets of utterances
through which languages take form) as the fundamental model through which languages exist and
persist  (Kirby and Hurford,  2002).  However,  differently from Chomskian  cognitivist  internalist
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approach all focused on I-L as the fundamental device building and constraining languages and
their structure, leaving E-L as a secondary aspect not relevant to understand language structure,
evolutionary  linguists  show  how  cultural  transmission  dynamics  of  E-L  can  shape  language
structure, stating in particular that “cultural evolution leads inevitably to recursively compositional
(i. e. syntactic) languages” (Kirby and Hurford, 2002).
Compositionality or  compositional  syntax is  the property of human language whereby semantic
units (like words) are combined into larger compounds (phrases and sentences) whose composite
meanings are functions of, but not wholly determined by, the independent units (Bowling and Fitch,
2015).  “Languages  with  compositional  syntax  assign  signals  to  meanings  in  a  predictable  and
systematic manner; in other words, they use the same encoding strategy for every meaning. An
evolutionarily early form of protolanguage that has been hypothesized (Wray, 1998) has no such
systematic syntax, but instead treats every meaning holistically. In such a protolanguage, the signal
for every meaning must be learned individually, and no generalizations are possible” (Kirby et al.,
2007). This property is commonly thought to be the hallmark of human language with no animal
communication systems showing it (although see Gentner et al., 2006; Suzuki et al., 2016). UG has
long been retained the explanation for this property of language, but Kirby and colleagues' work
claims that compositionality (along with  sistematicity and  learnability) might arise from cultural
transmission dynamics without assuming specific cognitive learning biases in the individuals and
without the action of natural selection, intended as selective pressures acting on genes controlling
for a specific trait (Kirby, 1998). 
In order to persist from one generation to the next, a language must be mapped from I-L to E-L
through use,  within an individual,  and from E-L to I-L through learning (transmission)  among
individuals. In order to “reproduce” from one individual to the other, languages should be learnable,
that is their structure should fit individuals' brains and cognitive biases. The spontaneous emergence
and  persistence  of  certain  linguistic  forms  is  intended  as  “cultural  selection  for  learnability”
according  to  these  cultural  transmission  dynamics  from  individual  to  individual  and  across
generations (Brighton et al., 2006).
The idea of languages' learnability at the basis of language reproduction and diffusion was one of
the fundamental intuitions that inform Terrence Deacon's 1997 work The Symbolic Species: the co-
evolution of langauge and the brain.
“The most basic principle guiding [language] design is not communicative utility, but reproduction
– theirs  and ours.  (…) Languages  are  social  and cultural  entities  that  evolved to  the forces  of
selection imposed by human users. The structure of a language is under intense selection because in
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its reproduction from generation to generation, it must pass through a narrow bottleneck: children's
minds” (Deacon, 1997, p. 110)
Languages can be metaphorically intended as entities that adapt to survive by fitting to learners'
mind,  that  means  adapting  to  be  learnable  (Brighton  et  al.,  2006).  Kirby  and  colleagues'
experiments  on  ILM show that  this  language  adaptation  to  learnability  can  occur  without  any
change in individuals' prior learning biases or any biological change (Kirby et al., 2007; Kirby et
al., 2008; Kirby, 2014).
“In particular, the experiments of Kirby (2002b) and Batali (2002) demonstrate that a collection of
learners  (…)  will,  from  an  initially  holistic  communication  system,  spontaneously  arrive  at
compositional and recursive communication systems. Because language is ostensibly infinite, and
cultural  transmission  can  only  result  in  the  production  of  a  finite  series  of  utterances,  only
generalisable forms will survive. These experiments suggest that certain hallmarks of language are
culturally  adaptive:  pressures  arising  from transmission  from one agent  to  another  cause  these
hallmarks to emerge and persist.  For example, adaptive properties such as compositionality and
recursion, which we can consider absolute language universals, are defining characteristics of stable
systems” (Brighton et al., 2006, p. 10).
The  majority  of  the  studies  performed  by  the  Scottish  evolutionary  linguists  are  computer
simulations of learning dynamics (reviewed in Steels, 2006). The same type of model however was
transferred in the lab with human learners, in a diffusion-chain experiment (Kirby  et al., 2008).
Participants are exposed to artificial language learning and the learning input of each participant is
the output produced by the previous participant according to what he/she learned. In order to make
the language more learnable, compositional structure emerges spontaneously as the unintentional
product of transmission, as participants (unaware of the problem) were trying to reproduce as best
as  they could  the  artificial  language they were  exposed to.  The authors  conclude  that  “just  as
biological evolution can deliver the appearance of design without the existence of a designer, so too
can cultural evolution” (Kirby et al., 2008).
Although it is recognized that genes may code for learning biases, in Kirby's models selection is
acting on what they  define as the extended phenotype of language,  that is those properties that
emerge at the population level as a result of cultural transmission.
“This approach does not deny the possibility that much of our linguistic ability is genetically coded
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and may be explained in terms of natural selection, but it does highlight the fact that biological
evolution  is  by no means the only powerful  adaptive  system at  work in  the  origins  of  human
language” (Kirby, 1998, p. 1)
In Chomskian view, language is seen as an individual trait (I-L), a cognitive device mapping signals
into  a  representation  system assigning meaning to  them according to  a  set  of  syntactical  rules
biologically engrained. The role of the linguistic population is not considered as a relevant factor in
determining language structure: language universals are to be explained with the innate cognitive
biases shared by all the world speakers.
Although putting a final word on the fruitfulness of UG as the fundamental engine for language
acquisition is not the aim of this work, as this debate belongs to the linguistic framework, it is
interesting  to  note  how Kirby's  studies  stress  the  importance  of  cultural  evolution  as  a  factor
shaping  language.  ILM  studies  challenge  the  existence  of  strongly  constraining  biological
predispositions for language and the adaptationist view according to which language structure was
shaped by natural selection (Pinker and Bloom, 1990) acting on the alleged biological constraints,
whose very existence is questioned by the ILM simulations and experiments.
Some clarifications however are needed. The object of inquiry of ILMs is language structure, that is
language current features and universals. This is something different from the language faculty, as
intended by Hauser  et al. (2002). ILM propose the alternative explanation that language current
features,  such  as  the  much  debated  and  fundamental  trait  of  compositional  syntax,  are  not
determined by innate learning constraints, biologically evolved, but rather they are the outcome of
language  use,  cultural  transmission  dynamics  that  shape  language  in  order  to  make  it  more
learnable: language structure is a function of its learnability, the characteristic that allows language
to “reproduce” and “survive” (be transmitted from individual to individual and across generations).
Cultural evolution, an evolutionary process acting on a different timescale, other than biological
evolution and classical natural selection, is retained responsible for the emergence of a property
(compositional  syntax)  that  Chomsky  explained  with  UG  (without  providing  a  satisfactory
evolutionary explanation)  and Pinker  and Bloom explained with  natural  selection  (a  functional
explanation). 
Evolutionary linguistics studies seem to lead to the consequence that two independent evolutionary
processes are responsible for a trait whose complexity is growing even bigger: not only language
should be intended as a mosaic of traits, each of which might have had an independent evolutionary
history (multicomponent approach),  but also different evolutionary processes acting on different
timescales  are  responsible  of  language  evolution;  this  means  that,  in  order  to  explain  the
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evolutionary  emergence  of  this  trait,  we  have  to  consider  evolutionary  processes  that  differ
fundamentally in nature (explanatory pluralism) (see Box 2).
Box 2 – biological and cultural evolution: differences and analogies
Biological and cultural evolutionary processes share analogies and differences. Both processes can
be described as sharing a common bones that is typical of all Darwinian processes: 1) variation 2)
inheritance  3)  differential  survival.  However,  some  fundamental  differences  exist  as  well:  if
variation is usually believed to be random in biological evolution (new mutations emerge randomly
in the population), in cultural evolution variation can be biased and even intentionally directed
towards  specific  novelties.  Some  fundamental  differences  are  present  also  in  the  system  of
inheritance; while in biological evolution inheritance is vertical (from one generation to another),
in  cultural  evolution  there  are  multiple  modalities  through  which  cultural  information  can  be
transmitted: vertical (from parents to offspring), horizontal (between two individuals of the same
generation), oblique (from one individual of one generation to a non-related individual of another
generation) (see Cavalli Sforza and Feldman, 1981). Moreover, while selection is one of the most
important processes through which a trait persists in biological evolution, some researchers believe
that selection is not as fundamental in cultural evolution as it is in the biological domain; in fact,
they maintain that the persistence of a cultural trait follows a modality that they call it the cutural
attraction model and selection is considered a subset of the possible forms that attraction can take
(Cladiere et al. 2014). Moreover, biological evolution and cultural evolution fundamentally occur
on different timescales, the latter being much faster than the former. The debate on how to frame
cultural evolution and understanding to which extent it shares fundamental features with biological
evolution is open and alive today. For an introduction to this topics see Mesoudi (2011).
Uncovering the genetic underpinnings of language remains a crucial effort and the biolinguistic
program (Boeckx et al., 2012) is trying to do exactly so, stressing the importance of identifying the
genetic and epigenetic network at the bases of language, focusing in particular on the concept of
language-ready  brain,  which  is  thought  to  be  shaped  by  biological  evolution  during  human
evolution (Arbib, 2012; Boeckx and Benitez Burraco, 2014). However, we would like to stress that
understanding the relationships between biological evolution and cultural evolution is crucial for
understanding the dynamics at the bases of language evolution and origins. We argue that such
integration is much needed.
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We will consider now some studies that address the interaction between biology and culture in
language  evolution  bringing  arguments  in  favor  of  a  separation  and  a  sort  of  incompatibility
between biological and cultural evolutionary processes.
7. Biology and culture: different evolutionary rates
A strong argument  against  an adaptationist  account  of language evolution,  say à  la  Pinker  and
Bloom, comes from the “moving target” argument held by Christiansen and Chater (2008).
Language change rate occurs on a timescale that is considered incompatible with the timescale on
which natural selection operates, hence the claim that a universal feature of language would be
coded in genes, fixed by natural selection, is unsustainable: natural selection cannot simply lead to
genetic fixation a trait that is changing too fast. Hence it results highly improbable that a domain-
specific mechanism could have evolved as an adaptation via the slow and gradual action of natural
selection (Christiansen and Chater, 2010). These authors also dismiss as highly implausible the non-
functional account of language (Bickerton, 1995; Gould, 1993; Lightfoot, 2000) intended as a by-
product of some structural effect such as increase in brain size (Christiansen and Chater, 2008).
However, it has to be noticed that the critique to the adaptationist view of UG itself adopts a naïve
evolutionism when it assumes a one-to-one correspondence between genetic change and linguistic
features. Moreover this critique seems to conflate the nature of UG, treating it as a feature common
to all languages (E-L) and not as a cognitive computational device that allows to acquire language
(I-L).
Christiansen and Chater conclude that UG represents a domain-specific system for language for
which  no  viable  evolutionary  account  is  available.  Instead  of  viewing  the  brain  as  having  a
genetically evolved system for language, they propose that the key to language evolution is the
evolutionary process over language itself. Language features that are easy to learn and process or
communicatively effective will be retained; language is the way it  is not because of a domain-
specific language acquisition device, but rather because of domain-general cognitive biases already
present in the brain and not specifically dedicated to language, from which the motto: “language as
shaped by the brain” or language adapted to the brain (Christiansen and Chater, 2008).
The  nature  of  these  constraints  is  divided  into  four  groups:  perceptuo-motor  factors,  cognitive
limitations  to  learning  and  processing,  constraints  from  thought,  pragmatic  constraints  (see
Christiansen and Chater, 2010 for details, where the implications for language acquisition are also
discussed).
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The incompatibility between biological and cultural evolution is made explicit in this passage:
“Cultural evolution will work against biological (co)evolution in the case of malleable aspects of
culture— rapid cultural change leads to a fast-changing cultural environment, which serves as a
‘‘moving target’’ to which biological adaptation cannot occur” (Christiansen and Chater, 2010, p.
12).
Based on computer simulation (Chater et al., 2009),  they argue that “genes encoding aspects of
culture that were initially freely varying, and  not held constant by functional pressure, could not
have arisen through biological evolution” (Christiansen and Chater, 2010, p. 12, my italic)
As biological and cultural rates of evolution are considered incompatible, Christiansen and Chater
(2010) consider the two processes as independent; nonetheless, they acknowledge that, to a certain
extent, the two processes can interact, displaying the issue in the following way, identifying two
clear-cut options:
1) culture comes first and biological adaptation brings about the fit with the cultural structure; they
call it biological evolution, or biological adaptation to cultural structures.
2) biological structures come first, and cultural adaptation brings about the fit with these biological
structures; they call it cultural evolution, as culture adapts to pre-existing biological constraints.
According to the “moving target” argument (specifically developed for language, but extensible to
cultural behaviors in general) culture does not generate selective pressures consistent enough to
allow biological  adaptation.  Also,  point (1) assumes that  culture does not arise  from biological
constraints, that is it is not the product of previous selective events. Moreover, biological adaptation
to a cultural environment would produce highly adapted domain-specific mechanisms.
On the  other  side,  point  (2)  assumes  that  culture  is  determined  by pre-existing  biological  and
developmental constraints and its evolution adapts to these constraints through processes of cultural
variation,  transmission  and  selection.  The  pre-existing  biological  machinery  is  the  product  of
Darwinian  selection  in  relation  to  old  tasks;  culture  sets  new tasks,  co-opting  already present
structures  to  new functions.  In  this  sense  the  motto  'language  is  shaped  by the  brain'  can  be
generalized in 'culture adapts to biological constraints'.
We believe that this way of framing the problem show limitations, as both these accounts taken
separately miss some crucial points.
Point (1) implicitly assumes that in human evolution selective pressures were not held constant, so
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that  biological  adaptation  could  occur  at  all.  However,  we  will  explore  an  alternative  to  this
viewpoint: partial genetic assimilation (Dor and Jablonka, 2000).
Point  (2)  poses  a  too  radical  separation  between  biological  and  cultural  evolution,  indirectly
suggesting that the former makes its job till a certain point and then the workload is overtaken by
cultural  evolution.  This  viewpoint  (which  we  label  separationist and  which  is  explored  and
criticized in chapter three, Suman, submitted) is present in literature today, and we believe its core
ideas  are  embodied  in  the  language-ready brain  proposals  (Arbib,  2012;  Pagel,  2012;  see also
Boeckx and Benitez Burraco, 2014). We believe that this conception represents a rather simplistic
account of the interaction between biological and cultural evolution, as it is not in agreement with
what we currently know from the paleoanthropological and archeological record,  which instead
suggests  the  viability  of  a  co-evolutionary  model  of  genes,  biological  constraints  and  culture
(Laland et al., 2010).
Summarizing, Christiansen and Chater's point, despite dismissing UG as a domain-specific system
at the bases of language acquisition for its evolutionary emergence cannot be demonstrated, argues
in favor of innate biological constraints to which language must adapt, intending these constraints to
be domain-general.
So despite the argument brought forward against the conception of UG as a domain-specific system,
whose evolution remains difficult to prove, seems plausible and convincing, the argument according
to which biological and cultural evolution present incompatible rates of change can be challenged
by recent researches.
8. The Assimilate-stretch principle
As we just pointed out, Christiansen and Chater's argument suffers a too radical separation between
biological  and  cultural  evolutionary  processes.  We  would  like  to  discuss  here  a  conceptual
framework in which biological and cultural  evolution show a better  integration,  interacting and
influencing each others.
We have reached the point in which the structuralist (Chomskian), the functionalist (reviewed in
Szamado and Szathamry, 2006), the domain-specific (Chomsky and Pinker and Bloom) and the
domain-general  (Christiansen  and  Chater)  accounts  show  limitations  when  matched  with  the
evolutionary analysis. We have identified these limitations primarily in the incapability of providing
a proper integration between biological and cultural evolution.
Dor and Jablonka (2000) try to re-frame the evolutionary question assuming a different perspective
41
on language compared to Chomskian syntactic-centered account, assigning much more importance
to  semantics:  speakers  mentally  categorize,  or  classify,  events  according  to  their  semantic
properties. Natural language, then, is a communication tool  which is structurally designed for the
communication of a constrained set of meanings, exploiting the vocal-auditory channel (and the
visual channel), and as such it has to be evolutionary addressed.
They recognize  the  functional  specificity  of  language and its  universality  (all  members  of  our
species possess it), but they argue that
“the  claim  that  specific  grammatical  rules  and  constraints  are  genetically  encoded  cannot  be
reconciled with what we know about  brain structures:  neuroscientists from different disciplines
seem to agree that the brain is an organ of extreme plasticity and generality (cf. Elman et al., 1996;
Deacon,  1997),  which  means  that  the  chances  of  finding  explicit  representations  of  linguistic
specificities innately encoded in brain tissue prior to acquisition are very slim” (Dor and Jablonka,
2000, p. 35)
They characterize language as a unique and highly constrained communication system, dedicated to
communication of a specifically restricted set of meanings, as the type of meanings that can be
expressed are a constrained subset of what can be thought and felt; “in technical terms, semantic
categories are a subset of conceptual categories” (Dor and Jablonka, 2000, p. 36)
The definition of the object of inquiry defines together the evolutionary questions that must be
addressed to understand the so-defined-object.
The evolutionary machinery proposed by Dor and Jablonka consists of a gradual expansion and
sophistication of the set of semantic categories, their interactions, and their modes of mapping onto
the speech channel.
We believe that Dor and Jablonka reframing of the definition of language allows to display an
evolutionary research programme that is able to exploit the explanatory power of the interaction of
biological and cultural evolution influencing each other.
The argument exposed by Dor and Jablonka (2000) is labeled the  assimilate stretch principle, is
refined in subsequent works such as Dor and Jablonka (2001; 2004; 2010), Jablonka and Lamb
(2005)  and Dor  and Jablonka  (2014),  and relies  on  some key explanatory ingredients  such  as
plasticity, cultural transmission, modification of the selective environment and genetic assimilation.
We will discuss further these elements in the wider framework of the debate on the evolution of the
evolutionary  research  programme  proposed  by  the  supporters  of  the  Extended  Evolutionary
Synthesis.
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Here is an outline of the assimilate stretch principle (see fig. 5; see also Jablonka and Lamb, 2005):
in this model a certain behavior is described as a sequence of actions and an animal, like a bird, is
capable of learning a sequence of, say, 4 acts culminating in a certain behavior, be it a mating dance
or a nest-building behavior. Constraints on the learning capacity are assumed, due for example to
memory  limitations  or  other  brain  features.  Constant  selective  pressures  for  the  efficient
performance are also assumed: the faster you learn and the more efficiently you perform, the more
advantage you have. Within the population, individuals in which one step of the complex behavior
will be genetically encoded will learn faster and will free a slot to further learning, allowing to
sophisticate  the  behavior  and  new behaviors  will  spread  in  the  population  via  social  learning,
allowing new behaviors to spread and be modified through cultural evolution. If selective pressures
remain constant, the genetic mutation will give an advantage to their bearers and will get fixed
within the population: this phenomenon is labeled genetic assimilation (see Waddington, 1957; see
also Dor and Jablonka, 2014). The speed of assimilation is expected to vary in different cases,
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The  process  of  assimilation  of  part  of  the  behavioral  sequence  via  genetic  evolution  and  the
stretching of the learning sequence may explain the evolution of many behavioral patterns in nature,
transforming learned behaviors in more innate, or instinctive, behaviors, such as predator avoidance
in birds, poisonous food avoidance in rats or fear of the smell of lions shown by hyena cubs before
they  have  ever  encountered  a  lion (see  Avital  and  Jablonka,  2000).  Genetic  assimilation  is
dependent  on the  consistency of  the  selective  pressures,  so  it  can  also  occur  in  only a  partial
assimilation  of  the  learning  sequence.  At  the  same  time  selection  pressure  for  more  efficient
learning exposes hidden variation in the ability to learn the specific behaviour, and leads to the
selection of better, specialised learners.
This model describes a process that shows the interaction between the biological and the cultural
level:  the process  of  genetic  assimilation (genetic  evolution)  and the  stretching of  the  learning
sequence and its spread through social learning (cultural evolution).
The type of process described reflects a typical case of Baldwin effect (Baldwin, ; Simpson, 1953).
Individuals first adapt to a new environmental challenge with a flexible, plastic accomodation of the
phenotype.  If  selective  pressures  are  constant  enough,  learning  is  on  average  more  costly  and
lenghty then a genetically fixed expression of the same behavior, as the energetic investment will be
smaller. If individuals emerge in the population equipped with genetic variations that will lower the
learning investment,  they will  have a  selective advantage on those individuals  fully relying on
learning, as the efficient behavior will be expressed faster and more efficiently. The advantageous
genetic variant will spread and fix in the population through standard Darwinian selection. 
Applied to the evolution of language, this model assumes a system of a very limited set of meanings
mapped  onto  a  set  of  phonetic  markers,  similar  to  an  early  protolanguage  or  an  animal
communication  system  based  on  referential  calls,  such  as  alarm  calls  or  emotional-social
vocalizations, as it is the case with some mammalian species whose signs are transmitted culturally
through social learning. Also the set of conceptual categories is larger than the set of expressible
semantic categories. This is a reasonable assumption if we think of experiments on chimpanzees,
showing  a  rich  mental  life  (some  form  of  theory  of  mind,  some  level  of  conceptualization,
understanding of social relationships and hierarchies, some motivation in sharing information, the
necessary amount of variability) but a limited capacity to communicate it.
At  this  hypothetical  stage  innovation  in  the  communication/linguistic  system come  across  the
population: this presupposes a certain group structure with interactions among individuals. Cultural
innovations  (Reader  and  Laland,  2003)  can  have  emerged  in  different  contexts  present  in  the
evolutionary history of genus  Homo, such as social play among offsprings, mother and offspring
interactions, cooperative needs among group mates: a plausible promising realistic scenario will be
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described  further  in  details  in  chapter  one  (Suman  and  Pievani,  2015;  see  also  the  Self-
Domestication Hypothesis, Gibbons, 2014). Innovations are more likely to be understood by closely
related individuals and this factor probably played a role also in the evolution of more sophisticated
forms of communication as different models based on kin selection argue (Fitch, 2004; 2007; Falk,
2009; Fogarty et al., 2011).
Once the innovation is acquired by a few members of the community it may spread across the
population,  through different  modalities  and depending  on several  factors  (Reader  and Laland,
2003; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013), being frequency dependent selection one of the most fundamental
criteria  (we will  discuss  it  in  chapter  three,  Suman,  submitted).  Through a  process  of  cultural
evolution the innovation can get conventionalized, depending on its adaptive value, as a tool of
social communication. 
At this point, we should clarify to which extent genetic assimilation can occur. Dor and Jablonka
(2000) argue in favor of a linguistically-driven genetic assimilation, that is a genetic assimilation
occurring  after  a  long  period  of  consistent  directional  cultural  evolution.  A complete  genetic
assimilation will lead in principle towards the genetic fixation of a specific adaptation, a sort of
genetic/developmental module for language. However, Dor and Jablonka argue in favor of a partial
genetic assimilation resulting in a cognition biased towards specific semantic categories, that is a
cognition  more  prone  to  language  acquisition  and  usage.  A  partial  rather  than  a  complete
assimilation is also more compatible with cultural change which remains at high rates and relies
deeply on phenotypic plasticity and behavioral flexibility.
Dor and Jablonka's argument hence claims that a certain genetic endowment dedicated to language
has to be found. However, it is important to understand the nature of this genetic endowment.
Despite the early enthusiasm that followed the discovery of FOXP2 led to mistakenly present it as
the gene for language, today it is widely acknowledged that things are much more nuanced than
that. The very notion of a “gene for” is an oversimplification resulting in a flawed conception of
biological networks. However, the notion of language genetics in not itself flawed or an illegitimate
enterprise.  On  the  contrary  it  represents  a  fundamental  brick  of  language  evolution  studies;
researchers  should  only  worry  of  not  adopting  a  naïve  evolutionist  view,  assigning  too  much
explanatory power to natural  selection acting on genes.  Studies  reviewed in Ramus and Fisher
(2009) suggest that many genes affecting cognition are “generalist genes”, producing their effects
relatively uniformly in the brain, hence genes that perform several different functions in various
organs and stages of development,  rather than genes for a specific monofunctional  task.  Genes
associated  with  dyslexia  and  other  language  disorders  are  turning  out  to  show  similar
characteristics.  Widening our  knowledge on the  genetic  and epigenetic  network  at  the  basis  of
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language is crucial for future research, and this is what the Biolinguistics group in Barcelona is
aiming at (Boeckx and Benitez Burraco, 2014; Boeckx et al., 2016).
9. A comparison: the moving target argument and the assimilate-stretch principle
The  “assimilate  stretch  principle”  by Dor  and  Jablonka  and  the  “moving  target”  argument  by
Christiansen and Chater both conceive an interaction between biological and cultural evolution but
with some crucial differences.
Christiansen and Chater conclude that biological and cultural evolution rates of change stand on
incompatible time scales, so that it is highly implausible that cultural traits would get fixed in the
genetic  endowment  resulting  in  task-specific  adaptations  or  a  domain-specific  innate  cognitive
device  such  as  UG.  They  argue  instead  that  language  acquisition  stands  on  domain-general
cognitive  capacities  evolved  through  biological  evolution  and  that  cultural  evolution  set  new
demanding tasks that allowed pre-existing congnitive biases to get recruited for linguistic use. We
will  label,  in  chapter  three,  this  juxtaposition  between  biological  and  cultural  evolution  a
separationist  perspective,  as  the  latter  seems  to  starts  where  the  former  stops,  and  such  a
perspective finds similarities with the language-ready brain as used by Arbib (2012) (see Suman,
submitted). Crucially, Christiansen and Chater assume that the incompatibility between biological
and cultural rates of change is due to selective pressures not remaining constant enough.
Dor and Jablonka's model instead assumes the consistency of the selective pressures as a key factor
for genetic assimilation of cultural traits to occur. However, they argue this assimilation is unlikely
to be complete resulting in a task-specific adaptation or a domain-specific cognitive device such as
UG; it will be most probably a partial genetic assimilation of the learned behavior, which allows to
free more space for learning and allowing the gradual sophistication of the behavior and its spread
through social  learning and its  cultural  evolution.  This  perspective on the interactions  between
biological  and  cultural  evolution  conceives  an  integration  (integrative  perspective,  see  chapter
three, Suman, submitted) between the two processes, influencing each other and going side by side.
We believe  that  in  order  to  understand the  kind of  interaction  between cultural  and biological
evolution  it  is  crucial  to  linger  on  the  nature  of  the  selective  pressures  that  might  have  been
involved in language evolution. This focus involves a significant and usually underappreciated shift
in  the  theoretical  approach  adopted  to  tackle  these  questions.  We  will  introduce  here  some
considerations at the basis of the Evolutionary Extended Synthesis proposal. It is crucial to have the
best possible understanding of the selective pressures that acted during the long course of human
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evolution,  in  order  to  evaluate  their  consistency and continuity.  We will  argue  that  continuous
selective pressures were present in human evolution, and specifically those pressures generated by
the systematic modification of the environment caused by niche construction activity.
10. Gene-culture co-evolution and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis logic
In conclusion of their influential paper, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002: 1579) suggested that
“particular  selective  pressures,  unique  to  our  evolutionary  past”  may  have  led,  as  a  direct
consequence or as a by-product, to a neural reorganization from which novel cognitive functions
might have emerged, being available to be coopted for different tasks, including language faculties.
Szamado and Szathmary (2006) consider why the transition to language occurred only in humans
among primates. A transition can be variation-limited “when the available genetic variation in the
given  lineage  does  not  offer  even  a  partial  solution  to  the  problem  at  hand,  and  it  takes  a
considerable  time  (in  evolutionary  terms)  for  the  necessary  variation  to  arise.  By  contrast,  a
transition  is  selection-limited if  the  necessary genetic  prerequisites  of  a  possible  transition  are
present, but the given transition is not selected for as this would require a specific ecological or
social context” (Szamado and Szathmary, 2006, p. 555).
For example, the transition from the prokaryotic to the eukaryotic cell is better interpreted as a
variation-limited transition. Chimpanzees and humans share almost 99% of their genome; some
great apes are capable of learning up to some hundreds of lexical items (lexigrams) and partially
communicating with sign language, showing also some understanding of novel sentences (Savage-
Rambaugh, 1998). Today, researchers argue that chimpanzees possess to a certain degree a theory of
mind, a crucial feature for the pragmatics involved in language (Call and Tomasello, 2008). 
Simplifying,  it  can  be  said  that  chimpanzees  have  a  rich  mental  activity,  witnessed  by  their
understanding capacities, but a much poorer capacity to express such an activity.
Despite  some variation  limitation  such as  the  cortico-ambigual  connections  associated  to  vocal
learning in humans (see Fitch, 2011), Szamado and Szathmary argue that the transition towards
human  language  from primate  cognition  and  communication  was  primarily  a  selection-limited
transition, “given that no other primates have yet evolved a language-like communication system
despite the fact that, arguably, they have the basic cognitive skills required and a similar genetic
background to humans” (Szamado and Szathmary, 2006, p. 556).
Laland (2015) argues that selective pressures are usually considered the starting point of standard
evolutionary analysis  or  Standard Evolutionary Theory (SET):  a  single trait  is  isolated and the
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selective pressures promoting the trait  are treated as the ultimate causes for the spread and the
evolution of that trait.  We previously characterized this  approach as “atomistic” referred to the
isolation of the trait and “externalist” and “unidirectional” as referred to selective causality:  the
selective  environment  operating  on  a  trait  is  the  only  (ultimate)  cause  for  its  evolution.  This
approach showed limitations as characterized by naive adaptationism and genocentrism (Gould and
Lewontin 1979);  the researches gathered and described so far  put in light  the need for a more
pluralist  and integrative  approach.  If  language transition  is  characterized  as  a  selection-limited
variation, taking selective pressures as the starting point seems a rather limited approach. Instead,
what should be asked is where do selective pressures come from, what characterized the selective
regime that made that transition possible.
We will argue in this work that niche construction, hence organismal activity, plays a fundamental
and underappreciated role in such a transition. We will also argue that a rethinking of the classical
distinction between proximate and ultimate causes (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963) is necessary to
frame the causal elements at the bases of language evolution in order to understand the evolutionary
processes involved in language emergence.  Niche construction theory (Odling Smee et al., 2003)
and the concept of reciprocal causation (Laland et al., 2011; see also Laland et al, 2013; Laland et
al. 2015) give the additional theoretical contribution that allows to frame causality in evolutionary
biology in a different way. We will argue (Suman, submitted) that in particular cultural transmission
is the additional element that must be taken into account to understand the causal links between
selective pressures, the evolved mechanisms and the conditions that allow selective pressures for
language to ensue. Chapter three tries to discuss these issues: if we intend language as a selection-
limited transition, we argue that in order to understand this transition, a rethinking of the causal
relationships among proximate mechanisms, cultural transmission and ultimate causes is needed,
and the concept of reciprocal causation provides the proper guidelines for such a rethinking.
The reasons why the theoretical framework proposed by the EES could result the proper theoretical
framework within which the evolution of language studies should operate are presented along all
the papers gathered in this work: chapter one (Suman and Pievani, 2015), chapter two (Suman,
2016) and chapter three (Suman, submitted).
Exploring the complex intertwine between biological and cultural evolution is the key to understand
the processes at the bases of language evolution. We argue that co-evolutionary dynamics between
genes  and  culture  were  dominant  throughout  all  the  evolution  of  genus  Homo  and  deeply
characterized hominin evolution. 
In particular, evolved cultural traits modified the selective pressures for novel traits and got fixed in
a positive feedback process: the more individuals relied on a certain behavior, the more possessing a
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refined variant of this behavior would result advantageous; in terms of learning and communication,
the more individuals  learned about the world, the more they could communicate about; and the
more  they  could  communicate,  the  more  they  could  learn.  This  in  principle  might  generate
consistent  selective  pressures  for  certain  traits  or  behaviors  and  it  also  might  speed  up  the
evolutionary rate in a run-away process.
In  such  a  scenario,  the  cultural  evolution  of  the  trait  becomes  a  relevant  active  causal  factor,
continuously constructing the selective regime for its  own spread. We argue in favor of such a
perspective in chapter three.
11. One long argument for the evolution of language: the cultural drive hypothesis
We will argue in chapter three that a gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamic has been in place at
least since the appearance of genus Homo, representing a deeply influencing evolutionary pattern. 
In parallel to development of animal culture studies (Reader and Laland, 2003; Laland and Galef,
2009), researches are revealing more and more that this evolutionary pattern might be much more
spread in phylogeny, beyond just humans, than what was previously thought. For instance, a very
recent study revealed that the differentiation of populations of Atlantic killer whales has been driven
by gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamics (Foote at al., 2016). 
We stress again that understanding the evolution of language requires what Darwin would have
labeled one long argument, that necessarily has to keep together a large set of evolutionary features:
the evolution of the brain, the evolution of cognition, the evolution of cooperation, the evolution of
communication,  the  evolution  of  culture,  just  to  mention the more macroscopic ones.  Multiple
factors co-evolved and influenced each others evolution. It seems rather hard to provide a proper
evolutionary  explanation  able  to  keep  together  all  these  heterogeneous  topics  within  a  single
explanatory framework. However, surprisingly, Kevin Laland in its most recent book Culturing the
mind (Laland, 2016, in press) provides what seems one long argument for the evolution of human
intelligence, cognition and language, presenting it within the guidelines of what we identify in this
work as the key concepts of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, namely explanatory pluralism, in
contrast to the atomistic explanation provided by a naïve evolutionism, and reciprocal causation
among several co-evolving features, in contrast to an externalist and unidirectional view of causality
represented by the SET view.
We would like to summarize here some of the main points of the hypothesis presented in Laland
(2016) and representing the guiding research lines that have driven researches in the Laland Lab in
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the last years. This analysis starts from the 'cultural drive' hypothesis that was advanced for the first
time by Allan Wilson (1934 – 1991). In a nutshell, this hypothesis wants to show how culture drove
the evolution of intelligence in primates and in humans.
Allan Wilson noted a correlation between rates at which animals evolve and their brain size, from
early amphibians to human beings. In the last 400 million years the brain size of a wide set of
vertebrates has increased and accelerated its expansion, suggesting some feedback mechanism at
work. Wilson hypothesized the following process: an advantageous habit (innovation) emerges in
an individual, it spreads through social learning, selection fixes it, with selection regime established
by innovations  themselves.  Each  increment  in  brain  size  would  enhance  the  species  ability  to
generate  and  propagate  new  habits,  in  a  runaway  process.  Advantageous  habits  would  favor
anatomical evolution, hence, according to Wilson, relative brain size (volume of the brain relative to
body size) should correlate to rates of anatomical evolution. Wyles et al. (1983) and Wilson (1985)
provided a first confirmation to these data, finding that rates of evolutionary change in body plan
correlate strongly with relative brain size in vertebrates.
A fundamental principle of Darwinism is that mutation rate and anatomical evolution rate (number
of mutations that get fixed) are independent from each other. However, the latter may be dependent
on  the  rate  at  which  new habits  spread,  by virtue  of  the  different  selective  regimes  they  can
generate. Wilson calls it  an autocatalytic process mediated by the brain. Today this process has
some similarities with niche construction (Odling Smee et al. 2003).
Wilson's cultural or behavioral drive hypothesis today is supported by little evidence for mammals
and birds. However, this is not the case for the evolution of large brains and complex cognition in
primates, hominins and humans (Reader and Laland, 2002; Reader  et al. 2011; Dean et al. 2012;
Navarette et al. 2016).
We will present here in the Introduction some of the main points of Laland (2016) proposal and we
will return to this point in the Conclusions.
12. The evolution of primate intelligence
Reader and Laland (2002) study on animal innovation showed an association between innovation
and brain size in primates and birds; they also showed that social learning and innovation co-vary in
primates, and that ecologically relevant measures of cognitive abilities were predicted by brain size
in primates.
However, some small-brained animals rely on social learning, meaning that they are able to copy
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others'  behaviors;  in  this  sense,  invertebrates  copying,  such  as  fruitflies,  wood  crickets  or
honeybees, seem a challenge to the cultural drive hypothesis, as they don't need big brains.
Simulation  experiments  such as  the  social  learning strategies  tournament  (Rendell  et  al. 2010)
showed that what was adaptive was not  copying frequency, but rather  efficient copying: copying
ability rather than frequency brought advantages to their bearers.
So more accurate, more strategic and higher-fidelity copying resulted the most adaptive strategy,
which would have ultimately spread through selection. At the same time, functional capabilities and
associated structures in the brain will be expected to evolve to the extent they enhance efficient
copying and favor innovation.
Better  perceptual  system  like  better  visual  acuity  to  imitate  motor  actions  (food-processing
techniques  or  tool  manufacturing)  or  better  auditory processing  and better  mapping of  sensory
inputs  to  behavioral  outputs,  connecting  visual,  auditory,  somatosensory  and  motor  cortex  are
features  that  are  expected  to  evolve  in  such  a  condition.  In  primates,  for  example,  foraging
information is the most socially transmitted knowledge. Effective copying might favor also a theory
of  mind  (ToM)  for  example  in  copying  facial  expressions,  or  mental  time  travel  (MTT)  and
planning capacities.  Social  learning and the spread of  cultural  transmission would favor  higher
computation  capacities  in  the  brain,  decision  making,  working  and  long-term memory,  mental
simulation,  features  that  in  humans are  associated  to  the  prefrontal  cortex,  an area  particularly
expanded in hominin evolution (Deacon, 1997; Somel et al., 2014).
Outside of the brain, at the population level, socially transmitted behaviors such as tool making
would easily spread and social tolerance would be favored, particularly among kin; in this sense we
explore in chapter one (Suman and Pievani, 2015) the connections with the meaningfulness of the
Self-Domestication hypothesis (Gibbons, 2014) in human evolution.
Laland and colleagues'  researches around the cultural  drive hypothesis  touch other fundamental
points of cognitive evolution, that will not be reported here in details but just quickly mentioned
(see Laland, 2016), regarding the implausibility of a modular cognitive evolution of the primate
brain, rather arguing in favor of the evolution of a general intelligence.
Dunbar's Social Brain hypothesis (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007) and its corollary (Social Intelligence
hypothesis), according to which primate intelligence has been primarily shaped by selection for
social rather than ecological (diet breadth, for instance) or technical (tool use) tasks, is confirmed by
several data, but also shows some limitations: for instance, it cannot predict the performance of
primates in laboratory tests of cognition (Reader et al. 2011).
A common habit spread through researchers in brain evolution studies was to make claims about the
role of a single variable, ranging from diet to group size, to predict brain size and its evolution. The
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Social Intelligence hypotheiss is an example that shows the typical structure of what we labeled the
SET view, that is isolating a single variable, like group size, and attributing to it the causal primacy
for a complex trait such as brain size or primate intelligence. On the contrary Reader and Laland
(2011)  considered  multiple  variables  at  the  same  time,  reaching  the  conclusion  that  primate
intelligence is characterized by the co-evolution of several factors, shaped both by biological and
cultural evolutionary processes (what we labeled here explanatory pluralism).
Reader and Laland (2011) made a meta-analysis of published scientific literature, considering more
than a hundred primate species and providing quantitative measures of rates of innovation, social
learning, tool use, extractive foraging, tactical deception (5 cognitive measures), diet breadth, fruit
in the diet and group size (3 social measures), investigating the relations between these measures
with statistical methods (principal component analysis, see supplementary material from Reader et
al. 2011). “The analysis revealed a single dominant component, which explained over sixty-five per
cent of the variance in cognitive measures. (…) Further analyses confirmed that these cognitive
abilities were not just correlated in the present, but had evolved together” (Laland, 2016, p. 127).
Laland and colleagues conclude that this single dominant component (that they label factor g) is a
good measure for primate general intelligence, keeping together social,  ecological and technical
features.
Subsequent  studies  showed that  capuchin monkeys,  baboons,  macaques  and great  apes  showed
convergently evolved high general intelligence; these species are known to deeply rely on social
learning (Lewis and Laland, 2012): “this pattern of results is exactly what would be expected if
social learning really were a major driver of the evolution of brain and cognition in primates.
Those primates with high primate g scores are those renowned for their complex cognition and rich
cultural  behavior” (Laland, 2016, p.  129, my italics).  Laland concludes that  brain size,  general
intelligence and reliance on culture had co-evolved in primates.
These studies seem to confirm Wilson's original insight, according to whom diverse mental abilities
had co-evolved in primates:  selection for efficient social learning and innovativeness allowed for
energy gains  in  diet,  which  in  turn  fueled  brain  growth,  and  generated  selection  for  extended
longevity and social learning: “the investment of time in acquiring skill and knowledge leads to
selection  for  lowered  mortality  rates  and  greater  longevity”  (Laland,  2016,  p.133). This
evolutionary pattern shows surprising similarities with what happened in hominin evolution: we
will discuss this point in chapter one and chapter two.
Summing up:
“Group size was not the sole predictor of either brain size or intelligence in our models, and this,
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combined with our finding that social  group size does not predict  the absolute  size of primate
brains, nor the performance of primates in laboratory tests of cognition, reinforced our view that
there  was  more  to  primate  brain  evolution  than  selection  for  social  intelligence.  The  most
parsimonious way to interpret these findings is to recognize multiple waves of selection for both
bigger  brains  and  greater  intelligence  in  primates,  operating  at  different  scales. Our  analyses
agreed with pre-existing research in recognizing the significance of natural selection for the social
intelligence to cope with the complexities of social life, which was probably widespread across
monkeys  and  apes.  However,  we  elaborated  on  this  story,  to  suggest  that  selection  for  social
intelligence  was  followed  by  a  later,  more  restricted,  but  nonetheless  critical,  bout  of  natural
selection favoring cultural intelligence, in a small number of large-brained, social primates, most
notably the great apes” (Laland, 2016, p.133-134, my italics)
13. Why only us? The question of cumulative culture
What emerges from these recent studies is that the interaction between biological evolution and
cultural traits are much more widespread than just in modern humans. Culture, in animal culture
studies,  is  usually defined as  “information  capable of  affecting individuals'  behaviors  that  they
acquire  by  members  of  their  species  through  imitation,  teaching  and  other  forms  of  social
transmission” (Odling Smee and Laland, 2011).  Other vertebrate  species and not only primates
however rely on dynamics of social learning and cultural transmission, like corivds, parrots, whales
and dolphins, and may have faced co-evolution of brain size, general intelligence and reliance on
culture. However, language have not evolved in them. Why? Given the autocatalytic nature of the
cultural drive process, one species could have run away from the others, but due to which factors?
One answer could be pure chance, but it would be scientifically unsatisfactory. Demographic factors
instead may have certainly played a role: when population size reached a critical threshold, cultural
information was less likely to be lost and knowledge could accumulate.
Mathematical modeling proved to be extremely insightful in inquiring these issues (Enquist et al.
2010; Lewis and Laland, 2012). In fact, another peculiar feature that must be taken into account
when dealing with alleged human uniqueness is the human capacity for cumulative culture (Tennie
et al. 2009), that is the ability to increase cultural  traits in diversity and complexity over time.
Enquist  and colleagues work showed that for a given population size there is  a threshold level
whereby a small increase in fidelity will transform a cultural trait from being short-lasting to long-
lasting. Similarly, Michael Tomasello (see Tennie et al. 2009) argued that high fidelity transmission
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is a critical feature to display the “ratchet effect” of cumulative culture, that is building cultural
traits up in diversity and complexity starting from what the previous generation built (“stepping on
the shoulders of giants”, see Enquist, Ghirlanda, Eriksson, 2011).
Although claims for cumulative culture have been made in chimpanzees (Boesch, 2003) and new
caledonian crows (Hunt  and Gray 2003),  these claims are controversial  and to date  cumulative
culture can be fairly treated as a species-specific human characteristic. Providing a proper definition
of cumulative culture is a demanding task that still needs refinement (see Dean et al. 2013 and Noël
Haidle et al. 2015 for a discussion on such a definition).
Lewis and Laland (2012) work quantified innovation, modification, combination, number of traits
and trait complexity as factors influencing cumulative culture; they found that loss of cultural traits
can be measured and transmission fidelity was shown to be the factor determining trait  loss or
persistence, hence providing support to Tomasello's argument on the ratchet effect. They also found
that  combination  of  traits  rather  than  innovation  had  a  much  more  relevant  impact  on
cumulativeness.
How have our species reached high fidelity transmission that allowed cumulative culture to ensue?
Sticking with Laland and Tomasello's joint hypotheses, through evolving high fidelity transmission
mechanisms, a character that would have been subject to positive selection: language is the high-
fidelity transmission mechanism evolved by humans, in this perspective.
The refinement of transmission fidelity, given constant selective pressures in this direction, might
have represented  a  long and hard  path,  starting  at  least  since  the  appearance  of  genus  Homo.
Morgan et al. (2015) provide an original experimental analysis obtaining data informative for the
selective pressures that might have led to the evolution of higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms:
a  selective  gradient  for  higher-fidelity  transmission  mechanisms,  started  with  the  dawn  of
cumulative culture in hominins,  might have generated the selective environment that led to the
emergence of language. We discuss this hypothesis in chapter three. Also, we believe that in this
context  causal  relationships  between  the  factors  in  play  cannot  be  depicted  by  the  classical
distinction between proximate and ultimate causes (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963) and we discuss
this theoretical argument in chapter three.
14. An updated evolutionary research programme for the evolution of language
54
We started our work (in the Preface) referring to a theoretical debate on the need of an updating for
the evolutionary research programme. We showed in this Introduction how, across the years, many
different theoretical approaches have been developed to tackle the thorny issue of the evolution of
language. Although we couldn't provide here an exhaustive summary for a too much wide debate,
we selected some significant aspects and we identified the core points of a naïve evolutionism that
has  often  been  adopted  to  explain  complex  interactions.  We  then  highlighted  the  need  of  an
integration between biological and cultural evolution in order to provide a proper explanation for
the origin and the evolution of language. We believe that in the sketch of this ever-ending debate we
gave here, we can delineate a shift from a classical SET approach to a EES inclined approach, the
latter being in principle able to overcome some theoretical difficulties that were still present with
the adoption of a SET approach.
We  believe  that  the  cultural  drive  hypothesis  from which  Laland  (2016)  builds  up  his  whole
research inquiry can be representative of a EES approach to the evolution of culture, intelligence
and language. In the following chapters, conceived as autonomous papers (two of them published,
one sumbitted) we will show how the core elements of the EES can be tracked in the evolutionary
explanation for the co-evolution of language and cumulative culture we propose in this work. We
will  add  some final  considerations  in  the  Conclusions,  proposing  a  tentative  expansion  of  the
assimilate-stretch  principle  by  Dor  and  Jablonka,  suggesting  it  presents  some  significant
continuities  with the  cultural  drive  hypothesis.  We will  also  argue that  cumulative  culture  and
language should be conceived as two steps of the last major biocultural transition (Maynard Smith
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brain development, characteristics of modern Homo sapiens, suggesting that they could have spread
in an ecological context in which some selective pressures were relaxed. We give an account of how
such an ecological condition could have been reached in hominin evolution, relying on the feedback
effects  of niche construction processes,  bringing the case of the use of fire.  We provide future
possible directions in order to make our hypothesis testable, suggesting it could help solving some
issues concerning human evolution and the evolution of language.
Keywords:  relaxed  selection;  neoteny;  evolution  of  language;  niche  construction;  self-
domestication; exaptation.
0. Introduction
The role of natural selection has always represented a source of dispute in the language evolution
debate, at least since Charles Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace times (Wallace, 1869, 1870; Darwin,
1871; Harris, 1996). A very similar structure of the disputation persists also in the more recent
debates, seeing some scholars defending the causal primacy of natural selection in shaping language
faculties as adaptive traits, hence selection as a designer (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 1994;
Jackendoff, 1999; Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005), and some others relying instead on the role played
by structural constraints and functional shifts, hence evolutionary tinkering (Hauser, Chomsky and
Fitch, 2002; Okanoya, 2007; Fitch, Huber and Bugnyar, 2010; Fitch, 2010, 2011, 2012).
Within a scientific and naturalistic perspective, it is safely acknowledged that selection has been
implicated in the evolution of language faculties. However, the variants of natural selection and the
structural and functional traits involved in such a process remain issue of intense debate. Which
kinds of selective pressures could have shaped the typically modern human language, if gradually in
genus Homo or punctuationally in recent Homo sapiens evolution, is still largely unknown. The
debate seems also to suffer from an exaggerated polarization between too confident pan-selectionist
and adaptationist approaches, on a side, and a pessimistic skepticism quite indifferent to the most
recent evidence, on the opposite side (Pievani, 2015). In the space between, new hypotheses try to
account for new, although fragmentary evidence.
In  conclusion  of  their  influential  paper,  Hauser,  Chomsky and Fitch  suggested  that  «particular
selective pressures, unique to our evolutionary past» (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002) may have
led,  as  a  direct  consequence  or  as  a  by-product,  to  a  neural  reorganization  from which  novel
cognitive functions might have emerged, being available to be coopted for different tasks, including
language faculties. Terrence Deacon (2010) suggested that a relaxed selection may have played a
fundamental  role  in  the  evolution  of  language capacity.  Relaxed selection  on  a  trait  is  usually
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associated to  the loss of functionality (Lathi  et  al.,  2009).  Hence Deacon's  proposal  may seem
counter-intuitive as it links a decrease of selective pressures to an increase in complexity of a trait.
In this paper we try to answer Hauser, Chomsky anf Fitch suggestion after 13 years of new data and
to theoretically develop Deacon's proposal and decline it within a sound evolutionary background,
going to investigate which kind of “particular selective pressures” might have acted in the course of
human evolution and which kind of effects they might have provoked, taking into account recent
data coming from the hominin branching phylogeny.
Deacon's  proposal  can be synthesized saying,  with an analogy,  that  what  could have happened
during  the  evolution  of  the  genus  Homo consists  in  something very similar  to  what  has  been
observed in a domesticated strain of Lonchuria striata: Bengalese Finches. Let’s begin with this
case-study.
1. A model case-study: Bengalese Finches
Bengalese Finches  are a domesticated strain of white-rumped munias  (Lonchuria  striata)  which
have been domesticated in Japan for over 250 years and artificially bred for plumage. Contrary to
the wild individuals, which keep their song simple, Bengalese Finches developed more complex
songs which have not been selected for (Okanoya 2004a; 2004b).  Deacon 2010 notes that this
increase  in  song complexity,  in  a  remarkably brief  period,  could  have  arisen  through a  global
relaxation of selective pressures in the domesticated condition.
Ecological and behavioral studies showed that song variations in wild individuals are due not to
genetic distance among populations but to ecological, behavioral and geographic factors (Kagawa et
al. 2012; Okanoya, 2012). Wild individuals of Lonchura striata keep their songs simple for three
correlated reasons:
1) to avoid predation: a too complex song would be a risky trait in terms of increasing predation
rate;
2) to prevent hybridization: white-rumped munias live in sympatry (mixed flocks) with other bird
species and varieties, and it has been shown that keeping simple songs has a function in species
identification and mate recognition;
3)  cost-benefits  trade-offs:  a  too  complex  song  does  not  seem  to  be  associated  to  adaptive
advantages, thus keeping the songs simple allows white-rumped munias to allocate energies for
other tasks.
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In Bengalese Finches' domesticated condition these ecological constraints on songs are no longer
present: selective predation-related pressures disappear as well as the condition of sympatry with
other bird species and varieties. A species-specific bias for simple songs results no longer adaptive
in domestication and degenerates rapidly, according to the (negative) expected effects of relaxed
selection on a trait (Lathi et al., 2009).
However, the unusual context of relaxed selection allowed Bengalese Finches to experience more
complex  songs  by  means  of  a  de-differentiation  effect:  as  constraints  on  song  production  are
removed  or  relaxed,  other  neural  systems  can  be  involved  in  influencing  song  learning  and
production (Okanoya, 2004a; Deacon, 2010). Moreover, this tendency towards more complex songs
seems to be reinforced by a female preference, that wasn't observed in the wild because absent or
masked (Okanoya, 2004a, 2012). Then, after the relaxation of ecological selective pressures, the
establishment of novel (sexual) selective pressures has been observed in the novel environmental
(domestication) condition.
Deacon's prediction on the (positive, not only negative) effects of relaxed selection on Bengalese
Finches seems to be further confirmed by ecological studies (Kagawa et al., 2012). A simulated
computational model also showed that a relaxation of selection in a domesticated condition might
lead to increasing complexity of song production in Bengalese Finches, even without the female
preference (Ritchie & Kirby, 2007).
A suitable way to test Deacon's proposal in the case of human evolution is to frame it within the
theoretical approach labeled the “Self-Domestication” hypothesis.
2. The 'Self-Domestication' hypothesis in human evolution
Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871) noted that “man in many respects may be compared
with those animals which have long been domesticated”, while in The variation of animals and
plants  under  domestication  (1868)  he  noted  a  series  of  characteristics  shared  by domesticated
animals  that  distinguish  them from wild  populations.  He  found  that  “conditions  of  living”  in
domesticated animals led to the appearance of a series of common traits as a by-product of selective
breeding for tameness.  Such traits  include,  among others:  reduced jaws,  flat  faces,  lower male
aggression, reduction of sexual dimorphism and retention of juvenile features and behaviors into
adulthood (neotenic traits). The whole set of features exhibited in domesticated condition today has
been labeled “Domestication Syndrome” (Wilkins, Wrangham and Fitch, 2014 – see Table 1 for a
complete list of traits; see also Hare, Wobber and Wrangham, 2012).
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Although the self-domestication of humans is an old suggestion (see Leach, 2003), recent studies
have brought new emphasis and novel interesting insights to this topic.
Quite interestingly, it has been proposed by W. Tecumseh Fitch, Richard W. Wrangham and Adam
S. Wilkins that a single developmental cause underlies to the apparent phenotypic diversity of the
traits exhibited by domesticated mammals: a hypofunction of the cells of the neural crest during
early development (Wilkins, Wrangham and Fitch, 2014). It is assumed that animals are primarily
artificially selected for tameness; this leads to reduced stress hormone levels, which in turn are
responsible for a developmental reduction in neural crest cell input to those tissues associated to the
traits of the Domestication Syndrome, as all these tissues are influenced during their development
by the neural crest cells. Thus the initial selection for tameness leads, as a non-selected by-product,
to the morphological and behavioral characteristics we observe in the Domestication Syndrome
(Wilkins, Wrangham and Fitch, 2014).
Here a significant connection with human evolution is emerging. It has been shown that some of the
traits of the Domestication Syndrome display a positive trend during the recent human evolution:
particularly, a reduction of brow ridges and a shortening of the face (feminization of facial shape)
have  been  shown as  a  trend  over  the  past  200,000 years,  so  at  least  since  the  appearance  of
anatomically  modern  Homo  sapiens  (Cieri  et  al.,  2014).  These  morphological  features  are
associated  to  reduced  testosterone  levels,  reduced  male  aggressiveness,  and  reduced  sexual
dimorphism, as expected in the Domestication Syndrome.
As these craniofacial and skeletal morphologies are pleiotropically correlated to social tolerance,
such information could be used to indirectly infer the level of the social bond within the group, as
an  increase  in  population  density  may  have  corresponded  to  a  demand  of  increase  in  social
tolerance (Cieri et al., 2014). 
At  the  symposium on 'Domestication  and human evolution',  held  in  October  2014 at  the  Salk
Institute of San Diego, California, it has been formally proposed that selection for social tolerance
during  human evolution led  to  lower levels  of  stress  hormones (and the  associated anatomical
features),  and favored the spread of  pro-social  behaviors  that  distinguished Homo sapiens  as a
uniquely cooperative species. The hypothesis has been echoed in Science (Gibbons, 2014): in the
evolution of early genus Homo individual natural selection may have weakened its effects, leaving
room for a stronger selective pressure promoting social  tolerance and cooperation.  In short,  we
became more "docile"  toward our in-group bandmates,  with higher  levels  of trust  and reduced
levels of aggression (at least within our group): this constituted a significant advantage in terms of
survival and also provided a relatively safer environment to the individual within the group.
We focus now on possible empirical supports to the Self Domestication hypothesis by relying on
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the role played by relaxed selection and Domestication Syndrome in human evolution. Then we will
focus on the candidate surrounding causes for relaxed selection in the evolution of genus Homo.
3. Neotenic features in human brain
A confirmation of the role of relaxed selection comes from human neoteny. As a matter of fact,
among the shared traits of the Domestication Syndrome, the neotenic or paedomorphic features,
namely  the  retained  juvenile  characteristics  in  adulthood  due  to  a  slower  developmental  rate,
deserve a special attention.
Although the idea that  neoteny might  have played a  pivotal  role  for  several  reasons in  human
evolution is an old one (and received recent paleontological confirmations, showing that Homo
sapiens reached a peak of neoteny also compared to Neanderthals – Smith et al., 2010), we would
like to focus our attention in particular on some neotenic features of human brain development and
then reflect on selective aspects that might have characterized human evolution, in order to depict,
with an integrated view (inquiring the ecological, behavioral and molecular level – Antón, Potts and
Aiello, 2014), an evolutionary scenario for the emergence of those neural structures and cognitive
capacities that distinguish today the complex behavior of Homo sapiens and allow this species to
make use of articulated language.
In Homo sapiens'  peculiar brain development profile (Leigh, 2004; Preuss, 2011; Neubauer and
Hublin,  2012),  some association areas,  related to cognitive functions such as episodic memory,
planning, social navigation and learning, are characterized by the presence of neurons that remain
structurally immature for the whole duration of their lifespans. Along with an increased expression
of genes in these areas and a higher aerobic metabolic rate, these structurally immature neurons lead
to a significantly increased synaptic plasticity in adulthood, with important functional and cognitive
consequences, such as enhanced learning and mnemonic capacities, which represent fundamental
cognitive skills exploited in symbolic culture and language (Bufill, Agustì and Blesa, 2011).
Although specifically human uniqueness, that distinguishes us both from non-human primates and
archaic hominins, is getting unveiled more and more, it remains a hard challenge to link it to our
peculiar cognitive phenotype. Even if it represents a hard task, skepticism should not take over the
whole enterprise (as quite controversially in Hauser et al., 2014). New convergent data are emerging
from different fields, from paleontology to molecular biology, to ecology. Among the molecular
hallmarks of human brain that might have been involved in the evolution of larger brain size and
novel behavioral traits during human evolution (Somel, Liu and Khaiatovich, 2013 – see Box 1),
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gene SLIT-ROBO Rho GTPase activating protein 2 (SRGAP2) deserves particular attention.
SRGAP2  is  a  gene  implicated  in  neocortex  development  and  it  is  highly  conserved  among
mammals, with the exception of the human lineage where different gene duplications have occurred
(Dennis et al., 2012).
It has been shown that SRGAP2:
1) promotes dendritic spine maturation;
2) limits spine density;
3) co-regulates spine density with the length of spine neck (Charrier et al. 2012).
SRGAP2 has undergone at least three duplications in human lineage; the human-specific paralog
SRGAP2C is believed to have emerged approximately 2.4 mya, a crucial time in human evolution
as it is precisely associated to the expansion of the neocortex, the implementation of first stone tool
uses,  dramatic  changes  in  behavior,  and  mostly  the  divergence  of  genus  Homo  from
Australopithecus. SRGAP2C is one of the most fixed human-specific duplicate genes as it encodes
a functional protein.
It has been shown that SRGAP2C antagonizes the original copy of the gene leading to:
1) a delay in spine maturation, hence neoteny (a heterochrony – see McKinney and McNamara,
1991) during spine maturation;
2) an increased density of spines with longer necks in the neocortex;
3)  major  consequences  in  synaptic  development  and  morphology,  likely  enhancing  synaptic
plasticity,  leading to important implications for cognition, learning and memory (Charrier et al.,
2012).
It  should  be  added  that  gene  duplication  has  been  proven  to  be  one  of  the  major  sources  of
evolutionary novelties  (Ohno,  1970;  Zhang,  2003;  Lynch  and  Katju,  2004).  Furthermore  some
models of gene duplication assign a role to relaxed purifying selection to let the duplicated copies
persist and not be deleted (Innan and Kondrashov, 2010 – see Table 1); one copy of the gene shields
the other from purifying selection and allows it to accumulate mutations that in a normal regime of
selection would be otherwise deleted. In some cases the relaxed selection on the copy, along with
the accumulation of modifications, leads that copy to a functional degradation and to a pseudogene
status. In other cases the mutated copies might be subsequently coopted for novel functions required
by novel selective pressures: this is the well-documented case of the exaptation of hemoglobin, in
which some spontaneous duplications expressing different variants were selected in response to
different oxygenation demands in early and late fetal development (Hardison, 1999).
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The  relaxation  of  selection  that  is  created  by  the  functional  redundancy  consequent  to  gene
duplication enables what amounts to a random walk away from the gene's antecedent function. But
because a random walk produces incremental deviation, there is a significant nonzero probability
that one or more of the increasingly variant forms within a population of organisms will “wander”
into a related interaction relationship with some duplicate counterpart, and again become subject to
selection for  any interactive deleterious or  synergistic  effects.  It  is  no surprise,  then,  that  gene
families descended from a common ancestral gene often form synergistic functional complexes.
(Deacon, 2010, pp. 4 – 5).
This seems to be the case for the functional synergy observed in the interaction among SRGAP2
and  its  paralog  SRGAP2C,  which  leads  to  neoteny  in  spine  maturation,  with  fundamental
implications for synaptic morphology and cognitive functions. Such molecular evidence suggests
that neotenic features of human brain development likely played a major role in the evolution of
cognition and in the establishment of those cognitive functions that, at a later stage in the evolution
of  Homo genus,  might  have  been coopted  for  several  functions,  including  communicative  and
linguistic faculties.
In the Bengalese Finches case study it has been shown how songs became more complex thanks to
a relaxed control over song production and a de-differentiation effect in neural control (Okanoya,
2004a, Deacon, 2010). In human evolution the relaxation of developmental constraints might as
well have played a pivotal role. Most interesting and encouraging data in this sense come from a
recent study on the transcriptome of human brain and its adaptive role in human cognition (Somel,
Rohlfs and Liu, 2014). Here it is shown that heterochronic expression differences in certain areas of
the human brain could have enhanced learning and cultural transmission in humans; among the
others,  SRGAP2  duplication  is  included.  These  differences  are  more  accentuated  in  humans
compared with  other  primates  (“human acceleration”,  especially  in  PFC and cerebellum).  This
«liberal  introduction of novel  regulatory and coding sequence variants into neurodevelopmental
networks and major remodeling of human brain development» (ibid.) constitutes most interesting
data that deserve proper explanations. Although finding such explanations represents a forthcoming
challenge, one of the three possible paths of inquiry proposed by researchers is the interpretation of
such data  as  evidence  of  rapid evolution and relaxed constraints  on human brain development
(Somel, Rohlfs and Liu, 2014). The data are consistent with an evolutionary scenario in which a
relaxation of selective pressures allowed a relaxation of developmental constraints which in turn
favored the emergence of fundamental cognitive functions.
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4. Peculiar hominin life-history traits and selective pressures
We have  outlined  how a  relaxed  selection  at  the  gene  level,  gained  through  gene  duplication
processes, could allow functional redundancy to accumulate and become subject of selection at a
later stage. We associate now an analogous evolutionary dynamic taking place at the ecological
level, in which relaxed selection and neoteny are involved, playing a central role. 
Homo sapiens is a species characterized by a peculiar life-history profile, a mixture of both fast and
slow components, such as an early weaning but slow somatic growth rate, if compared to wild
chimpanzees (Robson and Wood, 2008). Among the peculiar features of human life-history profile,
our analysis will focus on slow developmental and growth rate caused by neoteny.
Earlier  formulations of the influence of neoteny on human evolution claimed a general shift  in
human ontogenetic profile in its entirety (Louis Bolk – see Gould, 1977). However, more recent
studies showed that this is not the case, as neotenic shifts happened in independent modules of
development, suggesting that modern human life-history profile evolved not as a single trait, but
rather in a mosaic fashion (Leigh, 2004; Zollikofer and Ponce de Leòn, 2010; Schwartz, 2012;
Antón, Potts and Aiello, 2014).
Mosaic evolution is a concept that deals with patterns of evolvability and reflects the idea that an
organism does not evolve uniformly as a whole; instead, different parts (or modules), may follow
independent  evolutionary  paths  and  paces,  depending  on  surrounding  selective  pressures  and
constraints. Mosaic evolution is a concept applicable at different levels of the biological hierarchy:
a trait (made of several components as the case of a life-history trait, but also like the mammalian
brain) may evolve mosaically, meaning that each component of the trait may change independently
from other correlated structures (Barton and Harvey, 2000). The transition from a taxon to another,
in  a  geological  time  scale,  may  also  happen  mosaically,  with  each  variety  bearing  different
morphotypes for each homologous trait (Ahlberg and Clack, 2006). This macroevolutionary pattern
seems to  be  relevant  for  the  hominin  branching tree  (Berger,  2010,  2013),  where  we see  that
different species evolve different pathways of change in the elements of functional complexes.
As regards the human brain,  heterochronic shifts happened in different areas, suggesting here a
mosaic evolutionary pattern of the brain in hominin lineage. In this sense, meaningful studies have
been performed on the gene regulation system (the trascriptome) of the Pre Frontal Cortex (PFC),
showing no uniform shift in developmental timing between humans and other primates (Somel et
al., 2009).
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Hence each life-history trait, characterizing any hominin species, is an extremely complex set of
structural and functional features that should be taken into account not as the result of a single or
uniform shift in development, but rather as the result of a mosaic evolutionary history and as an
intersection of different developmental and growth patterns, such as, for example, shape retardation
(paedomorphosis) and changes in relative growth velocity, in different tissues and organs (including
the brain) (Penin, Berge and Baylac, 2002).
Assumed this evidence,  we take into account a well-known neotenic life-history trait  typical of
Homo sapiens: a prolonged childhood. Such a trait seems to be the result of a series of independent
changes, among which neotenic features of brain development, discussed above, might have been
present.
It is widely acknowledged that a prolongation of childhood during hominin evolution might have
been an important factor for the emergence of language, as it widened significantly the learning
window.
However,  from  an  ecological  point  of  view,  a  prolonged  childhood  might  have  resulted  an
extremely costly trait in terms of individual natural selection. Despite the dramatic advantages in
terms of increased learning capacities and plasticity, neotenic offspring remained immature for a
longer period, being exposed to predation and other ecological risks that they could have not coped
alone. Paleontological data confirm that occasional predation has been a strong selective pressure
on human populations until  unexpectedly recent times (“Man the Hunted” - Hart and Sussman,
2009).  Fragile  and  immature  puppies  are  a  social  cost  in  a  demanding  and  ever-changing
environment.  Some  buffering  effects  should  have  been  in  place  to  allow  the  bearers  of  these
neotenic traits to survive and subsequently spread such traits among the population. An ecological
trade-off between advantages and risks, between different selective pressures, has been somehow
reached.  Natural  selection  should  have  acted  tolerantly at  the  individual  level;  in  other  terms,
natural selection should have been relaxed in the ecology of genus Homo evolution.
A prolonged childhood might have favored mother-infants interactions, arguably favoring social
learning, along with vocal experimentations: in fact, an honest exchange of information via vocal
contact among kin (mother-infants) might have resulted an adaptive strategy for rearing neotenic
offspring.  Such  a  scenario  for  the  evolution  of  language  has  been  labeled  “Mother  Tongue”
hypothesis (Fitch, 2004; Falk, 2009). Vocal calls also represent a costly trait in terms of predation
risks, so it seems plausible to argue that a relaxation of selective pressures, at least on the neotenic
offspring, might have been a factor playing a decisive role for offspring's survival. 
One of the factor that might have contributed to relax selective pressures on neotenic offspring is
represented  by an  enlargement  of  the  social  group.  In fact,  a  prolonged childhood might  have
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represented a factor of social cohesion: strengthening the social relationships in small groups in
order to protect neotenic offspring could have been one of such balancing adaptive strategies. This
irreversibly  changed  our  ecological  and  social  niche  and  might  have  strengthened,  in  turn,  a
selective pressure in favor of individuals more "docile" and socially "domesticated", particularly
males less aggressive towards in-group members and young individuals. 
A positive feedback enhanced human self-domestication, resulting in neoteny as an evolutionary
trend observed and documented among the several species of the genus Homo (with the maximum
in Homo sapiens; Smith et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the initial trigger of such a process of trade-off
between antagonistic selective interests is not easy to explain. Other indirect and contextual factors,
above the direct cognitive and linguistic implications of a prolonged ontogenetic time for learning
and social  imitation,  could  have  fostered  the  ignition  of  the process,  providing to  early Homo
species a less demanding and severe environment.
5. Relaxed selection at the ecological level as the outcome of niche construction processes: the
example of the use of fire
Among the possible causes for relaxed selection in the evolution of genus Homo, the domestication
of fire and other cultural innovations are the most important candidates. In order to understand how
selective pressures might have relaxed during human evolution, leading to a condition in which
costly morphological and behavioral traits as those related to Domestication Syndrome and neoteny
could have appeared, it is appropriate to frame human evolution within the theoretical framework of
the Niche Construction Theory (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003). Niche constructors are
those organisms that, behaving within their ecological niche, with their metabolisms and activities,
modify their environment and with it the selective pressures acting on those very organisms. It is a
selective  bi-directional  process.  Like  other  socially  complex  species,  humans  are  skilled  niche
constructors, especially thanks to their distinctive cultural capacities (Kendal, Teherani and Odling-
Smee, 2011; Sterelny, 2011).
An example of  widely niche-performing cultural  activity is  the control  of fire.  The use of  fire
represents a phenomenon, pertaining to the cultural evolution domain, that played a huge role in
modifying hominin niche and that elicited not only dramatic behavioral changes, but also structural,
anatomical, biological modifications (Wrangham and Carmody, 2010; Atwell., Kovarovic, Kendal
Jeremy, in press). Since there is evidence for the opportunistic (and not yet systematic) use of fire, a
series of anatomical changes are observable in hominin evolution throughout the fossil record, such
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as smaller guts, reduced tooth size, reduction of jaws, reduced oral cavity volume, but also increase
in cranial capacity.
The control and then domestication of fire constituted also an enormous means of defense against
predators, hence it led to a reduction of selective predation-related pressures. Moreover, cooked
food led not only to a change of diet, with the intake of more energetic sources through the cooking
of vegetables and tubers, but also to a significant reduction in toxin intake, depressing the chance of
incurring in mortal diseases. These factors led to an overall reduction of extrinsic mortality rates.
Established life-history theory (Medawar, 1952; Williams, 1957) directly correlates the extrinsic
mortality rate to longevity and maturation rates. A high extrinsic mortality rate is expected to elicit a
life  history  strategy  of  the  type  “live  fast,  die  young”,  characterized  by  an  early  onset  of
reproduction age; while a reduced extrinsic mortality rate is expected to elicit a life history strategy
of the type “live slow, die old”, characterized by a slower maturation rate. Although hominin life-
history profiles are a mixture of fast and slow components, it is reasonable to assume that a reduced
extrinsic mortality rate led to an increase of the lifespan and to a slowdown of maturation rates, with
a larger proportion of population surviving until older ages (Wrangham and Carmody, 2010).
We have significant data in this sense, coming from hominin fossil record, at least starting from
Homo erectus (Antón, Potts and Aiello, 2014).
From 2.5 to 1.5 mya three lineages of early Homo (H. habilis, H. rudolfensis, H. erectus) evolved in
a  context  of  habitat  and  climatic  instability  in  which  larger  and  taller  body  size  and  dietary
flexibility resulted as advantageous traits. A trend towards the exhibition of some traits typical of
the Domestication Syndrome, such as reduced jaw size, can be found in the known fossil hominins
of this period.
Although  a  systematic  use  of  fire  seems  to  be  a  quite  recent  event  in  human  evolution
(approximately 350 kya according to Schimelmitz et al., 2014), it has been preceded by a relatively
long period of opportunistic use, whose precise dating unfortunately can be unlikely established
only by the archeological record. However, biology can offer alternative complementary data, as the
study of  anatomical  data  can  testify  quite  reliably  a  change  in  dietary  habits  (Wrangham and
Carmody, 2010). H. heidelbergensis differs from H. erectus for larger cranial capacity and many
aspects of cranial shape, such as higher forehead, less prognathous face, reduced masticatory strain
(Lieberman  et  al.,  2004;  Wood  and  Aiello,  1998).  Homo  erectus  already  presents  significant
differences  in  this  sense  compared  to  late  australopithecines,  such  as  smaller  mandible,  facial
shortening, reduced masticatory strain, an expected pattern of reduced gut size, increased energy
use  such  as  adaptation  to  long-distance  walking:  all  features  consistent  with  an  enriched  diet,
probably a cooked diet (Wrangham and Carmody, 2010).
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Moreover, there are available data from which we can infer that extrinsic mortality rate was lower
in Homo erectus compared to late Australopithecus and probably also to other non-erectus early
Homo. From methods of analysis of teeth data (Smith, 2013), we can also infer that developmental
rate in Homo erectus was significantly slower than what is known for late Australopithecus, even if
very  different  from  the  even  slower  developmental  rate  shown  by  Homo  sapiens  as  a  peak.
Moreover,  Homo erectus  seemed to be a greater  cooperative breeder  and a greater  cooperative
forager  than  Australopithecus  and  other  early  Homo  non-erectus.  This  evidence  points  in  the
direction of the presence of enlarged social groups where offspring bearing neotenic features could
have been reared in a relatively safer ecological and social context.
Although Cieri et al. 2014 found strong evidence of a trend for the appearance of Domestication
Syndrome traits at least since the last 200 kya, such trend could be an older one, starting at least
from the appearance of genus Homo around 2.4 mya. The spread of such traits might have been
allowed by a  relaxation  of  selective pressures  obtained thanks to  increasing niche construction
activities such as the use of fire.
The Self-Domestication hypothesis,  which predicts  the appearance of  a  series of paedomorphic
features, (among the others) such as reduction in jaws observed already in Homo erectus, seems to
be consistent with a scenario of relaxation of selective pressures.
The interplay between cultural evolution and biological evolution is a topic of growing interest,
especially in human evolution (Kendall, Teherani and Odling-Smee, 2011; Fisher and Ridley, 2013;
Curry, 2013). Cultural phenomena, produced by biological organisms, can act as feedback factors
on those organisms, altering the selective pressures on those very organisms, within a theoretical
framework of niche construction. Summing up:
1) The use of fire could have represented an event pertaining to the domain of cultural evolution
that  operated  as  a  niche  modifier  and  a  modifier  of  selective  pressures,  mainly  leading  to  a
relaxation  of  selective  pressures,  provoking dramatic  changes  not  only in  behavior  but  also  in
biological features.
2) The use of fire can also be intended as a buffer to the potentially dangerous effects implicated in
the transition to terrestriality (Wrangham and Carmody, 2010); it can be seen as a “cultural buffer”,
capable of producing a cascade of (beneficial) effects at different levels: molecular, developmental,
anatomical, functional, behavioral, social, cognitive, ecological.
3) It has to be noted, as highlighted in Atwell, Kovarovic and Kendal Jeremy (in press), that all the
possible adaptive responses to a reduction in toxin intake, and more generally to relaxed selective
pressures  caused  by the  use  of  fire,  have  not  been  studied  exhaustively  from an  evolutionary
perspective yet.
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4) The use of fire not only led to a slower maturation rate through a reduction of extrinsic mortality
rate, with all the associated changes in life-history and other morphological traits, but it also could
have been a factor in eliciting the enlargement of the social group, by means of the diffusion of
dramatically  novel  behavioral  habits,  probably  related  to  food-sharing  strategies.  The  enlarged
social group might have been a relatively secure environment where to rear neotenic offspring,
remaining  immature  for  longer  periods;  in  fact,  an  enlarged  social  group  represented  a  rich
environment to enhance social learning capacities (Pievani, 2011).
5) Moreover, taking care of the immature young kin might have represented a factor of cohesion for
the social group, involving in this task also the mature older kin. This classical hypothesis has been
labeled the “Grandmother hypothesis” (Hawkes et al.,  1998, Hawkes, 2003) and it represents a
possible explanation (consistent with a phase of relaxed selection) for some of the fast components
of the human life-history profile, as it allowed an early weaning and a shorter inter-birth interval.
6. An alternative evolutionary scenario for the evolution of human language
Here we summarize the relaxed selection evolutionary scenario (Fig. 1):
1) Alteration of the ecological niche by means of niche construction activity, intended as an effect of
cultural innovations, of which the use of fire is the example outlined above.
2)  Relaxation of  ecological  selective  pressures  (reduced predation,  reduced toxin  intake  and in
general reduced extrinsic mortality rate).
3) As certain selective pressures are relaxed, some traits might undergo either a loss of functionality
or  rather  a  structural  reorganization,  because of  relaxed developmental  constraints.  This  allows
functional redundancy to accumulate, as selection acts more tolerantly on the appearance of novel
structural and functional features; an example is a delay in development, hence neotenic traits, both
at the (3a) organismic level (neotenic life-history traits, such as slower maturation and prolonged
childhood) and at the (3b) molecular level (gene duplications such as SRGAP2, which leads to
neoteny in brain development, with fundamental implications in terms of function and cognition). 
4) Such novel costly traits are not selected against as it would happen in a non-modified niche with
a non-relaxed regime of selection, rather they persist and then spread thanks to the novel selective
pressures established in the new modified niche. We have seen that such novel selective pressures
can be represented by the unveiled female preference for complex songs in the case of Bengalese
Finches, considered here in § 1; shifting the focus into human evolution, several different novel
selective pressures  could have acted in favor  of  enhanced cognitive capacities,  once they were
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spread thanks to the initial (1) relaxation of selective pressures.
This process is:
1) a feedback process:  niche construction activity modifies the ecological  niche and leads  to a
relaxation of selective pressures that  allows the emergence of  novel  (cognitive and behavioral)
traits, that in turn may nourish the niche construction activities.
2) a recursive or iterated process: once the loop is completed it starts again, having as novel initial
conditions the outcome of the previous just-ended feedback loop.
Figure  1.  The  scheme
summarizes  the  model  (a
feedback loop), outlined in
this  paper,  for  the
emergence  of  costly  traits
(such as neotenic features)
in  a  regime  of  relaxed
selection:  niche
construction  processes;
alteration of the ecological
niche;  relaxed  selection;
accumulation  first  and
then  cooptation  of
functional  redundancy;
appearance  of  new traits;
spread  of  the  new  traits
through  novel  selective
pressures  in  the  modified
niche;  such  new  traits
might  in  turn  nourish  the
niche  construction
processes. See the text for
further details.
Human articulated language could be intended as one of those many behavioral traits, emerged in
the long path from the Last Common Human Ancestor (LCA) (which quite surely did not possess it,
according to the current data) to Cognitively Modern Humans (CMH). Language (as neoteny above,
and as any complex behavior in evolution) should not be reduced to a single evolutionary trait, but
conceived as a mosaic of both anatomical and functional interrelated components. For an updated
understanding of the evolution of language we should seek not for a single magic feature that would
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distinguish  man  from  the  rest  of  the  animal  reign  as  a  Rubicon,  but  rather  for  the  specific
interactions  between  the  several  anatomical  and  functional  features  implicated  in  the  human
language faculties (Okanoya, 2007; Fitch, Huber and Bugnyari, 2010; Fitch, 2012). Each of these
features  might  in  principle  have  had  independent  evolutionary  histories:  some  very  old  and
gradualistic, while other recent and rapid; and not necessarily linked to single specific functions,
being adaptations or exaptations case by case.
In order to properly understand the evolutionary history of such structural and functional features
underling the language faculties, we should primarily understand which kind of selective pressures
have acted during human evolutionary history. Any evolutionary hypotheses on the emergence of
human  language  should  be  in  close  accordance  with  what  we  know  about  overall  human
evolutionary history and cannot do without  it.  Then if  at  least  a period of human evolutionary
history has been characterized by a relaxation of selective pressures, any evolutionary scenario on
the emergence of language must take it into account. By contrast, many past evolutionary stories
about human language were based on the speculative adaptationist assumption that a long process
of  individual  natural  selection  implemented  the  language  performances.  Nevertheless,  the
complexity of the evolution of human traits in hominin phylogeny as we know it today (with more
than ten species, the mosaic evolution of crucial traits, strong and persisting ecological instability)
makes very difficult to identify a persisting and linear selective pressure (communication skills in
hunting, stone tool production, social binding, or sexual selection) able to produce such an effect.
If a relaxation of selective pressures during human evolution allowed the emergence and the spread
of important anatomical and functional features (for example neotenic features, at different levels)
that reorganized neural structure, enhanced cognitive capacities, which at a later stage have been
coopted also for language faculties, we suggest that this evolutionary scenario should be considered
an alternative one for the emergence of language (Szamado and Szathmary, 2006).
It  represents  an alternative evolutionary scenario because  the  general  logic  underling the usual
selective scenarios is overturned. Usual selective scenarios for the emergence of language basically
propose strong selective pressures for one single specific function: a specific ecological context
(quite hypothetical) is described and the advantages of a specific function is proposed as the main
reason  why selection  would  have  favored  it.  A typical  example  is  a  hunting  context  and  the
advantages brought by a communicative exchange are identified in the coordination of the hunting
group (Washburn and Lancaster, 1968; Hewes, 1973). Many of these selective scenarios have been
proposed in the last 50 years, but none of them survived as parsimonious once matched with the
evidence collected by the convergent data coming from the highly branching phylogenetic tree of
the genus Homo. Such scenarios alone, positing only strong selective pressures for communicative
skills, revealed themselves insufficient to gain a proper and complete vision of the evolution of
language. We argue that something must be added to bridge the gaps of the conception conveyed by
such scenarios, which otherwise might look like 'just so stories'.
Relaxed  selection  evolutionary  scenario  posits  the  attention  not  on  the  phase  in  which  strong
selective pressures favor the spread of communicative (proto)linguistic faculties, but on the phase
before that,  the one that constitutes the precondition for the establishment, mainly by means of
niche construction processes, of novel selective pressures for those faculties.
We argue that, in order to gain a proper and complete vision of the evolution of language, this issue
should be framed in a two-phases process. It is clear, in fact, that relaxed selection cannot do it all
alone. In the case of the emergence of complex songs in Bengalese Finches, the process is split in
two phases: 
1) the first phase consists in establishing a novel environmental context in which selective pressures
are relaxed (the domestication condition – even if  here it  is  not  reached by niche construction
activity), so constraints controlling songs are relaxed, and a neural reorganization of the trait is in
place; 
2)  the  second  phase  consists  in  establishing  novel  selective  pressures  (female  preference  for
complex songs, in this case) that allow the emergence and fixation of the new trait.
The evolution of human language, according to the analysis outlined here, can be split in two phases
as well:
1)  a  first  phase  in  which  selective  pressures  are  relaxed  through  niche  construction  activities,
affecting both behavioral and physiological traits, along with a modification of the environment.
2)  a  second phase in  which  the new traits  emerge,  as  adaptations  or  as  functional  cooptations
(exaptations) of extant structures, in the modified environment, by means of the novel established
selective pressures.
As regards the first phase, a possible evolutionary scenario in which selective pressures have been
relaxed by means of niche construction activities, allowing functional redundancy to arise,  was
outlined in this paper.
As regards the second phase, in which novel selective pressures act on or coopt the arisen functional
redundancy,  many different  explanations  can  be  provided  to  give  an  account  of  the  spread  of
language. The previously proposed selective scenarios (Szamado and Szathmary, 2006) should not
necessarily be discarded a priori,  although it  is essential  that each of them undergoes a careful
matching with the collected interdisciplinary data coming from the hominin evolutionary history,
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avoiding pan-selectionist shortcuts.
In our discussion, we argued that the 'Mother tongue' hypothesis (Fitch, 2004; Falk, 2009) and the
'Grandmother  hypothesis'  (Hawkes et  al.,  1998,  Hawkes,  2003) seem consistent  with the 'Self-
domestication'  hypothesis  (Wilkins,  Wrangham and  Fitch,  2014,  Gibbons,  2014),  a  scenario  in
which the social group expands, the population density within the group increases, favoring the
emergence  of  higher  rates  of  social  tolerance  among  bandmates.  Such  a  context  could  have
provided a  safer  environment  where  to  rear  neotenic offspring,  bearers  of  those  neotenic traits
which revealed pivotal for our evolution; moreover, vocal exchange of honest information among
kin might have resulted an advantageous strategy posing the bases for the evolution of language in
such a novel social and ecological context (Fitch, 2004; Falk, 2009).
However, the present work does not intend to provide a final word on how such an evolutionary
scenario should be built and much more future analysis is required to supplement what we labeled
the second phase of this picture. We do not exclude the possibility that relaxed selection might have
played a central role, allowing a fundamental reshaping of the vocal tract, which was later coopted
for vocal communication (see below, § 7.2).
7.  Discussion and future directions
     
An evolutionary scenario  based  on relaxed  selection  highlights  issues  that  can  result  of  major
interest not only for the long standing evolution of language debate, but also in terms of philosophy
of evolutionary biology.
1) We argued that neotenic features show an evolutionary trend in the evolution of genus Homo
(with a peak in Homo sapiens)  due to an active role of relaxed selection.
This  perspective  challenges  the  adaptationist  logic,  which  assigns  primary  agency  to  classical
natural selection and sees developmental constraints only as limiting factors to the power of natural
selection in shaping morphologies and behaviours of individuals. This represents the classical view
of the evolutionary theory at the time of the Modern Synthesis; however, such conception could
result  rather limiting.  The convergent data brought here suggest that natural selection itself can
represent a constraining factor in evolution, while the modulation of developmental constraints can
represent a source of evolutionary novelties.
As reported above, the case of white-rumped munias showed how an ecological selective pressure
for  simple  song  restrained  wild  individuals  from  developing  more  complex  songs,  while  a
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relaxation  of  these  selective  pressures  and the  corresponding relaxation  of  constraints  on  song
learning and production allowed Bengalese Finches to lose simple song bias and develop more
complex songs, through a de-differentiation effect in neural bases of song learning and production,
directly  caused by the  relaxation  of  constraints.  This  is  an  example  of  how ecological  natural
selection could represent a constraining factor in the evolvability of a trait. In human evolution,
ecological non-relaxed natural selection might have played a rather similar constraining role, until it
was relaxed by means of niche construction activity.
2) Relaxed selection is traditionally associated merely to the loss of functionality of a trait (Lathi et
al., 2009); however, in some conditions, acting on factors regulating development, relaxed selection
can represent an active element in shaping or generating novel traits and novel functions.
For  example,  future  researches  could  verify  if  reduced  jaws  in  human  evolution  might  be
interpreted as the result  of relaxed selection on a strong masticatory strain,  due to a change in
dietary habits (along with the control of fire) and the development of stone tools, which replaced the
function  played  by  large  teeth.  Such  a  remodeling  of  the  trait  might  have  had  a  cascade  of
consequences on many other functions related to facial morphology, not least the vocal apparatus
implicated in the production of sounds. It would be interesting to revalue the adaptations of the
vocal apparatus not in terms of results of positive selective pressures (which of course might have
been involved, but only at a later stage), but in terms of outcomes of a selective relaxation on that
trait.  In this sense, relaxed selection might represent a possible solution to a paradox which the
language evolution debate often refers to: a prone-to-language vocal tract should have been already
in place in order to let language evolve, but language itself could not have been the reason why this
vocal tract was selected for. Using Ian Tattersall's words: «Quite simply, we have no idea what the
reasons were for the acquisition of the reconfigured vocal tract, but we know that it must have been
in place before it could be exploited for speech production» (Comment to Lieberman, 2007).
A reconfigured vocal tract could be the outcome of a relaxation of selection during human evolution
which  brought  not  only  to  a  partial  degradation  of  the  tract  (reduced  jaws),  but  also  to  a
reorganization of the vocal tract anatomy which have been later engaged for speech production as
an exaptation (Pievani and Serrelli, 2011).
3) What represents the most compelling challenge is filling the gaps between evolutionary levels,
namely the ecological level and the molecular level. It has to be further proven that a relaxation of
ecological selective pressures results in a relaxation of developmental constraints. 
Again, studying the models with which a relaxed selection degrades the functions of a trait, leading
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to a reorganization of that trait, represents a path to be followed (Lathi et al., 2009). The alternative
evolutionary  scenario  discussed  here  integrates  the  ecological  level,  the  behavioral  level,  the
molecular  level.  These  are  the  features  required  by  an  exhaustive  and  updated  evolutionary
hypothesis  (Antón,  Potts  and  Aiello,  2014),  able  to  give  a  parsimonious  explanation  to
heterogeneous and convergent data coming from different fields.
Such an analysis succeeds in keeping together different levels of analysis. It also takes into account
the different levels and units of selection, like the gene level, the organism level and the ecological
level (Okasha, 2006), the trade-offs between antagonistic selective pressures, the modulation of the
strength  of  each  selective  forcing,  the  feedback  loop  between  selective  pressures  and  niche-
construction activities of organisms. These are examples of the complex machinery of selective
processes acting on social species. Future researches should explain the interactions between this
multifaceted aspect of natural selection. 
4) Evidence in favor of a mosaic brain evolution might represent substantial support in favor of
relaxed developmental constraints and relaxed selective pressures.
In fact, a mosaic evolution pattern predicts differential and independent evolutionary trajectories for
each module. Recent data from brain development studies (Somel, Rohlfs and Liu, 2014) show
differential developmental patterns for different areas of human brain, with differential rates of gene
expression,  and  a  relaxation  on  developmental  constraints  has  been  proposed  as  a  plausible
underling cause.
Relaxed ecological selection might lead to a relaxation of developmental constraints which allow
evolutionary experimentation,  hence a mosaic evolutionary pattern.  It  is  interesting to note that
mosaic  evolution  is  today  called,  in  paleo-anthropology,  for  the  explanation  of  many  crucial
phenomena: the morphology of transitional species (like in the case of Australopithecus sediba –
Berger, 2010, 2013); the development and evolution of brain areas; the traits related to neoteny; the
evolution of language as an integrated set  of anatomical,  cognitive and behavioral traits  (Fitch,
2012). The significance of this pattern must be further investigated.
5)  From a  macroevolutionary point  of  view,  a  mosaic  pattern is  consistent  with the ecological
models  of  the  occupation  of  new niches.  At  the  beginning of  any adaptive  radiation,  multiple
evolutionary “experimentations” is expected if a more tolerant selective regime is in progress.
Biogeographical  and paleo-ecological  data  concerning the hominin  “bushy” phylogeny (Berger,
2010, 2013) is consistent with such models, in which usually a first period of developmental and
phenotypic  plasticity  is  followed by different  specializations  (Standen,  Du and Larsson,  2014).
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Mosaic  evolution,  relaxed  selection,  adaptive  radiation  and  different  bursts  of  changes  are  all
elements that intertwine consistently in human evolution, according to the recent data we reviewed
here. In terms of macroevolutionary surrounding conditions, another line of future researches could
be the hypothesis that a model of early plasticity and branching specialization also applies to the
evolution of the genus Homo, highlighting new insights for a better understanding of the evolution
of human cognitive and linguistic faculties as well.
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Abstract
Language evolution, intended as an open problem in the evolutionary research programme, will be
here  analyzed  from  the  theoretical  perspective  advanced  by  the  supporters  of  the  Extended
Evolutionary  Synthesis.  Four  factors  (niche  construction,  inclusive  inheritance,  phenotypic
plasticity, developmental constraints) and two associated concepts (constructive development and
reciprocal causation) will be matched with a selection of critical examples concerning genus Homo
evolution, relevant for the evolution of language, such as the evolution of hominin life-history traits,
the enlargement of the social group, increased cooperation among individuals, behavioral change
and  innovations  (the  use  of  fire),  heterochronic  modifications  leading  to  increased  synaptic
plasticity. A particular form of niche construction will be considered (namely counteractive niche
construction or cultural mitigation of selection) in a multilevel framework (from the ecological to
the molecular level). It will be argued that the four points mentioned above prove to be fundamental
explanatory tools to understand how language might have emerged as a result of a gene-culture
coevolutionary dynamics.
Keywords: language  evolution;  Extended  Evolutionary  Synthesis;  gene-culture  co-evolution;
reciprocal causation; niche construction; self-domestication hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
Given the accumulation of a consistent body of researches going beyond population genetics (West-
Eberhard 2003; Odling Smee et al. 2003; Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Pigliucci and Müller 2010), the
community  of  evolutionary  biologists  recently  presented  a  dichotomous  debate  among  the
supporters  of  an  Evolutionary  Extended  Synthesis  (EES)  and  the  defenders  of  a  Standard
Evolutionary Theory (SET) (Laland et al. 2014). The former state that SET (the product of the
Modern Synthesis) is too narrowly focused on genetic inheritance and mechanisms regulating allele
frequencies across generations, assigning causal and informational privileges to genes and treating
development and heredity as separate phenomena. EES supporters argue for a more constructive
view of  development  (constructive  development)  and evolution,  suggesting  that  four  factors  in
particular should gain more attention in the evolutionary explanation: (i) niche construction, (ii)
inclusive inheritance, (iii) phenotypic plasticity, (iv) developmental bias.
On the other side, it is argued that these four factors are already well included in SET: Darwin
himself in 1881 published a book dedicated to earthworms altering soil acidity to better fit their
environment, a clear case-study of niche construction (Wray et al. 2014). Moreover, according to
SET supporters, developmental bias or niche construction do not directly change gene frequencies,
hence they should count as proximate causes. On the contrary, EES supporters argue that organism
and development are not passive products of selection, rejecting assumptions of unidirectionality in
evolutionary causation  (externalism),  stressing  the  capacity  of  organisms to  systematically  bias
selective pressures, criticizing the too rigid distinction between proximate and ultimate causes of
evolution (on reciprocal causation see Laland et al. 2015; see also Laland et al. 2011; Laland et al.
2013; Scott Phillips et al. 2013).
A scientific discipline showing such a debate on its  epistemological  status proves to be a  very
healthy one.  According to Lakatos' view (Lakatos 1978), the history of science advances through
transformation of scientific research programmes, intended as sets of theories, models, concepts and
hypotheses delimited by the choices of a community of scientists. Contrarily to scientific paradigms
evolving discontinuously through abrupt shifts (Kuhn 1962), scientific research programmes evolve
through continuous changes and processes of updating. The current debate between EES and SET
supporters is not questioning the validity of the core of the evolutionary research programme: both
sides  are  fully Darwinan.  At  the  same time,  the  current  debate  doesn't  resemble  a  competition
between  alternative  research  programmes,  but  rather  a  dispute  on  the  need  for  a  progressive
updating of the common research programme (see Pievani 2011, 2015).
As pointed out by the EES supporters themselves, “the EES entails not only new research directions
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but also new ways to think about, and interpret, new and familiar problems in evolutionary biology”
(Laland et al. 2015, p. 6, my italic).
The aim of the current work is trying to apply the core proposals of the EES, and somehow “test”
them, on a very old and  familiar  problem, puzzling evolutionists since forever: the evolution of
language, which can be considered an open problem for the evolutionary research programme.
The evolution of language will be taken as a specific case-study and will be here analyzed through
the lenses of the four factors listed above, plus a fifth one: (1) niche construction, (2) inclusive
inheritance,  (3)  phenotypic  plasticity,  (4)  developmental  bias,  (5)  a  multilevel  or  hierarchical
framework of analysis. It will be interpreted under the light of the core concepts proposed by the
EES supporters, namely constructive development and reciprocal causation, in order to see whether
this theoretical approach can help reaching useful insights.
2. Biology and culture in language evolution
Language is the outcome not only of classical biological evolution, but also of another evolutionary
process, namely cultural evolution, not necessarily sharing the same logic and the same properties
of the previous one (Claidière et al. 2014), in the sense that, for example, the former deals with
variation  and  differential  survival  of  biologically  inherited  traits,  while  the  latter  deals  with
variation and differenatial survival of culturally acquired traits.
Understanding the interactions between these different evolutionary processes is probably the key to
understand language evolution. The language faculty is a complex mosaic of traits, resulting from
the combination of several subcomponents, some very old and some rather new, evolved along
different evolutionary paths and following different paces (Fitch 2012).
While the last-years debate has been dominated by a dispute on the role played by natural selection
in shaping the language faculty (Fitch 2010; see also Pievani 2015b) today the picture has been
considerably enriched by a series of studies addressing the role that cultural transmission might
have played in shaping language (Kirby et al. 2007; Kirby et al. 2008; Scott Phillips and Kirby
2010).
As shown in Scott Phillips and Kirby (2010) – fig. 1, there has been a phase in human evolution in
which language, as we know it today, was not present; nonetheless language precursors or “pre-
adaptations” were in place.  Moreover,  hominin species  already exhibited a remarkably complex
range  of  behaviors,  such  as  tool  manipulation,  a  complex  social  structure  in  a  rather  wide
biogeographic  areal,  probably  some  forms  of  proto-communication  (protolanguage),  and  these
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complex behaviors were culturally transmitted. This latter aspect, namely the capacity of producing
cumulative culture, is one of those peculiar features distinguishing “culture-ready” hominins from
other non-human primates and vertebrates (Tennie et al. 2009).
It  is  precisely from this  ecological,  behavioral  and cognitive  background that  the  evolutionary
explanation for language emergence should arise. Understanding this background and the selective
pressures that might have acted on it is the main purpose here.
3. Niche construction and inclusive inheritance
Niche constructors are those organisms that, with their behaviors and their metabolisms, alter the
environment in which they live and modify selective pressures accordingly: what is transmitted to
the next generation is not only the modified gene pool, but also the modified regime of selective
pressures (Odling Smee et al. 2003; Odling Smee and Laland, 2011). As other socially complex
species, humans are outstanding niche constructors, especially thanks to their highly developed and
distinctive cultural capacities (Kendall et al. 2011).
Gene-culture co-evolution is that evolutionary field-study taking in consideration the possibility that
cultural practices might have influenced and transformed the selective environment and hence the
selective  pressures  acting  on  humans  and  their  genetic  endowment  (Laland  et  al.  2010).
Perturbations on the selective environment by means of cultural activities can be of various kind,
leading to  different  selective outcomes,  that  could  result  in  both positive  and relaxed selective
pressures on specific traits. A classical example of positive selection generated by a gene-culture co-
evolutionary pattern is represented by the rapid spread of alleles for lactose tolerance in adulthood
thanks to the alteration of the environment produced by the spread of cultural practices of dairy
farming (Durham 1991; Curry 2013).
However, cultural activities can also act as agents buffering natural selective pressures. Organisms
can initiate a change in the environment (inceptive niche construction) or rather they can respond to
environmental changes with countermeasures buffering the effects of selective pressures; the latter
is defined counteractive niche construction (Odling Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2010).
Hominin evolution has been characterized by strong climate instability (Potts 2013),  which today is
considered one of the main factors eliciting genus  Homo dispersal out of Africa (Parravicini and
Pievani 2015). Responding to such an environmental challenge might have represented a major
drive for developing counteractive measures. Counteractive niche construction by means of cultural
activities, relaxing and buffering the effects of natural selection on genus Homo species might have
89
played an underestimated role  in human evolution.  The most  well-known examples of  cultural
mitigation of selection (Laland et al. 2010) during human evolution are clothes manufacturing, the
use of fire, building shelters and the extremely recent spread of agriculture and farming.
It  is  well-established that  cultural  activities  have  been dominant  after  the  Neolithic  revolution,
completely changing the relationship between humans and their environment.
Although gene-culture co-evolutionary models have been successfully applied to study the effects
of this environmental reorganization on the human genome (Laland et al. 2010), it is more difficult
to establish whether this pattern could extensively apply to deeper times of genus Homo evolution,
as we lack direct observation of ancient hominin behaviors and exploitable data on their genetic
endowment. However, matching heterogeneous sets of data coming from the archeological record,
the paleontological fossil record, laboratory analyses on ancient skulls and teeth, it is possible to
make inferences over the behavioral traits of those ancient hominins. Today, evidence is gathering
indicating  that  erectines  seem to  have  benefitted  strongly  from cumulative  cultural  knowledge
(Stringer and Andrews 2005; Antón et al. 2014). Under this perspective evolutionay dynamics at the
bases of language emergence can be interpreted as the result of a culture-biology interaction of this
kind.
4. A behavioral innovation leading to a cascade of effects
The use of fire can be considered a buffering effect and a niche-modifier for several reasons: it was
a means of defense against predators; it elevated the quality of the diet with more energetic cooked
food supporting ever demanding brain metabolism; it lowered the risk of mortal disease by intaking
less toxines; it altered food-sharing strategies leading to more cohesiveness and enlarging the social
group. This picture is consistent with an overall reduction of extrinsic mortality rates, which in turn
have profound effects on life-history traits (Medawar 1952; Williams 1957). In particular longer
lifespans and slower maturation rates are among the expected patterns (Wrangham and Carmody,
2010).
Compared  to  other  forms  of  early  Homo,  Homo  erectus shows  significantly  lower  extrinsic
mortality rates, higher quality diet, greater cooperative foraging and greater cooperative breeding,
greater  developmental  plasticity  in  terms  of  body composition  and slower  developmental  rates
(Antón et al. 2014). This scenario is consistent with the prediction that Homo erectus was already
capable of benefiting from cumulative cultural knowledge, using it as a significant niche-modifier
and a buffer of natural selection (cultural mitigation of selection).
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A recent study, however, attributes Homo erectus' decreased masticatory and digestive capacities to
meat consumption, fulfilling brain metabolic demands, and stone-tool food processing, instead of
cooking, which would have come later (Zink and Lieberman 2016).
Moreover, expressions of symbolic behavior consisting of abstract patterns engraved on fresh water
shells have been attributed to member of the same species (H. erectus), outside Africa 540 kya in
Trinil, Java (Joordens et al. 2014). Even if this finding constitutes just an episodic expression of
alleged symbolic capabilities, and it is far from proving members of  H. erectus were capable of
something similar to a language, it can nonetheless be considered evidence in favour of the fact that
bursts of cultural complexity have been around in the hominin branching phylogeny much before
than  the  appearance  of  Cognitively  Modern  Humans  (see  D'Errico  and  Stringer,  2011  for  the
debates related to the emergence of Behavioral Modernity).
This scenario of reshaped life-history patterns just sketched above (see Suman and Pievani, 2015
for a more extensive treatment of this case-study) is extremely relevant to understand the hallmarks
of human evolution and the evolution of language. It has been argued that the unique and complex
mosaic of life-history traits characterizing humans (among which the evolution of childhood plays a
fundamental  role)  might  have  been  a  fundamental  prerequisite  without  which  the  faculty  of
language could not have emerged (Locke and Bogin 2006; Hublin et al. 2015): according to Locke
and  Bogin  (2006)  not  only  childhood,  but  also  adolescence  played  a  role  in  the  evolution  of
elaborated  vocal  behaviors,   enhancing  fitness  and  ultimately  integrating  performative  and
pragmatic skills with linguistic knowledge in the faculty of language; different selective pressures
are  responsible  for  different  features.  The  so  called  Mother  tongue  hypothesis  also  takes  into
account  the  reorganization  of  the  life-history traits  and proposes  a  kin selection  model  for  the
evolution of the semantic communication component of language (intended broadly as referential
properties  and  gradual  sophistication  of  conveyed  meanings)  in  terms  of  exchange  of  honest
information among kin,  with a  significant  role  assigned to alloparenting strategies:  altering the
organization of the social group produces effects at the behavioral level with consequences on the
exchange of information within the members of the group (Fitch 2004; 2007). Such an hypothesis
represents a good explanatory model as it is able to take into account heterogeneous sets of data
coming  from  evolutionary  anthropology  and  use  them  as  a  solid  background  to  build  an
evolutionary hypothesis for a specific component of the language faculty, in this case the semantic
one.
The use of fire was chosen as a critical example of that cultural exploration (Dor and Jablonka, 
2014) and cultural niche construction that allowed hominins to exhibit plastic behaviors that stand 
at the basis of a culture-prone brain and that shaped their ecological and selective niche. Among the 
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listed consequences, reshaping of the life-history traits, like longer childhood, is a fundamental and 
necessary substratum to let language emerge through exploratory processes. This is to stress how 
the evolution of language should be understood not as an abrupt emergence in recent times of 
human evolution; the roots of this process must rather be traced back in our deep time.
Getting a clear picture of how our life-history pattern came together is a fundamental part of our
explanation  for  the  origin  and  the  evolution  of  language,  as  life-history trait  evolution  can  be
considered one of the main (biological) causes generating several effects at the social level and
consequently leading to the several modifications at the behavioral level, generating the conditions,
and the necessity, for culturally transmitting novel behaviors (cultural inheritance), increasing the
selective pressures on reliable cultural transmission mechanisms. Proximate and ultimate distinction
seems difficult to draw here, while a reciprocal causation view provides a better account for causal
interaction.
Language  represents  a  high-fidelity  information  transmission  mechanism  that  could  have  co-
evolved with the complexity of the behaviors that needed to be acquired and transmitted, as recently
suggested by a  stone-knapping transmission chain experiment  by Morgan et.  al.  (2015): results
show that high-fidelity transmission mechanisms, hence verbal teaching, improves performances
more than other mechanisms such as observation, imitation/emulation, simple teaching and gestural
teaching. Researchers argue that stone tool-making might have generated selective pressures for
high-fidelity transmission mechanisms, hence teaching and language (see also Fogarty et al. 2011;
Lewis  and  Laland  2012).  Oldowan  technology  was  probably  associated  to  low-fidelity  social
transmission, while the transition to Acheulean technology probably marked an increase in fidelity
transmission,  involving  a  form of  (gestural  or  verbal)  protolanguage.  This  scenario  supports  a
gradual  evolution  of  language  in  genus  Homo and  assigns  a  pivotal  role  to  cultural  evolution
influencing not only cognitive but also genetic evolution, since this pattern could have been in place
for more than 2,5 million years (Morgan et al. 2015, see also D'Errico and Banks, 2015).
As complex behaviors emerged gradually thanks to cultural niche construction activity, they were
selected and transmitted as functional niche modifiers. What varies and what is  inherited is no
longer genes alone, but also behaviors and their transmission mechanisms and selection acts on a
widened  basin  of  variation.  Niche  construction  theory  and  its  associated  view  of  inclusive
inheritance (ecological inheritance and cultural inheritance) are indispensable perspectives in this
respect.
Behaviors intended as potent niche modifiers are capable of systematically bias selective pressures.
Niche  construction  advocates  and  EES  supporters  argue  that  Mayr's  (however  not  Darwin's)
proximate-ultimate  heuristic  distinction  has  today  crystallized  into  a  dogma  that  prevents  to
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appreciate some fundamental evolutionary features (Laland et al. 2011; Laland et al. 2013; see also
Scott Phillips et al. 2011). We argue that the need to overcome this too rigid separation between
proximate and ultimate causes is urgent if we want to properly understand the plurality of processes
at  the  bases  of  language  evolution,  as  the  latter  represents  a  complex  interplay  between  the
behavioral  level  and  the  domain  of  cultural  transmission  mechanisms  on  one  side,  and  the
biological level and the domain of classical biological evolution on the other side. Many feedback
effects operate between these domains and we suggest that reciprocal causation (Laland et al. 2015)
offers the correct explanatory framework within which to operate in order to understand language
evolution.
5. Phenotypic plasticity (behavioral plasticity)
It is reasonable to suggest that behavioral plasticity have been favored by natural selection during
genus  Homo  evolution.  However,  the  other  side of  the coin should  be considered  as  well:  the
bearers of a prolonged childhood were offspring that remained immature for longer periods, being
not self sufficient. Hence slower maturation rates might have been costly traits, and some buffering
effects, again, should have been in place in order to let the immature offspring survive, shifting the
costs-benefits ratio towards the advantageous side. Defending immature offspring could have been
a factor of cohesion for the social group.
Increased cooperation among group members  means also  increased  social  learning and a  more
efficient spread of acquired behaviors through cultural transmission. Language, along with other
forms of information transmission such as imitation or teaching, could have ensured high-fidelity
transmission of more and more complex behaviors,  allowing cultural  knowledge to  accumulate
among individuals and across generations (Fogarty et al. 2011; Lewis and Laland 2012).
These changes both at the individual and at the group level seem to be partially consistent with a
hypotheses that have been advanced recently: the self-domestication hypothesis (Gibbons 2014; see
also Suman and Pievani 2015).
In order to understand the evolutionary logic of the genetic recruitment (or exaptation) occurred in
language evolution, we cannot focus exclusively at the genetic level; we should also advance some
hypothesis  on  the  selective  pressures  that  might  have  elicited  this  recruitment.  The  Self-
Domestication  hypothesis  provides,  in  principle,  this  evolutionary  (ecological  and  social)
background: selection for less-aggressive (and more cooperative) behaviors among group mates
might  have  been  in  place;  consequently,  some  of  the  morphological  traits  listed  in  the
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Domestication Syndrome (Wilkins et al. 2014) might have resulted as by-products, and the genes
controlling their development have been positively selected accordingly. It is interesting to note that
our current understanding of cranial globularization fits well this evolutionary account (Boeckx,
Benitez-Burraco, 2014; Benitez-Burraco et al., submitted).
The scenario just outlined seems consistent with a gene-culture co-evolution explanatory model and
a  reciprocal  causation  perspective.  A first  phase  of  plastic  behavioral  response  to  the  mutated
ecological and social conditions elicits phenotypic accomodation,  in which brain neuroplasticity
plays a fundamental role (Anderson, 2010). Novel behaviors translate in new niche construction
activities  and  modifications  of  the  (natural  and  cultural)  selective  pressures  accordingly.  This
modified  regime  leads  to  selection  on  specific  genes.  Language,  intended  as  a  high-fidelity
transmission  mechanism,  co-evolving  with  the  complexity  of  behaviors  required  to  face  ever-
demanding  ecological  and  social  challenges,  fits  in  principle  this  gene-culture  co-evolution
evolutionary explanatory model (Fisher and Ridley 2013).
6. Developmental bias and constraints (developmental plasticity)
We would like to suggest that building the language phenotype shares also some interesting features
with what the EES supporters intend for constructive development (Laland et al. 2015).
According to the constructive development perspective developmental processes are intended as
“exploratory processes” in the sense that development is an “open-ended” process (see also weak
linkage in Kirschner and Gerhart, 2010), responding flexibly to internal and external inputs (Laland
et al. 2015) with genetic information playing only a part of the whole game and with epigenetics
regulating this process. Language is a trait only partially genetically determined as its phenotype is
built during infancy and extended ontogeny.
According to the constructive development view, “genetically specified reaction-norm approach is
limited,  because  phenotypic  variation  results  from ontogenetic  selective  processes,  rather  than
genes,  responding to  environmental  variation.”  (Laland  et.  al. 2015). This  point  is  particularly
relevant for language, if we consider the exaptive hypothesis for the evolution of complex vocal
learning accounting for the difference between humans and non-human primates, labeled in (Fitch
2011) the “Kuypers/Jürgens direct connections hypothesis”.
A developmental  hypothesis,  involving competition during development  between an innate  call
system based in the brainstem, and the cortico-motor system, was put forward by Terrence Deacon:
“By Deacon’s hypothesis, evolving the kind of direct cortical control over vocalizations typical of
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humans  would  require  a  reduction  in  the  innate  call  system,  and  perhaps  also  the  innate  call
repertoire.” (Fitch 2011, p. 5).
This  perspective  includes  exactly  the  kind  of  ontogenetic  selective  process  in  line  with  the
constructive development view. Fine-tuning (and then canalizing) this developmental process might
have been crucial in the course of human evolution to evolve complex vocal learning. Moreover,
Deacon expressively argues that a reduction in the innate call system would have been required to
let  the  intentional  vocalization  system  “win”  this  developmental  competition.  Relaxed
developmental constraints can be considered serious candidates for allowing this developmental
plasticity (Suman and Pievani 2015; see also Deacon 2010; Somel et al. 2014).
Epigenetic here is of course a big topic, whose relevance has only recently started being appreciated
even in language evolution studies. However, this work doesn't aim at such a comprehensiveness
and leaves aside this area which would deserve a much more accurate treatment.
Moreover,  the  brain  is  an  extremely plastic  organ,  prone  to  recruit  its  anatomical  components
(neural reuse, see Anderson 2010) and language is the result of such a massive recruitment (Steels
2011). Determining the role of genetic modifications in language evolution is one of the hardest
tasks in this field-study; some defend the “genes-as-followers” perspective (West-Eberhard 2003),
some search for the genetic component that triggered language evolution. Most probably, the truth
lays in between, in the sense that a co-evolutionary dynamic between genes and the environemtal
and  selective  effects  of  the  phenotypes  produced  by  these  genes  may  result  the  most  proper
perspective.
We would like to bring just an example that might bring more clarity to this viewpoint, even though
this work doesn't aim at expanding its theoretical character on the genetic field.
In particular, we would like to focus on a specific and well-known mutation of the gene SLIT-
ROBO Rho GTPase activating protein 2 -SRGAP2- (whose relevance was more extensively treated
in Suman and Pievani 2015), originated by duplication, that got fixed approximately 2.4 mya, a
crucial time for human evolution as it is located at the bases of genus Homo phylogeny and at the
beginning of the encephalization trend. The human-specific paralog SRGAP2C inhibits the original
gene whose function is arresting spine maturation in the neocortex (Charrier et al. 2012): this is a
case  of  heterochrony (specifically neoteny),  a  differential  timing in  gene  expression  leading to
prolonged spine maturation in the neocortex (hypermorphosis)  and leading to longer necks and
larger heads, responsible of enhancing synaptic connectivity and implementing synaptic plasticity. 
Such  a  genetic  modification  most  probably  played  a  significant  role  in  increasing  general
intelligence and synaptic plasticity,  bringing plenty of selective advantage.  However  this  is  not
enough to assess that genes are the prime movers for language evolution.
95
“The critical  role  of genetic  or epigenetic  evolution was to  support  broad changes  to  neuronal
structure,  for  example  for  regulating  synaptic  growth,  synaptic  repairing,  or  brain  expansion”
(Steels 2011, p. 10). Consistently with this view, SRGAP2C was the example we provided here.
But once these neurobiological foundations were in place, cultural selective pressures (of the kind
discussed  in  Morgan  et  al.  2015,  hence  for  high-fidelity  transmission)  imposed  by behavioral
modifications, could have favored a significant recruitment of neural and cognitive traits, exploiting
the  underlying  evolved  brain  plasticity  and  adapting  novel  features  to  pre-existing  constraints
(Deacon 1997; Christiansen and Chater 2008). 
This  process  of  recruitment  might  have  deep  roots:  for  example,  Putative  Precursors
of  Speech Dynamics  (Ghazanfar  et  al  2012)  can be identified in  rythmic  facial  movements  of
ancestral  primates  such as  lip-smacking (Tramacere  and Ferrari,  2016).  However,  it  is  hard  to
establish whether this exaptive process might have be driven by cultural dynamics influencing the
action of biological evolution or the other  way around. New developments in  “animal  culture”
(Laland and Galef 2009) studies will shed new light on this field.
Once again, a co-evolutionary dynamic, a reciprocal view of biological causality and explanatory
pluralism (biological and cultural evolution acting in concert) seem the proper perspective to adopt
here.
7. A multilevel hierarchical framework of analysis
Summing up, the perspective we provided so far keeps together the different levels of the biological
hierarchy, from the ecological one, down to the molecular one, passing through the individual and
the group level. We started taking into account the perturbation at the ecological level caused by a
plastic  behavioral  response  to  environmental  challenges;  we  considered  the  altered  regime  of
selective pressures provoked by the use of fire, an example of counteractive niche construction or
cultural mitigation of selection. A behavioral innovation, hence a plastic response not preceded by
any  gene  modification,  is  in  principle  capable  of  triggering  a  cascade  of  effects  both  at  the
molecular level (heterochrony), at the individual level (prolonged childhood, slower developmental
rates)  and  at  the  group  level  (self-domestication  hypothesis,  increased  cooperation).  Once  the
neurobiological  biological  foundations  were  put  in  place  by  biological  evolution  (genetic  and
epigenetic),  cultural  selective  pressures  for  behavioral  transmission  might  have  triggered  a
recruitment process, made possible by the previously selected plastic features, for the emergence of
a high-fidelity transmission mechanism, that is language.
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A multilevel perspective is here proposed as a metalevel of analysis that keeps together the factors
we considered so far (see fig. 1).
The logic of the argument presented here is consistent with a gene-culture co-evolutionary model.
In fact, it does not take a genetic mutation to trigger a response to environmental challenges, but a
plastic adjustment of the phenotype (a behavioral response) is sufficient to trigger a modification of
the selective regime in a niche construction logic. This modified regime of selection can eventually
lead to selection of particular genes or metabolic pathways, such as the well-known case of lactase
persistence (Curry 2013), the biological adjustment to the use of fire (Wrangham and Carmody
2010), or even FOXP2 human variants, in a population already using a form of communication
system requiring high-fidelity and high variety transmission mechanisms (Fisher and Ridley 2013).
Figure  1.  The  logic  of  the  gene-
culture  co-evolutionary  dynamic  is
presented here. A flexible behavioral
response to environmental challenges
is able to alter the selective regime at
the  ecological  level,  provoking  a
cascade  of  effects  at  other  levels;
alloparenting, increased cooperation,
increased social learning are among
the  modifications  occurring  at  the
social  level;  novel  behaviors  and
mechanisms  implementing  the
transmission  of  cumulative  culture
are  among  the  modifications
occurring  at  the  individual  level;
delayed  developmental  rates  caused
by heterochronic gene expression are
among the modifications occurring at
the  molecular  levels,  promoting  in
turn reliance on social learning and
producing positive selective feedback
effects.
So if it is fairly accepted that gene-culture co-evolution is a fundamental evolutionary pattern that
can explain some recent human genomic adaptations (Laland et al. 2010), we speculate that this
pattern can be extended to deeper times in human evolution, not only because cultural and cognitive
complexity associated to genus Homo species is being unveiled today more and more (Joordens et
al. 2014; Rodriguez-Vidal et al. 2014), but also because some hypotheses on the role played by
gene-culture  co-evolutionary  patterns  in  genus  Homo  evolution  have  started  being  inquired
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experimentally today (Morgan et al. 2015). These recent works however suggest that a thorough
reconsideration of the causal roles of the elements in play is needed, namely the interplay between
the  transmission  mechanisms,  cultural  transmission  across  individuals  and  generations  and  the
selective pressures seen from a reciprocal causation perspective.
8. Conclusions
An evo-devo approach to language evolution has surely gained much value in the last years among
the scientific community (Dor and Jablonka 2009; Fitch 2012; Boeckx 2014). This work, however,
aims at making a further step trying to gather some relevant language evolution studies with the
perspective advanced by the EES supporters (Laland et al. 2015). We tried to picture an adaptive
complementarity  between  organisms  and  their  environment  throughout  genus  Homo  evolution,
showing how selective pressures might have changed in accordance to the influence of increasing
behavioral complexity.
Conceptual frameworks should be evaluated on their ability to stimulate useful research.
Language evolution can be considered an open problem of the evolutionary research programme.
Although  no  novel  specific  predictions  are  advanced  here,  we  believe  that  this  conceptual
architecture better frames our current understanding of language evolution. Genes, development and
the environment constructively interact in building the language faculty. Language is the result of a
plurality  of  interactions  causally  interrelated  (explanatory  pluralism):  biological  and  cultural
evolution are complexly intertwined in the evolution of the language faculty, and understanding the
interplay of these different systems is pivotal for the future studies on language evolution. We argue
that  reciprocal  causation represents  a  proper  theoretical  tool  to  frame the  interaction  between
cultural and biological evolutionary processes as the cultural and social dimension of language have
systematically biased selective pressures for language evolution.
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Abstract
The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes has generated fruitful research but could
result rather limiting in certain areas of biology. Biological evolution and cultural evolution are
distinct evolutionary processes interacting with each other. Gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamics
offer well documented examples of such an interplay. Biological and cultural dynamics are apparent
also in human language, where both processes contributed in shaping its evolution. However the
nature of this interaction today is still poorly understood. It is often claimed that the emergence of
modern language was preceded by the evolution of a language-ready brain: the latter is usually
intended as a product of biological evolution, while the former is believed to be the consequence of
cultural  processes.  We  label  this  account  as  separationist and  we  argue  that  current  evidence
coming from the archeological  and fossil  record suggests that  cultural  evolution have played a
pivotal role in shaping not only modern language but also the language-ready brain. We label here
this as an integrative perspective. We consequently argue that a rethinking of causation in language
evolution is needed when cultural transmission is taken into account. We show the limits of the
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proximate-ultimate  sharp  distinction  in  this  specific  case-study  and  we  argue  in  favor  of  the
necessity  of  a  feedback  causal  model.  We  extend  our  argument  to  the  debate  on  gradual  and
punctuational  evolutionary  rates,  suggesting  that  the  debate  on  patterns  (gradualism  and
punctuationism)  in  language  evolution  should  leave  room for  discussion  on  the  nature  of  the
processes (separationist and integrative) involved in producing certain patterns, bringing reasons in
favor of the integrative perspective.
Keywords:  language  evolution;  cultural  transmission;  reciprocal  causation;  gene-culture  co-
evolution; language-ready brain; processes and patterns; gradualism; punctuationism; 
1. Introduction
The proximate-ultimate distinction (Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963) represents the standard account
for causation in biology. As such it has been adopted also as the core methodology in language
evolution  studies,  generating  fruitful  research  and  displaying  the  explanatory  power  of  the
comparative  method  (Fitch  2005).  However,  some  scholars  argued  that  the  proximate-ultimate
distinction can sometimes result rather limiting in certain areas of biological inquiry such as evo-
devo, niche construction, the evolution of cooperation and language evolution (Laland et al. 2011).
Although proximate and ultimate explanations are complementary and not competing explanations,
distinguishing proximate and ultimate causes may be not always as straightforward as it  might
seems.  Intersexual  selection  offers  a  critical  example.  Peacock's  tail  ultimate  cause  is  peahen's
choice,  that  is  female  mating  preference,  which  is  the  outcome  of  proximate  (behavioral  and
developmental)  mechanisms;   peahen's  choice  then  co-evolves  with  peacock's  tail.  In  such  a
perspective, causality is defined as reciprocal rather than unidirectional (natural selection acting on
a  trait),  meaning  that  a  causal  feedback  loop  operates  between  male  and  female's  traits  and
generates selection across generations.
This example illustrates how a too rigid proximate ultimate distinction might sometimes produce a‐
rather unsettling confusion, namely that the causes of phenotypic variation such as behavioral and
developmental proximate mechanisms have nothing to do with ultimate, evolutionary explanations
(Laland et al. 2011; West Eberhard 2003; Watt 2013).
Language  can  be  addressed  as  a  typical  ethological  trait,  relying  on  the  proximate-ultimate
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methodology. However, it is clear that a two level distinction is insufficient to frame the processes
involved in language evolution; in fact, beyond the phylogenetic level and the ontogenetic level, we
have to deal with an additional intermediate level that is the one concerning cultural transmission,
often labeled the glossogenetic level (Fitch 2008). Hence, understanding language implies taking
into account three different levels of analysis, complexly intertwined, at the same time (Kirby and
Huford 2002):
(1) the phylogenetic level: inherited phylogenetic constraints and ultimate causes such as natural
selection  for  specific  functions  and  other  neo-Darwinian  evolutionary  processes  involved  in
language evolution;
(2)  the  ontogenetic  level:  proximate  mechanisms  through  which  language  is  acquired  such  as
learning and developmental processes.
(3) the glossogenetic level: languages change over time, but more generally behaviors change over
time and they are transmitted across individuals and across generations. Cultural evolution is the
evolutionary field-study dealing with how behavioral transmission occurs not only in humans but
also in non-human animals relying on social learning strategies (Mesoudi 2011; Whiten et al. 2011).
This level is set at an intermediate time-scale between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic one.
While  it  is  safely  acknowledged  that  natural  selection  and  other  neo-Darwinian  evolutionary
processes are undoubtedly ultimate causes, as well as mechanisms by which language is acquired in
ontogeny by each  individual  are  proximate  causes,  the  main  point  at  issue  here  is  whether  to
consider cultural transmission as a proximate cause (Scott Phillips 2007; Scott Phillips et al. 2011)
or rather as an ultimate cause (Laland et al. 2011; Laland et al. 2013) in language evolution and
more generally in human evolution. In fact, every hypothesis on the evolution of language should
be  soundly  grounded  on  the  empirical  bases  available  today,  that  is  what  we  know from the
paleontological and archeological record.
Here  we  present  two  different  perspectives  present  today  in  literature  providing  alternative
interpretations, starting from the same empirical phenomena. For conventional reasons of simplicity
we label  the  former  stance  the  “evolutionary psychologist”  perspective,  endorsing  a  “Standard
Evolutionary Theory” (SET) (Scott Phillips 2007; Scott Phillips et al. 2011); we label the latter the
“cultural evolutionist” perspective, endorsing an “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” (EES) (Laland
et al. 2013; Laland et al. 2015; see also Scott Phillips et al. 2013 for such a debate).
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2. SET & EES supporters: The evolution of adult lactose tolerance case-study
Researchers supporting the Standard Evolutionary Theory (SET) argue that missing the distinction
between proximate and ultimate explanations  (Mayr,  1961) is  source of  epistemic incoherence,
confusion, wasted efforts and dangers in language evolution and in cultural evolution studies (Scott
Phillips 2007; Scott Phillips et al. 2011): evolutionary psychology (Cosmides, 1989) is quoted as a
proper application of the proximate-ultimate distinction which is claimed to be a central pillar of the
neo-Darwinian paradigm (see Pievani 2016 for a critique to evolutionary psychology assumptions).
Culture is hence usually assimilated to individual learning or environmental effects on behavior, and
it is treated as merely a proximate mechanism.
“Evolutionary psychologists often characterize cultural influences on development as operating like
a (proximate) switch (like the buttons on a jukebox) to shift behavior and cognition from one pre-
established program to another, with each context dependent strategy fashioned by natural selection
(Tooby  and  Cosmides  1992).  In  contrast,  cultural  evolutionists  view  culture  as  a  historical
knowledge-gaining  process  and  therefore  as  a  legitimate  source  of  ultimate  explanations  for
acquired human characters (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Mesoudi
2011)” (Laland et al. 2013, p. 724).
Evolutionary psychologists (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) and SET defenders (Scott Phillips et al.
2011;  Dickins  and  Rahman  2012)  usually  assume  that  cultural  transmission  is  genetically
controlled,  as  if  cultural  change  was  directly  tied  to  genetic  variation  in  gene-culture  co-
evolutionary dynamics.  Cultural  evolutionists  instead conceive the phenotype as an open-ended
outcome of both evolved developmental processes and learning mechanisms, and so as the interplay
between  both  genetic  and  cultural  inheritance  intended  as  independent  but  interacting  and
reciprocally influenced processes (Laland et al. 2010; Mesoudi et al. 2013). EES advocates embrace
an  inclusive  inheritance  perspective,  arguing  that  multiple  inheritance  systems  contribute  to
phenotypic variation across generations (Danchin et al. 2011)
Non-genetic inheritance systems (cultural, ecological, epigenetic inheritance, parental effects) are
usually  considered  in  SET as  proximate  mechanisms  evolved  as  adaptive  functions  for  which
natural selection acting upon genetic variation is the ultimate explanation (Dickins and Rahman,
2012). Therefore, non-genetic inheritance systems would not challenge the explanatory structure of
SET. Conversely, EES advocates maintain that SET defenders conflate epigenetic inheritance with
ontogenetic  phenotypic  plasticity  and  cultural  transmission  inheritance  with  individual  learning
(Mesoudi et al. 2013), failing in distinguishing that these mechanisms operate at different time-
scales and hierarchical levels.
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We  lay  here  as  a  common  ground  for  comparison  a  specific  case  study  in  which  cultural
transmission is interpreted differentially by the two alternative perspectives: the evolution of adult
lactose tolerance.
Even though all human babies can drink milk, only a few adults have lactose tolerance. It has been
shown that the frequency of alleles for adult lactose absorption within a culture correlates with
whether that culture has a history of dairy farming. Dairy farming is a cultural practice that spread
with  the  Neolithic  revolution,  with  agriculture,  domestication  of  plants  and  animals,  livestock
farming. It started approximately 11 kya in Anatolia and then it spread in Europe (Curry 2013). A
typical 'why' question can be asked: why adult lactose absorption has this distribution today? We
can see how the two different approaches answer this question.
According to SET supporters (Scott-Phillips et al. 2011; Scott Phillips et al. 2013), the advent of
dairy farming changed  local ecology;  variation in genes for lactose tolerance is correlated with
variation in  fitness,  being natural selection the result  of this  genetic covariance.  Environmental
change is not considered as an evolutionary cause, so natural selection acting on genes is the only
ultimate evolutionary explanation required. Causality is unidirectional, flowing from the selective
environment  to  the  genes  carried  by  the  organisms.  The  spread  of  dairy  farming,  a  culturally
transmitted practice,  is  flattened to a  mere background environmental  condition;  hence cultural
transmission is considered as a proximate cause with no evolutionary relevance. According to a
study performed within this conceptual framework (Simoons 1970), genes are the prime movers,
that is the spread of lactose absorption alleles allowed dairy farming to spread (Scott Phillips et al.
2013).
According to EES supporters (Laland  et al. 2013; Scott Phillips et al. 2013), dairy farming is a
culturally transmitted practice that cannot be characterized as caused by earlier selection. That is
saying  that  lactose  absorption  alleles  are  not  genes  for  dairy  farming  at  all,  they  are  alleles
regulating enzymatic digestion; dairy farming is a complex set of behaviors, knowledge, traditions
that  are  culturally transmitted across  generations.  As such, dairy farming is  considered a  niche
construction activity (Odling Smee et al. 2003), being able to alter the selective environment, to
modify the selective pressures acting within that environment and to trigger the evolutionary event
of the spread of lactose absorption alleles. The selective environment and the genetic trait co-evolve
in  a  gene-culture  co-evolutionary  dynamic  (Feldman  and  Laland  1996).  According  to  a  set  of
researches conducted within this conceptual framework (Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 1989; Durham
1991;  Holden  and  Mace  1997;  Aoki  1986;  Gerbault  et  al.  2011),  the  spread  of  dairy farming
preceeded the spread of lactose absorption alleles. In such a perspective genes are “followers” (West
Eberhard 2003) meaning that a plastic behavioral response to the environment alters the selective
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pressures and generates the selective regime that favors the spread of the alleles. In this sense,
cultural transmission plays an important evolutionary role.
The two accounts just presented reach opposite conclusions on what is the cause and what is the
consequence of what. Here we would like to highlight some problems related to the SET view,
assigning cultural transmission to the category of proximate mechanisms.
Firstly,  proximate  mechanisms  should  operate  within  the  individual  lifespan,  while  cultural
transmission, by definition, is transmission of behaviors among individuals and across generations.
SET supporters conflate individual learning with cultural transmission, while they are mechanisms
operating at different time-scales.
Secondly,  by  reducing  dairy  farming  to  a  background  environmental  condition  they  do  not
recognize  cultural  transmission  as  an  independent  system  of  inheritance,  while  today  it  is
acknowledged  that  multiple  systems  of  inheritance  contribute  to  phenotypic  variation  across
generations (Danchin et al. 2011).
Today the interactions between biological and cultural evolutionary processes have been developed
in population genetic models by theoretical biologists, showing how deeply selection can be biased
by this  interaction (Odling Smee  et  al.  2013).  Recent  analyses  on human genome showed that
hundreds  of  genes  might  have  responded  to  cultural  biases  of  selection  produced  by  human
activities (Laland et al. 2010). Hence, “when an evolutionary mutation is identified as crucial to the
human capacity for cumulative culture, this might be a consequence rather than a cause of cultural
change. The smallest, most trivial new habit adopted by a hominid species could –  if advantageous
– have led to selection of genomic variations that sharpened that habit” (Fisher and Ridley 2013, p.
3)
3. Gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamics for language
Current studies in language evolution are putting more and more light on the relevance of a gene-
culture co-evolution approach to language (Sterelny 2012; Jablonka et al. 2012; Dor  and Jablonka
2014; Morgan et al. 2015).  In gene-culture co-evolutionary models, the control of the phenotype is
not  exclusive  matter  of  genetic  determination;  cultural  transmission  mechanisms  of  learning,
phenotypic and behavioral plasticity are also involved (Suman, 2016).
Although biological and cultural  evolution are processes operating at different time-scales, they
interact with each other. The key point is trying to understand how far back in time this interaction
could go and in which ways it is articulated. By doing so we might evaluate the proper causal role
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of  cultural  transmission  in  language  evolution,  according  to  empirical  evidence  in
paleoanthropology and archaeology.
Furthermore, understanding the causal role of cultural transmission might result pivotal to advance
some predictions in order to bring clarity to the protracted debate on whether language evolved
gradually at uniform rates or rather punctuationally, a topic we will discuss in the last paragraph
before the conclusions.
According to these debates, we think that three main positions, concerning the processes at the basis
of language evolution, can be identified today in literature.
1) a saltationist perspective, according to which a genetic mutation, occurred between 100 and 50
kya,  triggered  language  appearance  giving  the  alleged  genetic  endowment  that  makes  humans
unique. (Chomsky, 2010; Berwick et al., 2013; Bohluis et al. 2014). This stance, supporting a lucky
mutation  being  responsible  for  letting  the  whole  human  language  package  emerging  abruptly,
without  any role  for  natural  selection,  is  believed to  be  anti-Darwinian  and  no longer  tenable
(Hillert, 2015; Lieberman, 2015; but see Bohluis et al. 2015), hence we won't further discuss it here.
2) a  separationist  perspective: language readiness (see below) was shaped by biological (genetic
and epigenetic) evolution; then, approximately 50-100 kya, cultural conditions, often generically
defined, allowed the emergence of modern (or true) language. In such a perspective, the causal role
of culture enters pretty late the evolutionary scene and is exclusively associated to the emergence of
modern “full-developed” language (Christiansen and Chater, 2010; Arbib, 2012; Pagel 2012).
3)  an  integrative perspective:  cultural  transmission played an evolutionary role  not  only in  the
evolution of modern language, but also in previous forms of communication (protolanguages) and it
should be considered a causal evolutionary factor in shaping language readiness (Laland 2016, in
press; Morgan et al. 2015 and discussion below).
Today, a term used to refer to the biologically evolved capacity to acquire language is  language
readiness or language-ready brain. This term stands for the neural features evolved during hominin
evolution  (not  expressively for  linguistic  functions)  and representing the  scaffolds  that  allowed
modern language to emerge (Arbib 2012; Boecks and Benitez Burraco 2014). Typically,  in this
perspective,  language readiness  is  intended as  a  product  of  biological  (genetic  and epigenetic)
evolution,  while  the  emergence  of  modern  language  is  intended  as  a  cultural  invention,  as  a
consequence  of  specific  cultural  conditions  (Kirby et  al.  2008;  Christiansen  and  Chater  2008;
Christiansen and Chater 2010;  Scott-Phillips and Kirby 2010;  Arbib 2012; Pagel  2012).  In this
sense, modern language appearance is usually dated approximately 100 kya, associating it to the
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explosion  of  Behavioral  Modernity  (D'Errico  and  Banks  2013)  observed  in  the  archaeological
record.
We label this stance the separationist perspective and we believe it presents some problems related
to the alleged evolutionary processes that shaped language, in particular regarding the causal role
assigned to cultural transmission in hominin evolution.
This separationist account is well depicted by some crucial passages in Arbib's (2012) argument, in
the sixth chapter where the core hypotheses of the book are revealed: the hypotheses presented in
Arbib (2012) distinguish
“biological  evolution,  which  shaped  the  genome  for  a  language-ready  brain  (and  body),  from
cultural  evolution,  which took us  from hominids  with a  language-ready brain  and rudimentary
manual-vocal communication (protolanguage) to humans with full language capability. I will argue
in later chapters that the demands of protolanguage in hominids prior to Homo sapiens contributed
to  the  evolution  of  the  human  brain,  whereas  those  features  that  distinguish  language  from
protolanguage did not”  (Arbib 2012, p. 162)
And again:
“It has been the argument of this book that many different changes during biological evolution gave
humans a  language-ready brain  but that it  took  cultural evolution  to exploit  the human brain’s
capabilities to the point where the potential for language (in the singular) became realized in the
development of diverse languages (in the plural) as Homo sapiens developed different groupings in
Africa and spread from there around the world” (Arbib 2012, p. 251)
Arbib's  argument  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  biological  evolution  built  the  scaffolds  for  a
language-ready brain, with a central role played by the Mirror System; the scaffolds comprehend: a
mirror system for grasping in the common ancestor between monkeys and humans; simple imitation
in  the  common ancestor  between  humans  and ape;  complex imitation  unique  to  genus  Homo;
pantomime;  multimodal  protolanguage  (protosign  and  protospeech).  When  cultural  evolution
entered the scene,  true  language (provided with compositional semantics) could emerge in all its
diversity and complexity.
The aim of our work is not entering the linguistic, the cognitive and the neural details of Arbib's
proposal,  which  certainly  provides  promising  insights  for  language  evolution  studies,  but  just
evaluating the causal role assigned to culture in its account of language evolution.
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In the figure 6.2 (Arbib 2012, p. 159) a straight line goes from animal communication systems to
protolanguages and biological evolution alone is the process responsible for such a transition. Then
the same straight line starts  from  Homo sapiens,  it  goes towards Indo-European languages and
cultural evolution is retained responsible of such a change.
Depicting the evolutionary processes responsible for language evolution as a straight line that shifts
from biological to cultural evolution represents exactly what we labeled a separationist account.
We argue that there are at least two critical points in Arbib's account:
1) the absence of overlapping between the biological and cultural evolution lines;
2) cultural evolution starting only with Homo sapiens appearance.
The same problematic perspective is present in Pagel (2012):
“language  evolved  to  solve  the  crisis  that  began  when  our  species  acquired  social  learning  –
probably some time around 160 to 200 kya” (Pagel 2012, p. 280)
and in Christiansen and Chater (2010):
“Instead  of  viewing  the  brain  as  having  a  genetically  specified,  domain-specific  system  for
language, which must somehow have arisen over the course of biological evolution, we see the key
to  language evolution  to  be  evolutionary processes  over  language itself.  Specifically,  we view
language as an evolving system, and the features of languages as having been shaped by repeated
processes  of  acquisition  and  transmission  across  successive  generations  of  language  users”
(Christiansen and Chater 2010, p. 5)
“Cultural evolution will work against biological (co)evolution in the case of malleable aspects of
culture— rapid cultural change leads to a fast-changing cultural environment, which serves as a
‘‘moving target’’ to which biological adaptation cannot occur” (Christiansen and Chater 2010, p.
12)
Such an account of language evolution poses a sharp separation between biological and cultural
evolution, not supported by the updated empirical evidence about hominin phylogeny. We believe
that the quoted accounts underestimate the role played by cultural transmission and social learning,
as cultural evolution and social learning simply did not enter the evolutionary scene with  Homo
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sapiens, but instead played a significant role during all the evolution of genus Homo.
Each hypothesis on language evolution should be primarily in accordance with the most updated
data coming from the archeological and paleontological records. Today, the archeological and the
paleoanthropological records coming from hominin branching phylogeny suggest that these two
processes have worked side by side (inclusive inheritance and explanatory pluralism perspective,
see Suman 2016) at least since the appearance of genus Homo (or even before) and so they should
be integrated in a gene-culture co-evolutionary interaction in order to understand how uniquely
human and interdependent features of cumulative culture and language have emerged.
Here we briefly list some of the main compelling evidence. The first evidence of material culture
are  today set with the Lomwekian  tools  3,3 mya,  and tentatively associated to  Kenyanthropus
platyops (Harmand et al 2015). The presence of such a lithic industry indicates that those hominins
were  already relying  on  rather  advanced  social  learning  practices,  hence  cultural  transmission.
Oldowan technology (Semaw  et  al.,  1997),  usually associated  to  Homo habilis,  appears  in  the
archeological  record around 2,4 – 2,6 mya and shows stasis  for 700 ky.  Acheulean technology
(Lepre et al. 2011), usually associated to  Homo erectus, the first hominin species coming out of
Africa, appears 1,7 mya and shows significantly different and novel characteristics, such as bifacial
processing. Erectines showed morphological, behavioral and developmental features suggesting that
they were benefitting from cumulative cultural knowledge (Antón et al., 2014) and probably they
already exhibited a pre-syntactic protolanguage (Tallerman and Gibson 2012).
Moreover, theoretical analysis showed that “individual learning, social learning (from the parental
generation),  and  innate  determination  of  behavior  are  favored  by  natural  selection  when
environmental changes occur at  short,  intermediate,  and long generation intervals,  respectively”
(Aoki et al. 2005, p. 335). Climatic fluctuations indeed played a pivotal role in the evolution of
human behavioral flexibility and adaptations (Parravicini and Pievani 2016, in press). Consequently,
we  could  expect  that  hominin  species  evolved  individual  learning  as  a  fundamental  adaptive
strategy. However, evidence coming from the fossil and archeological record suggest that hominins
have relied on complex social interactions at least since the appearance of the first lithic industries,
hence Lomekwian, 3,3 mya (Harmand et al. 2015). Climatic fluctuations effects should have been
attenuated in order to let hominins evolve social learning adaptive strategies. This consideration
support the idea that (cultural) niche construction activities have long been in place in hominin
evolution,  allowing  hominins  to  build  environments  in  which  to  fit.  Counteractive  niche
construction (Odling Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2010) is an example of such an evolutionary
mechanism favouring hominins fit to their constructed environment. As culture may have been the
main factor allowing this environmental modification and eventually human adaptation to a wide
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range of environments (out of Africa), selection for more and more efficient cultural  capacities
should have been strong in hominin evolution, especially on those hominin species coming out of
Africa, coping with several different environments, from at least two million years ago. Constant
selective  pressures  for  cultural  variants,  allowed  human  cultures  to  grow  in  diversity  and
complexity, in several human species.
However, culture, in order to be cumulative, requires high-fidelity transmission (Lewis and Laland
2012), and verbal language is such a high-fidelity transimission mechanism. In order to support the
transmission  of  cumulative  culture,  hominins  evolved  more  and  more  complex  forms  of
communication  along  with  the  increasing  complexity  of  cultural  variants  in  a  co-evolutionary
dynamic.
Summing up, the archeological and the paleontological records provide strong evidence today in
favor  of  the  third  stance  we  labeled  the  “integrative”  perspective,  that  is  a  gene-culture  co-
evolutionary scenario in genus Homo evolution. This scenario supports a co-evolutionary dynamic
between  higher  and  higher-fidelity  transmission  mechanisms  and  culture,  and  supplementary
experimental data seems to support such a prediction (Morgan et al. 2015), as argued below.
4.  Causality  in  co-evolutionary  feedback  processes:  cultural  transmission  shaped  the
language-ready brain
Although other non-human animals relying on social learning strategies exhibit cultural variation
(Whiten  et  al.  1999),  today  there  is  no  available  compelling  evidence  that  animal  culture  is
cumulative  (although  see  Boesch  2003).  Cumulativeness,  that  is  cultural  traits  increasing  in
diversity and complexity over time, seems to be a uniquely human characteristic (Tennie et  al.
2009). In order to be cumulative, human culture must be reliably transmitted and language is indeed
a high-fidelity transmission mechanism (Lewis and Laland 2012).
A recent study, which we argue being representative of the EES conceptual framework, claims to
have found experimental evidence for the co-evolution of hominin stone-tool making and language
(Morgan  et  al. 2015).  Other  studies  previously  explored  the  connections  between  the  putative
cognitive  capacities  required  for  the  stone  knapping  practice  and  those  exploited  in  linguistic
functions, showing how both tasks could rely on hierarchical planning of actions (Stout 2011; Di
Vincenzo and Manzi 2013).
In considering Morgan et al. (2015) experiment, what we want to evaluate is the evolutionary causal
role of cultural transmission,  and its  interplay and overlapping with biological evolution,  in the
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evolution of hominin transmission mechanisms.
184 adult human participants were disposed along chains and tested for their Oldowan tool-making
skills  under  5  different  learning  conditions:  reverse  engineering,  imitation/emulation,  basic
teaching,  gestural  teaching  and  verbal  teaching.  Results  showed  performances  improved  under
higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms, hence gestural and verbal teaching, the latter involving
verbal communication. Researchers argue that stone tool-making might have generated selective
pressures  for  high-fidelity transmission  mechanisms,  hence  teaching and language.  Researchers
suggest that the evolution of material culture, such as relying on stone-tool making and its social
transmission, generated a selective gradient towards high-fidelity transmission mechanisms.
The findings  of  this  study suggest  how language might  have evolved through gene-culture co-
evolutionary dynamics, and more generally they provide a gene-culture co-evolutionary account of
human technology and cognition. Even though Oldowan technology probably relied on relatively
low-fidelity transmission mechanisms, such as observational learning or simple imitation, social
transmission of material culture might nonetheless have generated a continuous selective gradient
towards higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms, hence verbal teaching. Later technologies would
have reinforced this gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamic.
It  is  only with  more  advanced  Acheulean  and  Mousterian  lithic  technologies  that  tool-making
processing shows long sequences of planned and hierarchically organized actions. The study hence
speculates that hominins relying on social transmission of material culture possessed a capacity for
teaching and potentially a form of (gestural or verbal) protolanguage around 1.7 mya.
As already mentioned, evidence coming from the archeological and paleoanthropological record
support  in  principle  this  conclusion  (Tallerman  and  Gibson  2012):  cooperative  breeding,
cooperative foraging, slow developmental rates (Antón et al. 2014) represent indirect evidence that
erectines probably benefitted from cumulative cultural knowledge.
Moreover,  as  Acheulean  technology  (characterized  by  bifacially  processed  amigdala),  required
hierarchical  planning of action in order  to  be obtained,  it  has been argued that  this  skill  could
represent a precursor of the hierarchical organization and planning of action subsequently employed
in linguistic structures (Di Vincenzo and Manzi 2013).
In  such  a  scenario,  teaching,  a  certain  form  of  protolanguage  and  the  associated  transmitted
cumulative culture,  represent potent niche modifiers,  being able to  systematically bias selective
pressures and generate new ones. In such a perspective, protolanguage and language might have
evolved  following  a  gene-culture  co-evolutionary  dynamic  in  parallel  with  the  evolution  of
cumulative culture.
What is crucial to recognize in such a co-evolutionary dynamic are the feedback effects between (1)
118
the transmission mechanisms and (2) the selective gradient acting upon them generated by (3) the
cultural transmission, nourished in turn by (1) those very transmission mechanisms. Let's try to
decompose this feedback causal relationship in its components:
1)  transmission  mechanisms:  imitation,  teaching,  language  can  be  intended  as  proximate
mechanisms (developmental and neural mechanisms are not directly addressed here, the cognitive
and neural level are black-boxed).
2) the selective gradient for high-fidelity transmission mechanisms can be intended as an ultimate
cause for the evolution of transmission mechanisms.
3) Social learning among individuals and cultural transmission among generations can be intended
as the triggering factor for the selective gradient.
Acknowledging the causal role played by cultural transmission in this co-evolutionary feedback
process is crucial. The SET approach typically doesn't ask where do these selective pressures come
from.  The  selective  pressures  are  instead  usually  considered  the  starting  point  of  evolutionary
analysis in SET approach. Moreover, “the convention within evolutionary biology is to distinguish
evolutionary processes from the causes or modulators of those processes” (Laland 2015). However,
this convention can be questioned. A simple intuitive example brings clarity to this point:
“if a nail is hit with a hammer we describe the hammer as the direct cause of the nail entering the
wood. It would seem strange to describe the impact of the hammer as a background condition to the
nail’s momentum”. (Laland 2015)
In our argument, cultural transmission can represent the impact of the hammer and the selective
gradient  the  nail's  momentum.  We  hence  consider  cultural  transmission  as  the  causal  factor
triggering the selective gradient that ultimately leads to transmission mechanisms evolution.
If we accept the logic that cultural transmission is a relevant evolutionary factor for the spread of
lactose  absorption  alleles,  as  today  is  widely  accepted,  we  consequently  should  embrace  the
perspective that culture is a relevant evolutionary factor for the evolution of those transmission
mechanisms that built up the long course of language and cumulative culture co-evolution. Bringing
this  argument  to  its  theoretical  consequences,  we  think  that  cultural  transmission  should  be
considered a relevant evolutionary factor shaping not only language current features (Tamariz and
Kirby 2014),  but,  more  strongly,  the  language-ready brain.  In  fact,  language  evolution  can  be
depicted as an evolutionary history of recruiting (exapting) previously evolved mechanisms and
capacities, a process capable of building up higher and higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms.
FOXP2 human variant fixation can be taken as a clear example of a component of the language-
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ready brain, in which the role of culture should be considered not as a mere proximate cause, but
rather  as  a  relevant  evolutionary  factor.  In  fact,  “It  seems  unlikely  that  FOXP2  triggered  the
appearance of spoken language in a nonspeaking ancestor. It is more plausible that altered versions
of this gene were able to spread through the populations in which they arose because the species
was already using a communication system requiring high fidelity and high variety.” (Fisher and
Ridley,  2013).  This  suggestion  means  that  in  a  population  already  relying  on  a  learned
communication  system,  a  genetic  variant  providing  enhanced  communication  capacities  would
spread rapidly, as testified by the positive selection signals found on FOXP2 (Enard et al. 2002).
The selective pressures for such a genetic variant would be stronger in a population already relying
on  learned  communication.  Human  FOXP2  variant  can  be  the  product  of  a  gene-culture  co-
evolutionary  process,  with  cultural  transmission  as  the  evolutionary  cause  (and  not  just  the
background condition) that generates the selective pressures that spread the variant.
We  find  this  logic  quite  consistent  with  the  assimilate-stretch  principle  proposed  by  Dor  and
Jablonka (2000; 2014), according to which innovation arises through plastic phenotypic adjustment
and in presence of consistent selective pressures advantageous variants are genetically assimilated
in the population. These selective pressures are generated within the cultural niche characterized by
social  learning  of  a  certain  communication  system  (say,  a  protolanguage)  and  its  cultural
transmission. Hence we see cultural transmission playing a clear evolutionary causal role. As in the
case of the spread of lactose absorption alleles, a genetic variant can be the consequence rather than
the  cause of  behavioral  adjustment,  turning the traditional  logic,  according to  which genes  are
always the prime movers, upside-down.
 Attributing  an  evolutionary  causal  role  to  cultural  transmission  might  have  an  interesting
theoretical consequence:
1) a shift in the definition of what has to be considered an evolutionary process (Laland 2015).
Typically, the SET approach confines the definition of an evolutionary process to those processes
directly  affecting  gene  frequencies  across  generations  (mutation,  selection,  drift,  flow).  This
approach however attributes an unjustified causal primacy to the genetic level. The EES approach
instead proposes to widen the definition of evolutionary process to those processes that are capable
of systematically bias selective pressures, even though not directly or immediately affecting gene
frequencies, hence niche construction and developmental bias. In this perspective, genes are no
longer  the  main characters  of  the  evolutionary theater,  but  rather  evolution  is  represented  as  a
complex interplay of  mechanisms,  processes  and causal  factors  displayed  across  the  biological
hierarchy. More importantly, this approach allows to inquire the nature of the selective pressures
and  genes  are  treated  as  the  resulting  outcome  of  the  action  of  selective  pressures  and  other
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evolutionary processes.
We  argue  cultural  transmission,  intended  as  the  causal  trigger  of  phenomena  such  as  lactose
absorption alleles spread or selective gradients for high-fidelity transmission mechanisms, should be
considered an evolutionary process. Even though it does not modifies gene frequencies directly, it
can be considered a process that modifies the selective pressures which stand upstream from the
selected gene frequencies.
Distinguishing  between  evolutionary  causes  and  evolutionary  processes  is  not  trivial:  they  are
separate but interrelated concepts. The question about causation is an epistemological question; the
question about the process is a scientific-mechanistic question that allows to understand the details
of a complex set of events. We argue that cultural transmission can be considered an evolutionary
cause  when  it  can  trigger  a  selective  event,  and  at  the  same  time  it  can  be  considered  an
evolutionary process as it fits, in our view, the broadened definition proposed by the EES general
conceptual framework.
2)  causality  between  the  three  factors  identified  above  (transmission  mechanisms,  selective
gradient,  cultural  transmission)  flows in  a feedback circle,  in  what  has been labeled  reciprocal
causation (Laland  et  al.  2015).  If  transmission  mechanisms  and  the  selective  gradient  can  be
identified as proximate mechanisms and ultimate causes respectively, cultural transmission is the
gear playing a linking role, allowing feedback causal relationships between the previous two.
Therefore, we see the insufficiency of the proximate-ultimate distinction in catching the causal roles
in play here (Laland et al. 2011). A different model of biological causality should be developed to
cope with the limits of the proximate-ultimate distinction. Reciprocal causality is a first step in this
direction (Laland et al. 2015) but we believe it can be integrated with further analyses, for example
a multilevel perspective (Martinez and Esposito 2014), or a graph theory-based approach (Otsuka,
2015). This area of research is promising and needs further inquiry.
3) The consequence of such an argument is that cultural transmission should be considered as an
evolutionary cause shaping not only language current features (Tamariz and Kirby 2014), but, more
strongly,  the language-ready brain.  This stance follows from 2 points:  a  theoretical one and an
empirical one. The theoretical one is the adoption of the EES-inclined conceptual framework that
leads us to consider cultural transmission as an evolutionary cause and an evolutionary process,
entangled  in  feedback relationships  with  other  proximate  mechanisms and ultimate  causes;  the
empirical  one  is  the  current  evidence  coming  from hominin  evolution  suggesting  that  cultural
transmission  has  been  in  place  at  least  since  the  origin  of  genus  Homo,  or  even  before,
accompanying the building up of what today we call the language-ready brain. Hence, we believe it
is inappropriate to consider the language-ready brain as a product of biological evolution alone. We
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argue instead that explanatory pluralism (biological and cultural intended as distinct and related
evolutionary processes) should be adopted in order to explain the language-ready brain evolution,
referring to it as an overlapping of both biological and cultural evolutionary factors in what we
labeled an integrative perspective (see fig. 1). 
We argue this represents a crucial theoretical shift to understand the evolutionary factors in play in
language evolution, and this is possible thanks to a EES-inclined theoretical framework.
5. Eco-evolutionary feedback loops: the Gradualism and Punctuationism debate
Evolutionary feedback loops can accelerate  evolutionary change,  making it  compatible  with an
ecological time-scale rate of change (Post & Paklovacs, 2009). Gene-culture co-evolution is exactly
the kind of process in which dynamics occurring at different time scales (cultural and biological
change) can match. The evolutionary response can therefore result in an accelerated rate, producing
a typical punctuated pattern, that is a burst of change preceded by relatively long period of stasis.
Moragn et al. (2015) selective gradient hypothesis relies exactly on a gene-culture co-evolutonary
process,  that  is  an  eco-evolutionary  feedback  loop:  in  a  population  of  individuals  relying  on
learning and transmission mechanisms, the appearance of a genetic variant enhancing the efficiency
of  learning  and  transmission  would  have  generated  a  significant  advantage  in  the  individuals
possessing it, thanks to a frequency-dependent selection, hence it would have spread rapidly. The
logic  of  this  evolutionary  mechanism  is  in  principle  compatible  with  what  Dor  &  Jablonka
argument (2000; 2014), the assimlate-stretch principle, in order to explain language evolution.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  the  analysis  of  the  archeological  record,  we  can  observe  a  rather
punctuated pattern of spread of the lithic industries. Oldowan technology appeared approximately
2,5 mya and its  stasis  lasted approximately 700ky;  Acheulean technology appears  rather  neatly
around 1,7 mya and lasted quite unvaried until approximately 100kya. We can observe instead a
burst  of  diversity  in  the  archeological  record  in  more  recent  years,  starting  from 300-200kya,
suggesting that a certain threshold might have been overcome (d'Errico and Banks 2013).
However, even if we accept the argument that language have co-evolved with cumulative culture,
this  does  not  allows  us  to  make  inferences  on  whether  cognition  or  communication  systems
followed the same apparently punctuated pattern showed by the evolution of material culture.
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Figure 1. Separationist 
perspective: the language-ready
brain shaped by biological 
(genetic and epigenetic) 
evolution and modern 
language, as the product of 
cultural evolution; cultural 
transmission is associated only 
to the appearance of Homo 
sapiens; cultural evolution 
starts on top of biological 
evolution and their interaction 
is considered incompatible 
(Christiansen and Chater 
2008). Integrative perspective: 
cultural evolutionary processes 
have acted along with 
biological evolutionary 
processes in a co-evolutionary 
feedback loop at least since the 
emergence of genus Homo; it 
follows that cultural 
transmission must be 
considered an evolutionary 
causal factor shaping the 
language-ready brain (Morgan 
et al. 2015).
Culture,  communication  and  cognition  are  three  strictly  interrelated  elements  here,  but  their
evolution could have in principle followed different rates. A punctuated pattern of cultural change is
not  in  principle  inconsistent  with a  more  gradual  accumulation  of  cognitive  modifications  that
would have led to overcoming a certain threshold in communicative or cultural capacities. In fact,
“the appearance of Acheulean tools may have additionally been contingent on the evolution of other
aspects of cognition, such as technical comprehension or the hierarchical planning of actions, as
well  as  demographic  and socio-ecological  factors.  Accordingly,  the  extraordinary length  of  the
Oldowan stasis could indicate that a large number of limiting factors needed to be overcome before
innovations could appear and spread” (Morgan et al. 2015, p. 6)
Gradual  accumulation  of  cognitive  modifications  and  punctuated  change  of  communicative
capacities or cultural products are not inconsistent elements in a co-evolutionary dynamic based on
threshold effects. Positive feedback processes typically scale up in rate after overcoming a certain
threshold  value.  If  a  feedback  dynamic  is  the  actual  process  underlying  the  co-evolution  of
123
cumulative culture and (proto)language, and given the initial stasis of cultural evolution relying on
low-fidelity transmission mechanisms, it is possible that it took a rather long amount of time to
overcome some of the limiting factors (that other apes have never overcome) associated to the
simplest  forms of transmitted hominin culture.  Cultural  mitigation of selection might also have
played  a  role  in  overcoming  these  limiting  factors  (Suman  and  Pievani  2015).  Once  these
limitations, of various nature (cognitive, demographic, morphological, life-history, socio-ecological
factors),  where  overcome,  more  complex  forms  of  protolanguage  and  language  might  have
appeared (what Pavlicev et al. 2016 label bio-cultural epicycles).
The eco-evolutionary feedback present in gene-culture co-evolutionary dynamics in principle makes
the old antagonistic debate about gradual and punctuational rates of change in language evolution
rather  sterile,  as  different  elements  involved  in  language  evolution  (culture,  communication,
cognition) may have co-evolved, changing at different rates. The observed punctuated pattern of
material culture evolution does not rule out the possibility of a gradual accumulation of biological
(genetic,  epigenetic,  neural,  cognitive)  changes  that  at  a  certain  point  might  have  crossed  a
threshold  value,  scaling  up  the  speed  of  observable  change,  consistently  with  co-evolutionary
feedback processes. We retain more important to focus, rather than on the observed pattern (gradual
or  punctuational),  also  depending on the  scale  of  observation,  on the  nature  of  the  underlying
process, that is the interaction between biological and cultural evolutionary processes: in this sense,
we argued against a separationist perspective, depicting cultural evolution as a process that almost
substitutes biological evolution, and in favor of an integrative perspective, in which biological and
cultural evolution interact in a co-evolutionary feedback process in principle capable of producing
bursts in evolutionary rates.
6. Conclusions
We did not explore here the underlying mechanisms that might have implemented the evolution of
transmission  mechanisms,  but  in  such  a  co-evolutionary  dynamics  many  specific  cognitive
mechanisms might have been co-opted to improve the effectiveness of information transmission: in
principle, some traits today involved in the complex mosaic of the language faculty might have
evolved as novel adaptations, not present in the ancestors (autapomorphies);  other traits instead
might have been already present as phylogenetic inheritance (synapomorphies), serving a different
function  not  specifically  related  to  linguistic  communication,  and  could  have  been  co-opted
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(exapted) for this novel functions (Fitch 2012; Suman and Pievani 2015).
We stressed here that the archeological and paleoanthropological data suggest that the interplay
between cultural transmission, generation of new selective gradients and evolution of transmission
mechanisms such as imitation, teaching and language has been in place for the long course of genus
Homo evolution. This is why we argue in favor of what we labeled an integrative perspective and
against a separationist perspective (Christiansen and Chater 2008; Arbib 2012; Pagel 2012) that
simply  juxtaposes  cultural  evolution  on  the  top  of  biological  evolution,  the  former  almost
substituting the latter. Acknowledging the role of cultural transmission in the process that led to the
evolution  of  higher-fidelity  transmission  mechanisms,  hence  language,  implies  a  significant
theoretical shift, towards an EES framework of research, that may lead to interesting conceptual
adjustments: widening the definition of evolutionary process; exposing the limits of the proximate-
ultimate distinction, showing the need of a rethinking of biological causality in the direction of a
reciprocal, as well as multilevel, view of causation; considering cultural transmission as a casual
factor  shaping  the  language-ready brain;  a  reconsideration  of  the  debate  on  whether  language
evolved gradually or punctuationally, in light of considering language a multicomponent trait.
Today a proper model  of feedback or reciprocal  causation has only been suggested,  but is  not
available yet to our knowledge; understanding why our species was able to separate its cognitive
prowess from other species requires deepening our knowledge on the evolutionary feedback loop
dynamics between biology and culture and developing a proper reciprocal or feedback model of
causation may represent a crucial theoretical step in this direction.
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1. Teaching and language
Another point we would like to touch briefly here in the conclusions is the relationship between the
evolution of teaching and the evolution of language discussed in Laland (2016, in press). Teaching
can be defined as the behavior that enhances the fidelity of the information transmission between
tutor and pupil, hence, an active facilitation of learning in others. Understanding teaching is then
fundamental for our purpose, as language is seen as a particular form of teaching, that is verbal
teaching. Under this perspective language is part of a more broad view that is the evolution of
teaching. And teaching evolution itself in turn is part of a broader frame which is the evolution of
cooperation. That's why this should be intended as one long argument for the evolution of language,
as we discussed in the Introduction of this work.
In Morgan et al., (2015) language was treated experimentally exactly as a form of (verbal) teaching.
Teaching has an unusual phylogenetic distribution (Fogarty et al., 2011): it is found in cheetahs,
domestic cats, meerkats (feeding behaviors, like eating scoprions), ants (tandem running), a bird
named pied babbler,  tamarin monkeys and bees. Mechanistically speaking, these cases are very
different  from  one  another.  No  compelling  evidence  for  teaching  instead  has  been  found  in
dolphins, apes and elephants, which are usually accounted as brainy animals.
Teaching is  linked to  the evolution of  social  learning,  learned communication and cooperation.
Despite  the  fact  it  can  be  considered  a  form of  cooperation,  teaching  is  not  usually  formally
explained with theories of evolution of cooperation. Cooperation usually works with a donor giving
matter (food, for instance) to a receiver, but it also works with the exchange of useful or adaptive
information: in the case of teaching in fact we can talk of fitness-enhancing information provided
by the tutor to the pupil.
Mathematical  modeling for  the evolution of teaching were developed by Fogarty et  al.  (2011).
Teaching occurs at a cost, that is the cost that the tutor pays to school the pupil and providing him
with fitness-enhancing information. This is supposed to be the reason why teaching is more likely to
evolve through kin selection eventually resulting in a positive increase of inclusive fitness.
Animals like chimpanzees, very good in both asocial (trial and error) and social (copy) learning,
would not invest in teaching, which is costly, as long as they can solve all their tasks relying on less
costly strategies. It follows that the taught skill will not be easy to acquire, but rather it is expected
to be quite sophisticated, as the cost should be translated in a significant advantage (resulting in
fitness increase).
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Although language today is usually intended as an almost cost-free communication system (each
utterance involves a minimum cost in terms of energetic investment),  language evolution might
have involved several costs, both at the individual level and at the social level. At the individual
level, lowering the larynx represented a rather high cost as it raised the risk of choking (Fitch and
Reby, 2001); such a risky adaptation could only have been reached through a significant benefit,
which could be the one provided by language acquisition. At the social level, a reorganization of the
social group was a necessary condition to increase social tolerance among individuals and allow
more information exchange through cultural transmission: we explored the plausibility of the self-
domestication  hypothesis  in  the  first  chapter  and  we  analyzed  the  causal  role  of  cultural
transmission in the evolutionary process that led to the emergence of language in the third chapter.
In such a closer social condition, teaching might have spread more easily.
However, instead of building wrong expectations on teaching, believing to find it necessarily among
“smart” animals,  which can still  solve their tasks relying on trial  and error and social learning,
teaching should be expected in those contexts in which the exchange between pupil and tutor is
frequent, so mainly among kin. As the social structure has changed during human evolution, it is
plausible that in a first stage exchanges among kin might have represented the context in which
vocal experimentations were performed.
Of course, human teaching today is extended also among non-kin, and the same is true for language
intended as  exchange of  information among non-kin.  Moreover,  language is  today exploited to
teach and transmit all sort of things, not necessarily related to higher fitness. However, this should
not be seen as an obstacle to the kin selection hypothesis for the early stages of language evolution
(Fitch, 2004, 2007; Falk, 2009; Laland, 2016). The current use of a trait is not informative of its
evolutionary path (Gould and Lewontin, 1978), as language, once in place, has almost certainly
been exapted for the most variable tasks. More specifically, language, might have co-evolved with
the complexification of cumulative culture and the cognitive traits exploited to support it,  in an
evolutionary feedback process of reciprocal causation.
Dean et al. (2012) inquired which kind of cognitive traits might have been related to the evolution
of teaching, language and cumulative culture, in an experiment involving human kids, chimpanzees
and capuchin monkeys. The experiment consisted in the solution of a puzzlebox with three levels of
increasing complexity, and three corresponding levels of increasing reward. As expected, children
performed better, showing capacity for teaching each other with task-relevant communication and
gesture.  This  result  can  be  also  considered  an  indirect  support  for  the  cultural  intelligence
hypothesis, according to which humans possess “a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills,
emerging  early  in  ontogeny,  for  participating  and  exchanging  knowledge  in  cultural  groups”
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(Herman et al. 2007;  see also Van Shaik and Burkart, 2011, Van Shaik et al., 2012).
Moreover, relying on teaching, that is transmission at a cost of not-so-easy-to-acquire behaviors or
other cultural traits, might have been advantageous once cumulative culture grew in complexity and
diversity. In fact, Fogarty et al.  (2011) also tested this scenario with their mathematical models,
obtaining the expected results that teaching is more advantageous in the presence of cumulative
culture, namely teaching is more probable to spread, it is more profitable. This is a confirmation
that teaching is likely to be exploited when the transmitted trait is not easy to acquire through trial
and error or copying strategies.
Another relevant point for our discussion here is that species relying on teaching are also good
cooperative breeders. We discussed in chapter 1 some aspects through which cooperative breeding
might have emerged in genus  Homo evolution, focusing in particular on how prolonged juvenile
dependency might have contributed to the spread of teaching and vocal experimentation (Fitch,
2004, 2007), hence providing another fundamental brick for the ground on which language could
blossom. 
Summing up,  it  can  be  noticed  that  a  cluster  of  relevant  factors  must  be  clarified  in  order  to
understand the onset of language evolutionary trajectory.
Once again we want to stress how inadequate are mono-functional, atomistic, unidirectional and
externalist explanations, whose profile we have outlined, in the Introduction, referring to them as to
naïve evolutionism; we brought the example of the Social Brain hypothesis (Dunbar and Shultz,
2007) highlighting a general tendency associated to the SET viewpoint of considering one single
variant (for example group size) as causally relevant and predicting for a complex trait like brain
size. 
Instead, Laland and colleagues' work (Laland, 2016) revealed how multiple variants (quantitative
measures of rates of innovation, social learning, tool use, extractive foraging, tactical deception, diet
breadth,  fruit  in  the  diet  and group size;  see Reader  and Laland,  2011)  are  interrelated  in  the
prediction of a particular complex measure (such as intelligence) and how these components have
co-evolved, causally influencing each other reciprocally. In this sense, it is inappropriate to search
for a  prime mover  both for the evolution of human intelligence and for the evolution of human
language:  we  argued  in  the  Introduction  that  the  inclination  to  look  for  a  prime  mover  that
characterizes the SET theoretical framework is associated to a causal primacy attributed to genetic
inheritance. In fact, for the evolution of language many speculative hypotheses have been proposed:
cooperative  hunting,  costly  ornament  allowing  females  to  assess  male  quality,  substitute  for
grooming, pair bonding, mother-child communication, gossip, tool making, tool for thought (see
Szamado  and  Szathmary,  2006  for  a  review).  We  argued  that  they  represent  monofunctional
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explanations, or just so stories, identifying one single cognitive or behavioral trait responsible for
the evolution of the whole language faculty.
We believe that the work brought forward by Kevin Laland and colleagues in the last years and
quickly summarized at the end of the Introduction and here in its crucial points (see Laland, 2016
for  a  more  appropriate  synthesis)  represents  a  fruitful  conceptual  framework shift,  along some
pivotal theoretical assumptions that overcome the SET logic and that characterize the EES proposal.
In this sense, chapter two shows how the key epistemic elements of the EES can be exploited for a
more  accurate  account:  niche  construction,  inclusive  inheritance,  phenotypic  plasticity,
developmental  bias,  reciprcal  causation,  constructive development and an explanatory pluralism
against the prime mover logic.
We believe  that  this  explanatory  structure  makes  more  justice  to  Ernst  Mayr's  suggestion  that
biology is the science of multiple causes (Mayr, 2005). We tried to adopt this very viewpoint also in
the published papers constituting all the chapters of this work and in particular we dedicated chapter
two to show why the adoption of this theoretical framework might result crucial for the studies to
come.  In  the  evolutionary  explanation,  multiple  underlying  causes  are  responsible  for  the
emergence of a certain trait and this becomes apparent when language, defined as a mosaic of traits,
is taken into account; in chapter 3 we argued that a reciprocal causation model is required, even
though such a causal model still has to be developed in literature to our knowledge.
Recapping the argument presented in this work, we try to keep together some aspects of human
evolution in order to clarify the emergence of language.
Humans alone possess cumulative culture because humans alone possess sufficiently high fidelity
information  transmission  mechanisms,  including  an  unusually  accurate  capacity  for  imitation,
teaching and language.
Theoretical  findings  suggest  that  natural  selection  might  have favored more efficient  means  of
cultural  transmission  and  higher-fidelity  social  learning.  But  why humans  alone?  High-fidelity
transmission is required for cumulative culture, but then how our ancestors achieved it? Here in the
conclusions, we are suggesting, with Laland's argument, that teaching might have played a crucial
role. Stringent conditions (low costs, accurate and effective, strong relatedness) should be met for
teaching to  evolve,  as  it  is  rare  in  nature;  cumulative  culture  itself  relaxes  the  conditions  that
restrain teaching to evolve and a self-domestication condition, which we explored in chapter one,
might have favored the spread of such a trait once it was already present in smaller groups. In fact,
our ancestors 2mya were structured in small kin-structured groups and teaching is more efficient
and likely to evolve among kin. Also, cooperative breeding (allomothering and alloparenting), long
period of juvenile dependence (extended childhood), a change of diet (determined by the use of fire)
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are among the factors that we considered in chapter one that might have favored this change in the
ecological conditions. From this perspective niche construction and more precisely counteractive
niche construction or cultural  mitigation of selection are among the fundamental processes that
influenced human evolution.
The co-evolution of teaching and cumulative culture in a self-domesticated condition increased
transmission effectiveness and lowered the costs of the transmission of complex behavior whose
adaptiveness was positively selected: language could have followed this evolutionary logic.
Let's state this argument once again: language is a form of high-fidelity transmission; high-fidelity
transmission is required for cumulative culture; cumulative culture generates the (cultural) selective
environment  to  make  teaching  highly  adaptive;  language  is  a  high-fidelity  form  of  teaching.
Language  could  have  co-evolved  with  cumulative  culture  as  a  high-fidelity  form of  teaching,
allowing the transmission of complex behaviors and cultural traits.
Is there some form of circularity in this explanation? No, because this represents a co-evolutionary
logic and a form of feedback causality. But in order to appreciate this logic, we argued, in chapter
three, that a theoretical shift  in our understanding of evolutionary causality is required,  moving
away from a conception of unidirectional causation typical of the SET view and moving towards a
conception of feedback causality (see fig. 6) typical of the EES framework.
“It sounds paradoxical that teaching should both explain the advent of human cultural complexity
and be the product of it, but that is exactly what we should expect if a feedback mechanism, like
Wilson's cultural drive, is operating. In fact, evolutionary feedback mechanisms help to explain a lot
more about  the human condition than I  have touched on so far,  including that  quintessentially
human attribute, our language” (Laland, 2016, p. 161)
Figure 6.
Cultural  transmission  itself






in  a  population  relying  on
such  mechanisms.  A
feedforward  process  is  in
play  and  causality  is
reciprocal., 
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2. The Cultural Assimilation model: a tentative sketch
Referring to cultural evolutionary dynamics, Lewis and Laland (2012) identify three main cultural
processes through which information is retained or lost: novel invention (generation of new traits),
modification  (refinement  of  existing  traits)  and combination  (bringing  together  two established
traits to generate a new trait). The study develops a simple cultural transmission model and, beyond
finding that transmission fidelity is the key ingredient for cumulative culture, it finds that progress
in  cumulative  culture  is  dependent  more  on  trait  combination  than  on  trait  invention  or
modification.  However,  “novel  invention,  modification  and  combination  are  all  forms  of
innovation” (Lewis and Laland, 2012, pp. 2172-2173).
Creative individuals are usually considered the source of innovations in cultural evolution studies.
However, Dor and Jablonka (2014) suggest that language, intended as a cultural collective entity
that exists above and outside the individual (meaning that individuals come in a world in which
language  is  already  outhere  spoken  by the  community  in  which  they  are  born),  is  subject  to
phenomena of  collective innovation  (see also Dor, 2015;  Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016). As a
cultural collective entity, a language is built by a plurality of individuals across generations and it
represents a much larger phenomenon than whatever could be detected at the level of the individual
or looking only inside the brain. Communication, by definition, exceeds the single individuality and
involves  at  least  a  sender  and a  receiver,  up to  a  community of  speakers.  In  language change
dynamics,  it  is  apparent  that  linguistic  innovations  “emerge  and  make  their  way  towards
stabilization and acceptance through implicit social negotiation” (Dor and Jablonka, 2014, p. 24).
James Hurford (2014) makes an illuminating simple example regarding these dynamics: we cannot
say who invented the way of saying “I was like [pause] Wow!”, it could be one individual or several
individuals, a sort of monogenesis or polygenesis; but this “innovation” spreads and is accepted by
the  members  of  the  community  of  speakers  as  a  social  innovation,  collectively  invented  and
immediately put at use. Does this modality of innovation exist in other animals or is this social
innovation a uniquely human dynamic?
We saw that cumulative culture can be considered one of the hallmark of humans compared to other
non-human  primates,  but  Dor  and  Jablonka  (2014)  make  a  step  further  proposing  that  “the
suggestion that the major capacity that separates us from the apes is the social capacity of collective
invention” (Dor and Jablonka,  2014, p. 17).  Primate species are capable of exhibiting complex
cultural traits (Whiten et al., 1999), but as for cultural dynamics of innovation primates would be
incapable of generating innovation as a community.
Although creativity and innovation are usually associated to the lone genius, humans, thanks to the
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evolution of their high level of cooperativeness (for which the self-domestication hypothesis is a
tentative even though plausible explanation that we explored in the first chapter), are capable of
something that Dor and Jablonka define  group genius, that is a joint action in which individuals
cooperate  in  intensive,  motivated  and  trustful  communication,  giving  rise  to  new  linguistic,
behavioral, communicative or generally cultural inventions. Social play in human children could be
taken  as  a  good  case-study  to  model  such  dynamics  and  comparative  behavioral  experiments
performed among children and chimpanzees seem to confirm the hypothesis that human cognition
has an evolved inclination towards social inputs and cooperation (Hare  et al., 2007; Dean  et al.,
2012).
But does collective innovation play a role only in language change (that is how natural languages
evolve in the glossogenetic timescale) or rather it might have played a role also in language origin
and evolution? Dor and Jablonka answer in a co-evolutionary sense arguing that language facilitates
social interactions and they suggest that language may have co-evolved with human capacity for
collective collaborative creativity.
It has to be said, however, that collective innovation is not defined in details in Dor and Jablonka's
work and it  remains a little  too vague concept,  although with extraordinary heuristic  potential.
Future work should refine better the definition of collective or social innovation in comparison to
animal cultural capacity to innovate. In fact, two pivotal elements are key in cumulative culture: 1)
transmission fidliety (Lewis and Laland, 2012) and 2) innovation capacities; non-human primates
are capable of innovation capacities although limited (Charbonneau, 2015), collective innovation
might be a specific feature that distinguish humans from other non-human primates.
Along this lines of research, recent studies proposed that the unparallelled capacities for innovation
in our species are to be intended as emergent properties (Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016; Griffin,
2016) of our cultural learning abilities, applied within our culturally complex societies and social
networks, stressing that rates of innovation are heavily influenced by sociality, transmission fidelity
and cultural variance, with these factors at the same time shaping each other  (Muthukrishna and
Henrich, 2016). Regarding languages, they also argue that  transmission efficiency  is affected by
sociality and languages with more speakers are more efficient (Lupyan and Dale, 2010; Bromham
et al., 2015).  Muthukrishna and Henrich (2016) in particular argue that our societies and social
networks act as collective brains, with individual members acting like neurons in a neural network,
each  one  of  them possessing  an  individual  brain  evolved  for,  and  entirely  dependent  on,  the
acquisition  of  culture  and language:  therefore,  our  cultural  brains  (see  the  cultural  intelligence
hypothesis by Herrmann et al., 2007) evolved in tandem with our collective brains.
The collective brain metaphor might present some serious theoretical difficulties; for example a cell
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like a neuron, possesses all the genetic information of the organism in which it is located, while an
individual in a society does not retain all the cultural information within that very society. However,
this metaphor allows to frame collective innovation as an emergent property, leading to some useful
empirical  consequences.  Griffin  (2016)  reviews  the  last  decades  studies  on  animal  innovation
(Reader and Laland, 2003) and proposes a fundamental paradigm shift: innovation has long been
treated as single behavioral trait,  a  single product  of cognition and a  direct target  of selection.
Griffin argues that recent evidence suggests that innovativeness should be intended as an emergent
property of a larger array of underlying traits evolved to cope with environmental variation. This
also suggests that innovation could not be a direct target of selection, but rather a by-product of
selection  occurring  on  underlying  traits.  This  might  be  in  principle  consistent  with  the  study
conducted  by  Laland  and  colleagues  (Reader  and  Laland,  2002;  Reader  et  al.,  2011)  on  the
evolution  of  primate  general  intelligence.  If  we consider  the  capacity  of  innovation  and more
specifically the capacity for collective innovation a fundamental component for the evolution of
cumulative culture, once again a co-evolutionary model seems to result the most accurate one to
account  for  the  complex  interrelations  between  various  traits  and  components  influencing  and
shaping each other reciprocally.
Going back to  Dor and Jablonka (2014) viewpoint,  we also believe that  their  proposal  on the
evolution of language shows a theoretical continuity with the cultural drive hypothesis, extending
some of its arguments to the evolution of language.
Allan Wilson's cultural drive hypothesis original idea (that we presented in the introduction of this
work) was based on the hypothesis that an advantageous habit (innovation) emerges, it  spreads
through social learning, selection fixes it,  and the selection regime is influenced by innovations
themselves.  Innovation,  as  we  already  said,  is  usually  associated  to  individuals,  but  Dor  and
Jablonka argue that humans are characterized by social, collective capacity for innovation, hence
coming from the cultural level. Moreover, Dor and Jablonka proposal follows a cultural-phenotype-
first logic and a gene-as-folowers logic: a novel trait emerges as a plastic behavioral adjustment to
environmental conditions and, given a certain stability in selective pressures, the trait gets fixed in
the population.  The first  way a trait  can get fixed in the population is  the  genetic  assimilation
model, proposed in the assimilate-stretch principle by Dor and Jablonka (2000) for the evolution of
language (that we explored in the Introduction of this work): a novel trait, emerged through cultural
innovation, given the consistency of selective pressures, can be genetically fixed in the population
once it emerges as genetically expressed (see also the Baldwin effect); this model was originally
proposed for language evolution but, in principle, might be extended for the evolution of cumulative
culture. However we would like to add that there is another way, in our opinion, through which the
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trait can get fixed in the population.
We would like to characterize the second way through which a cultural innovation can get fixed
within the population without involving genetic fixation but only involving the cultural level, hence
labeling it the cultural assimilation model: when a novel trait emerges, both through individual or
collective innovation, instead of being fixed at the genetic level, we argue it can get fixed at the
cultural level. This is possible if we take seriously the theoretical consequences of embracing an
inclusive inheritance framework: culture, intended as a system of inheritance, is a repository of
information, capable of storage, replication and modification processes. Intended as a system of
information transmission, the cultural level contributes to phenotypic expression in the organism. In
fact, according to the inclusive inheritance perspective, multiple inheritance systems contribute to
phenotypic  variation  across  generations  and  according  to  a  constructive  view of  development,
genetic  expression is  an open-ended process  and the  organismal  phenotype is  the  result  of  the
interaction  of  genetically  modulated  information  and  environmentally  (hence  also  cultural)
modulated information.
Culture  can  work  as  a  collective  repository  of  information  that  is  shared  by a  multiplicity  of
individuals:  this  corresponds  to  the  concept  of  cultural  archive  in  Pavlicev  et  al.,  2016.  This
information can be adaptive and maintaining this information across generation can result crucial
for the survival of a population. A novel behavior can emerge, it can result adaptive and it can
spread among individuals through cultural transmission, and an efficient communication system
might help spreading this adaptive behavior or cultural trait. The recipe to perform effectively this
adaptive  behavior  can  get  fixed  in  the  communication  system and  as  such it  can  spread  with
teaching to other individuals. So without involving a costly genetic fixation, but only adjusting the
available endowment and exploiting the degrees of plasticity of the organism, a certain behavior can
get fixed culturally in the communication system in the form of adaptive information that allows to
perform effectively an efficient behavior. Language would be the communication system that allows
such a cultural assimilation better than any other culturally emerged system, due both to its high-
fidelity transmission features and to its degrees of freedom in integrating in principle an infinite
number of novelties starting from a finite set of elements and combinatory rules (discrete infinity:
making infinite use of finite means).
In  such  a  model,  plastic  adjustment  capacities  of  the  individuals  (and  the  population)  are  a
fundamental ingredient, and plasticity is expected to be favored by selection in such conditions. As
a matter of fact, in the course of human evolution, populations had to cope with different changing
environment and construct their niche in order to recreate adaptive conditions and plasticity might
have  been  significantly  favored;  moreover,  as  behaviors  grew  complex  and  complex,  a
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communication system capable of storing and reproducing adaptive information might have been
positively selected. We explored the hypothesis according to which a selective gradient from lower
to higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms co-evolved with the evolution of cumulative culture in
human evolution in chapter two and three, and Morgan et al., 2015 experiment is a first tentative
attempt to provide experimental support to this hypothesis.
Moreover,  such  a  cultural  assimilation  model,  here  just  sketched,  makes  some  predictions:  it
predicts that a certain amount of adaptive information in humans is stored not at the genetic level,
but rather at the cultural level. Access to this information occurs through various forms of mimesis
(observation,  emulation,  imitation),  teaching  (simple,  gestural,  verbal)  and other  forms  cultural
transmission; this is a much more rapid and effective way to get access to adaptive information than
the expression of developmental programs extracting information for adaptive traits from genes. As
a matter of fact, human diversity today is scant at the genetic level and extremely rich at the cultural
level.
This proposal of a  cultural assimilation  model is derived from taking inclusive inheritance to its
natural consequences: genetic inheritance is not the exclusive way through which information can
be transmitted from one generation to another; cultural transmission can be another much more
rapid source of adaptation for organisms relying on culture as a plastic evolutionary strategy.
Summarizing,  we are essentially proposing a partial integration (or expansion) to the asimilate-
stretch  principle  model  (Dor  and  Jablonka,  2000)  which  initially  stressed  genetic  assimilation.
Today we know that language is best described as a mosaic of traits (Hurford, 2003; Fitch, 2012)
that have been exapted from already existing traits  such as pre-synactic,  pre-semantic  and pre-
symbolic features that were probably present long before the appearance of Homo sapiens in other
hominins. Some of these traits are older and some more recent, made of both “innate” or more
genetically modulated components and “acquired” or culturally learned elements. The assimilate-
stretch principle  (see fig.  5 in  the Introduction)  provides  an abstract  model  of the evolutionary
process that might stand at the basis of the interaction between typical biological (genetic) evolution
and  cultural  evolutionary  dynamics  influencing  the  former.  Despite  the  fact  this  model  was
originally  proposed for  language  evolution,  it  can  be  easily  extended  to  any cultural  capacity,
broadly intended; in  other words,  it  can be a valid model also for the evolution of cumulative
culture. As a matter of fact it is much more likely that genetic assimilation occurred for older and
fundamental  traits,  such  as  mnemonic  capacities  or  information  processing  capacities  (already
exploited  in  other  tasks),  rather  than  for  more  recent  specifically  linguistic  features  such  as
syntactical  rules.  Moreover  today  hypotheses  for  cultural  acquisition  of  syntactical  rules,  not
involving specific genetic or cognitive requirements, are in principle available, such as the Iterated
144
Learning Model (see Kirby and Hurford, 2002).
Intending culture as a collective repository of information (cultural archive, Pavlicev et al., 2016)
we propose that  cultural  assimilation might  occur  in  parallel  to  genetic  assimilation:  the result
would be a complex system in which certain parts are more genetically modulated than others that
will remain “culturally modulated”, that is learned through cultural/behavioral transmission. The
complex system will rely both on genetic and cultural systems of inheritance, in agreement with an
inclusive inheritance perspective.
This proposal is only at a tentative stadium here, as it should be better defined under which specific
conditions  it  is  advantageous  to  genetically  assimilate  a  trait  and under  which  conditions  it  is
advantageous to culturally assimilate a trait. However, we believe this abstract model might have
some merit in describing the co-evolutionary process (integrating biological and cultural evolution)
at the bases of the origin and the evolution of language and more boradly it can be extended in
principle to the evolution of cumulative culture. Future work on these issues is however required.
3. Language as a bio-cultural major transition
In light of what we discussed so far, we believe that characterized as an information storage and
replication system, it is legitimate to intend language as a major transition in evolution (Maynard
Smith, Szathmary, 1995; Jablonka, Lamb, 2006).
In fact, a major transition in evolution is defined as a change in the way information is stored,
transmitted or interpreted in evolution. So for example, despite being a fundamental turning point in
evolutionary history, the transition from water to land is not intended as a major transition sticking
with the definition just provided, because it doesn't involve a modification in the way information is
transmitted. Here we won't explore all the issues related to the concept of information in biology
(see  Stotz  and  Griffiths,  2011).  Maynard  Smith  and  Szathmary identify 8  major  transitions  in
evolution:
(1) from replicating molecules to populations of molecules in compartments (protocells); (2) from
independent genes to chromosomes; (3) from RNA as both an information carrier and enzyme to
DNA as the carrier of information and proteins as the enzymes; (4) from prokaryotes to eukaryotes;
(5)  from asexual  clones  to  sexual  populations;  (6)  from single-cell  eukaryotes  to  multicellular
organisms with differentiated cells; (7) from solitary individuals to colonies with non-reproductive
castes; (8) from primate societies to human societies with language.
Maynard Smith and Szathmary's work set the agenda for the biological studies of the 21 st century;
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however, we argue that, as it is strongly focused on the primacy of genetic information, it represents
probably a typical SET approach. As we saw, the EES framework expands the concept of hereditary
transmission of information beyond genetic inheritance, to epigenetic, environmental and cultural
inheritance (Danchin et al., 2011). We believe that Jablonka and Lamb proposal and Pavlicev et al.
account  go  exactly  in  this  direction  especially  regarding  cultural  inheritance,  whose  causal
relevance in human evolution was treated in chapter three.
One of the fundamental logic through which these transitions occur consists of the formation of
higher-level entities, with selection shifting from lower-level units to higher-level units, allowing
them to benefit more by cooperating than by competing; in these processes a multilevel selection
analysis shows how selection, at a certain point and under certain conditions, favors higher-level
units (see Okasha, 2006 for an analysis of multilevel selection in the major transitions).
However not all the major transitions occur through the exclusive process of the emergence of a
higher-level entity.  For example,  the transition from RNA to DNA follows a  division of labour
logic. The same is true for the 8th transition, that is the emergence of human cultural and linguistic
societies: reliance on cultural transmission beyond genetic transmission plays a crucial role in this
last major transition, the differentiation is more horizontal (division of labour) than vertical (higher-
level entity emergence). As a matter of fact, when we refer to culture, we cannot talk of a higher
level entity in the same way as we intend the transition from unicellular to multicelluar organisms;
it would be a strong claim assessing that culture is itself an individual, or better a collective entity
capable of self-reproduction. However, something analogous has been proposed by researchers like
Terrence Deacon (1997) referring to  language as a self-reproductive system adapting to human
mind.
Pavlicev  et  al.  (2016)  also  discuss  culture  within  the  major  transition  framework  and  they
“hypothesize that any major transition in the evolution of life is accomplished through the origin of
novel kinds of individuals”. One of the new kind of individuals discussed by Pavlicev et al., (2016)
is  what  they  call  systems  of  human  cultural  coalescence  or  epicycles  in  human  biocultural
evolutionary dynamics.
“Cultural epicycles help to explain the pace of cultural innovation across late hominin evolution, its
sporadic burgeoning for several hundred thousand years, and its explosive acceleration, especially
among sapient humans, across the last hundred millennia or so” (p. 212). We explored the issue of
evolutionary  pace  in  biolcultural  dynamics  of  eco-evolutionary  feedback  in  chapter  three,
discussing also the debate on evolutionary patterns like gradualism and punctuationism (Suman,
submitted).
We cannot explore here the theoretical, philosophical and conceptual consequences of claiming that
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culture is an individual at this point here (is it  capable of self-reproduction? Is it a level in the
biological hierarchy?) despite this crucial topic would deserves more inquiry in the future (for a
tentative definition of culture and its differentiation from cumulative culture, see Dean et al. 2013
and Noël Haidle et al. 2015)
In Pavlicev  et al. view, culture (broadly defined as learned information), traditions (group level
fixed behaviors) and single cultural traits (such as the production of a hand axe), represent packages
or  archives of  information  transmitted  across  generations  with  more  or  less  fidelity  through
cooperative  activity  in  social  groups,  and cultural  transmission  is  seen  as  a  novel  modality  of
information transmission, hence a major transition, according to the definition provided before.
Pavlicev et al. see the strong reliance on cultural transmission as the first part of the last major bio-
cultural  transition:  “cultural  archives  in  hominin  history  gathered  together  arrays  of  gestures
involving  information  and  interaction  with  material  affordances  of  the  environment”  (p.  212);
producing hand axes starting from a lithic core and transmitting this knowledge to conspecifics
represents an example of such a logic.
“Such cultural archives had considerable power to alter the interactions of hominin groups with
their environments and ultimately, through the feedback operations of niche construction, to shift
the selective pressures at work on the species involved”. (Pavlicev et al., 2016, p. 212)
The  feedback  relationship  between  elements  in  play  and  a  reciprocal  causation,  as  well  as
cooperativeness, are fundamental elements, present at different levels, of Pavlicev et al. account.
“As hominins’ cognitive capacity for  shared attention grew—a growth attested in archaeologists’
reconstruction of social circumstances already half a million years ago — the coordinated turn-
taking of modern human discourse could begin to form. The kinds of gestures and calls that must
have long characterized protodiscourse, partly innate and involving pointing signification, came to
be more firmly tied to this coordination, and this solidified linkage altered vocalized interactions on
the  landscape  in  new,  advantageous  ways.  The  value  of  intensified  vocal  interaction  and
collaboration drove selection for greater control and variety in vocalization. (…) New capacities for
production of the new repertories of calls but new capacities for their perception and interpretation
as well. (…) The selection, in other words, was not only for communicative gesture but also for the
capacity to attend to it—the very shared attention that set off the communicative changes in the first
place. A feedback cycle was closed.” (Pavlicev et al., 2016, p. 213-214)
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Pavlicev et al., describe this systematization of the communication system as the second part of the
last  major  bio-cultural  transition,  namely  the  transition  from  protolanguage  forms  to  modern
languages  framed  as  a  transition  from analogical  forms  of  communication  (protodiscourse  and
protolanguage) to a discrete or digitalized form (today apparent both in language and in music),
with a role played by new capacities for hierarchized cognition attested in the archeological record
(see also Di Vincenzo and Manzi, 2013).
We would like to reinterpret Pavilcev et al. suggestion of splitting the last major transition in two
parts, identifying more precisely (1) the first as the evolution of capacities for cumulative culture
and (2) the second as the evolution of language, that is a more systematized communication system
(probably relying on discrete infinity).
According to the argument developed during this work, we believe that these two steps are parts of
the  same  major  transition  because  the  underlying  evolutionary  process  might  be  shared.  In
particular we identify this process with the expanded version (genetic assimilation plus  cultural
assimilation)  of  the assimilate-stretch principle  that  we proposed here,  an abstract  evolutionary
model that can stand at the bases both of the evolution of cumulative culture and the evolution of
language features. In fact, as reported in fig. 5 in the Introduction, the Behavior X that complexifies
in Behavior X+1 might be in principle every kind of behavior, not necessarily or strictly a linguistic
feature. The assimilate-stretch principle in fact has been applied to explain cognitive evolution and
more specifically categorization in non linguistic behaviors such as predator avoidance in Avital and
Jablonka (2000). It might in principle work also for other culturally transmitted traits following a
cultural-phenotype-first  and  a  gene-as-followers  logic.  That's  why  we  see  a  certain  continuity
between the cultural drive hypothesis and the expanded account presented here of the assimilate-
stretch principle. The complexification of behaviors that might emerge according to the assimilate-
stretch logic could provide a plausible process at the bases of cumulative culture; moreover, the
assimilate-stretch  principle  was  originally  presented  to  explain  the  evolution  of  language,  with
which it remains consistent. We believe that the expanded account of the assimilate-stretch principle
presented here might in principle be an evolutionary process that integrates biological and cultural
change at the bases both of the capacities for cumulative culture (such as enhanced information
processing capacities, or improved working memory) and capacities specific for language, intended
as a high-fidelity transmission mechanism. In fact, it seems plausible that general features such as
enhanced brain capacities for information processing (already exploited for cumulative culture) are
older and more genetically modulated than specific linguistic capacities, which are arguably more
recent  and  probably  more  culturally  modulated:  for  example,  the  Iterated  Learning  Model
developed  by Simon  Kirby and  colleagues  today provides  a  cultural  explanation  for  syntactic
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features in language, without assuming a strong genetic base.
In conclusion,  we think that we explored a tentative explanation for what kind of evolutionary
process was involved in the co-evolution of cumulative culture and language, that we characterized
here in the end of our route as two steps of the last major transition occurred in human evolution.
We believe that for the tentative explanation provided, it is indispensable to rely on some of the
main epistemic elements of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. 
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Moreover, to understand the feedback dynamic in play, it is also indispensable to adopt a multilevel
perspective to appreciate how entities at different levels of the biological hierarchy influence each
other (see figure 7). This is why in chapter three we argued that a reciprocal causation model (see
fig. 8 for a recapitulation of the feedback relationships) should be the standard model of causation
in  evolutionary biology,  but  also  that  it  should  be  implemented  with  a  multilevel  perspective,
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Moreover  we argued that  an explanatory pluralism should be adopted when the evolution of  a
complex mosaic of traits such as language is considered. This means that it is likely that different
evolutionary processes, at different evolutionary stages, are responsible for the evolution of such a
complex trait. In fact, in the first chapter we argued that the initial stages of language evolution
might be intended as the evolution of a form of verbal teaching between mothers and offspring
(Mother Tongue hypothesis, Fitch, 2004; 2007; Laland, 2016) and hence a kin selection dynamic
might have played a significant role. At later stages of language evolution, when the trait started to
spread across the population, also among non-kin, a frequency dependent selection model might
explain  the  accelerated  rates  of  co-evolution  between  culture  and  higher-fidelity  transmission
mechanisms: we discussed this in chapter three (Suman, submitted) taking as a case study Morgan
et  al.  (2015)  experiment.  We  proposed  here  in  the  conclusions  an  expanded  version  of  the
assimilate-stretch principle  as  a  good model  capable of integrating both biological  and cultural
evolutionary processes, even though this proposal is still at a tentative stage here and further inquiry
is required to assess under which conditions it is advantageous for genetic assimilation to occur and
under which conditions it is advantageous for cultural assimilation to occur.
We believe that in principle the EES-inclined explanation we tried to provide in this work is able to
integrate biological and cultural evolutionary processes and hence to overcome what we identified
as some of the main difficulties of the SET approach. We believe that this represents a substantial
virtue  for  the  EES  and  future  studies  in  this  field  cannot  ignore  key  concepts  like  niche
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construction, inclusive inheritance, reciprocal causation in language evolution studies.
However, the analysis proposed here only argues that a theoretical framework (EES) shows to be
more  appropriate  than  another  (SET)  in  framing  a  certain  topic  of  research;  future  work  will
establish  whether  specific  predictions  can  be  advanced  adopting  this  updated  conceptual
framework. In order to maintain that a research programme is actually an expansion of the rival one
it  should be shown that it  is  able  to explain new facts with new predictions that don't  rely on
assumptions belonging to the rival research programme. Gene-culture co-evolutionary studies have
already proved their fruitfulness not only in the domain of human behavior and human evolution
but  also in  other  non-human social  species  (see Foote  et  al.,  2016).  A gene's  eye view clearly
revealed to be insufficient to shed light on human evolution, whose complex interactions go beyond
the scope of a reductionistic approach; gene-culture co-evolutionary models are among the most
promising approaches to tackle human evolution and we argue that the EES conceptual framework
provides  concepts  and  explanatory  tools  to  properly  do  so.  If  in  the  next  future  new specific
predictions generated within the EES conceptual framework will be empirically corroborated also in
the domain of language evolution, we could testify the actual expansion in this case-study. For now
the debate is still open and alive.
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